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Abstract 
This thesis conducts a critical analysis of jihadist discourse. This is achieved by qualitatively 
analysing the content of Sawt al-jihad, a propagandistic e-magazine published by Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) between 2003 and 2005. The aim of the research is to establish 
how the jihadist worldview is discursively constructed and legitimised. The investigation is in 
accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and 
draws on an interdisciplinary model to examine the discursive features of jihadist discourse. 
This model includes Bourdieu’s ‘capital theory’ and ‘symbolic power’, Islamic religious 
epistemology, the literature on intertextuality and theories connected to Aristotelian topoi. The 
thesis undertakes a three-pronged analysis. The first is a representational analysis concerned 
with the discourse topics preferred within AQAP discourse and how the relevant social 
actors/actions are constructed, focusing on representation of the Self and the Other. The second 
analysis explores the intertextual connections via which AQAP discourse appeals to, and 
overlaps with, prior (sacred) texts and hearers’ repertoires of ‘old knowledge’. In this 
discussion, I attempt to develop a novel and systematic analytic approach to intertextuality for 
analysing (politico)-religious discourses and to use this approach to analyse the structurings and 
restructurings of AQAP discourse, which might then be applied to other texts in the same genre. 
Finally, the third analysis is specifically concerned with the persuasive dimension and attempts 
to critically identify the topoi AQAP utilises to legitimise the Self and delegitimise the Other. 
The ultimate aim of this project is thus not only to contribute to the body of knowledge about 
radical jihadism from a CDA perspective, but also to make a substantial contribution to the 
study of the discursive construction and reproduction of such ideologies from a wider 
perspective, too.  
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
In this study, I carry out a critical analysis of the discourse and ideology of a radical jihadist 
group: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (henceforth, AQAP). This analysis is based on the 
premise that macro-ideologies are localised in micro-discursive practices. It is achieved by 
conducting a textual analysis of a propagandistic e-magazine published by Al Qaeda’s wing – 
AQAP – that operated in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2005: Sawt al-jihad. The contents 
and forms of the propagandistic magazine Sawt al-jihad are a rich repository where everyday 
jihadist performances and rhetorical patterns can be traced and identified. The purpose of this 
analysis is to establish a greater understanding of the deep ideological structures of AQAP, in 
particular, the construction and (de)legitimisation of the Self and the Other. Ultimately, my 
interest centres on how Al Qaeda groups – and the broader jihadist movement – succeed (or 
fail) in presenting a coherent and cohesive politico-religious worldview. The fundamental aim 
of my research is to contribute to the body of knowledge about radical jihadism as an ongoing 
global problem. Moreover, it will contribute to the growing body of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) tied to the investigation of the discourse of jihadist movements.  
Despite recent developments, including the transformation of Al Qaeda into a global jihadist 
movement and the appearance of the so-called “Islamic State”, the phenomenon remains that 
of the mujahedeen, which dates to the 1960s, encompassing the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War, 
which marked a key breakthrough for jihadism. Given the ongoing turmoil in Middle-Eastern 
geo-politics that has created political lacunae and an obvious space for the onset and progression 
of jihadist groups, critical analysis of the discursive practices of radical groups is a very topical 
research area that can best be approached via a multidisciplinary research agenda within the 
critical social sciences. For reasons of familiarity with the context, my research project focuses 
on AQAP between 2003 and 3005, which saw the decentralised expansion of Al Qaeda and the 
formation of different jihadist groups that pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda’s leadership and 
followed its strategies. However, AQAP’s discursive practices are by no means fundamentally 
different in form or content to other jihadist groups. 
This study draws on several theoretical traditions to tackle jihadist discourse. Although, in 
principle, it subscribes theoretically and methodologically to the tradition of CDA in 
accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), I also 
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draw on Bourdieu’s social constructivist theories of ‘capital’ and ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 
1986; 1991); Islamic religious epistemology (al-Jabiri 2008; 2011); the literature on 
intertextuality within and beyond CDA (Fairclough 1992; Genette 1997) and theories connected 
to Aristotelian topoi (Slomkowski 1997; Aristotle 2006). Such an approach, drawing as it does 
on several frameworks, is dictated by the research questions and data analysis requirements.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter reviews approaches to the study of jihadism, sets the 
research questions and sheds some light on the rationale of the current study and my position 
as an analyst. Finally, I conclude by outlining the thesis structure. 
1.2. Approaches to terrorism and jihadism 
Terrorist rebellions attract a great deal of scholarly attention. Across various disciplines, vast 
tomes and journal articles have been written, constituting a huge body of research in what can 
be called terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. There are several textbooks studying 
terrorism: on the history and the varying and often conflicting definitions of the phenomenon 
(e.g. Martin 2006; Harmon 2013), and terrorist groups around the world and how to counter 
them (e.g. Forest’s (2007) three-volume seminal work, which contains chapters by experts 
discussing terrorist groups’ strategies, sources and facilitators). Furthermore, much work has 
been done in the social sciences, especially that investigating terrorists’ social and 
psychological root causes (e.g. Bjørgo 2005; Horgan 2005) as well as these groups’ cooperative 
coalitions and organisational structuring and functioning (e.g. Karmon 2005). Some media 
studies have been concerned with the distinct advantages that are offered online, where terror 
groups can reach out to wider audiences and radicalise individuals, thus publicising their causes 
well beyond local domains (e.g. Weimann 2006; Ganor et al. 2007). 
Al Qaeda and its clusters have received considerable scholarly attention. There are many cross-
sectional studies exploring Al Qaeda’s structure, history, strategic thinking and media policies, 
particularly after 9/11. This event prompted several studies on the revival of jihad by militant 
Islamist groups (e.g. Bonney 2004; Kepel 2006; Bonner 2008; Cook 2015). There have been 
numerous studies exploring Al Qaeda’s history and structure (e.g. Burke 2004; Gerges 2009; 
2017; Byman 2015). Gurr and Cole (2002) have examined the threat of terrorist organisations 
potential acquiring WMD. Other studies have looked at regional offshoots of Al Qaeda in 
different parts of the world, e.g. Al Qaeda in Europe (Vidino 2006) and Al Qaeda in Yemen 
(Harris 2010; Page et al. 2011). With the recent threat of various jihadist groups in Iraq and 
Syria and the establishment of the so-called “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS), many 
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studies have attempted to investigate ISIS and its likes. AQAP – in its Saudi phase prior to 
merging with the Yemeni counterpart – has received scholarly attention too (e.g. Obaid and 
Cordesman 2005). The most comprehensive account of AQAP’s mission in Saudi Arabia is 
Hegghammer’s (2010a) Jihad in Saudi Arabia. 
The research literature, however, contains relatively few in-depth discourse/ideology analyses 
of jihadist ideological texts. In his historical analysis, Hegghammer (2010a) considers some Al 
Qaeda statements but his methodological approach is based on the analysis of mujahedeen 
biographies, not jihadist texts. While texts in AQAP’s propagandist magazine Sawt al-jihad 
have been referred to in several studies (Harris 2010; Hegghammer 2010a; Page et al. 2011), 
no study has conducted a systematic analysis of the magazine’s content. It is the aim of my 
thesis to carry out a systematic analysis of AQAP’s ideological message. The representational, 
intertextual and argumentative analyses are intended to contribute to the growing literature on 
jihadism and to provide a data-driven discourse/ideology analysis. Following Alexander’s 
(2006) symbolic dimension, doing politics can be taken to include all efforts of political 
performance, not least, discursive practices in the media. Therefore, the current work aims to 
analyse politics at this micro-level. 
1.3. Research Questions 
I seek to conduct a historical and evaluative piece of research that addresses a complex 
sociopolitical issue. My aim is to go beyond linguistic analysis and attempt to make sense of 
the social, political, cultural and epistemological contextual elements involved. The key 
question underpinning the research is why extremist jihadist rhetoric has succeeded historically 
in gaining sympathy and promoting jihadist ideology to the point of recruiting significant 
numbers of sympathisers. Working within the guidelines of the discipline of CDA and drawing 
on allied frameworks, this research focuses on three specific research questions. These have 
been formulated to diagnose AQAP discourse and are answered in Chapters 5–7, respectively: 
1. What is AQAP’s worldview? That is, how are jihad, the Self and the Other represented 
in AQAP discourse? 
2. What are the intertextual charatceristics of AQAP discourse? And what meanings do 
these AQAP intertextual characteristics bring about? 
3. How does AQAP discursively (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in its discourse? 
What (de)legitimatory topoi are utlised in AQAP discourse? 
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These questions are not mutually exclusive; rather, combined, they seek to explicate and explain 
the nature of jihadist discourse. Moreover, they are intended to illustrate the systematic 
mechanisms of argumentation and (de)legitimisation by analysing textual patterns in the data 
against the background of other discourses by drawing on the general sociopolitical context in 
which they were written. 
1.4. Rationale of the study 
A potential question could be raised regarding the novelty of analysing jihadist discourse as to 
what explanations could actually be added to insights already known about this complex 
phenomenon. This question is cogent and I should provide a brief answer to it. First, and most 
importantly, the jihadist movement conveys diverse but coherent narratives in terms of both the 
forms of rhetoric and specific contents. These contents are intertextually complex and appeal 
to the common knowledge and identity narratives of an audience belonging to the same 
epistemic community. Therefore, the theoretical-methodological approach to this complex 
phenomenon should proceed along the sociopolitical and epistemological dimensions upon 
which the rationality of the argumentative structures of the discourse at hand is built. That is, 
for an appropriate look at the front stage performance – the text, one has to look into the 
collective background culture, symbols narrative and myths that resonate with the audience 
(Alexander 2006). The theoretical/methodological approach to jihadism I would like to adopt 
is a multidisciplinary one that is richly informed by the sociological and epistemological aspects 
of language and religion. I have reason to hope that such an integration will provide a fruitful 
point of departure for such an intricate enterprise. One way of embarking on this enterprise is 
by recourse to actual jihadist texts as repositories of their sociocultural practices. 
Another question concerns the obscurity of terrorist groups’ intentions, in other words, how can 
one differentiate between the secret and declared aims of a clandestine jihadist group such as 
AQAP? I have no recourse to the group’s secret aims, as top leaders only have them, and they 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. For me, what is at issue are their declared aims. I will 
investigate what aims emerge in AQAP’s discourse and how they are textually encoded and 
justified. However, my objective is not to make conclusive claims but rather to put forward – 
in Max Weber’s (1949: 184) terms – “causally adequate” explanations, as far as the analysis of 
discourse can allow. Although access to the social practices of the jihadists, which gives 
discourse analysis explanatory power, is more or less limited (particularly the actual processes 
of production and consumption of discourse), a CDA perspective has a lot to offer to the 
investigation of jihadist discourse/ideology. The framework has sufficiently robust tools to turn 
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jihadist texts into useful resources for historical discursive analysis. It can offer a consistent and 
data-driven approach, via which one can analyse the discursive construction of violence in the 
field of religio-politics. Thus, my perspective is geared towards the analysis of a productive 
discourse type containing a range of specific and significant semiotic features that have thus far 
not been sufficiently attended to in the social science literature. 
So, where do I stand and from what standpoint do I observe and analyse? However much a 
researcher prides themself on being an objective social scientist, or pretends to be merely an 
observer, everyone is after all positioned inside their social system with only a limited range of 
viewpoints during their lifetime. I have no access to how jihadists produce texts and how 
recipients interpret them. Instead, as Fairclough (2001: 183) suggests, I have to engage in the 
discourse process under investigation and draw upon my own memory and experience as an 
‘insider’ in order to explain how participants draw upon theirs. Being a researcher from the 
wider socioculture to which jihadist groups belong, I do therefore have preferential access as 
an analyst to interpret, rather than describe, the texts under investigation. 
However, at this early stage, it is worth underlining both what this thesis is and is not about. I 
am not concerned with assessing the truth of the statements underlying AQAP’s narrative. More 
importantly, I shall not get involved in questioning the accuracy of their interpretations of 
sacred texts, for I have neither the capacity nor the qualifications to do so. Instead, my focus is 
on the way AQAP discourse effectively brings into existence a ‘truth’, or a representation of it, 
with particular consequences in the real world. If a significant number of people accept the 
jihadists’ worldview and believe their interpretations to be true, real consequences result, 
whether or not these interpretations are theologically or juristically valid in the first place. 
1.5. Thesis design 
In accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),1 this 
introductory chapter provides a general background to the project and sets out the research 
questions. Chapter 2 outlines the historical background of radical jihadism in the Arab/Islamic 
world, focusing particularly on the period following the anti-Soviet Afghan War up until 2003-
2005, the time period in which AQAP operated. It also reviews existing scholarly work on 
jihadism and outlines a rationale for tackling this research topic from a critical perspective. 
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical frameworks for this study, while Chapter 4 sketches out the 
                                                 
1 A detailed account of the DHA and its analytic categories will be given in section 4.2.2. 
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methodologies of data selection and data sampling, the problematisation and operationalisation 
of the research questions, and the analytic tools to be employed. The three chapters that follow 
conduct a three-pronged analysis. First, Chapter 5 provides a representational analysis 
concerned with AQAP discourse topics and how relevant social actors/actions are discursively 
constructed, focusing on the presentation of the Self and the Other. Second, Chapter 6 explores 
the intertextual connections of AQAP discourse. Third, Chapter 7 is specifically concerned with 
the persuasive dimension and attempts to critically identify the argumentation schemes and 
themes of AQAP discourse. Finally, the thesis concludes with a chapter summarising the 
findings, formulating a prospective critique and referring to this study’s limitations and the 
potential for future research in this area. 
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Chapter 2 THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
2.1. Introduction 
For discourse to be analysed and meanings to be constructed, understood and explained, one 
has to consider many layers of contextual knowledge, including: from the macro sociopolitical 
context to the micro intertextual/interdiscursive one. The latter can only be done along with 
localised micro-analyses, but at this stage, it is wise to start off by shedding some light on the 
former: the wider historical and sociopolitical contexts. Therefore, this chapter provides a brief 
historical overview of the development of jihadism. A definition of ‘jihadism’ is given in 
section 2.2. Section 2.3, which follows, then briefly reviews the jihadist movement from the 
1960s to the emergence of global jihadism in the 1990s, via the Afghan anti-Soviet War of the 
1980s. Section 2.4 describes Al Qaeda before and after 9/11. The next section, 2.5, offers an 
account Al Qaeda’s wing in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In section 2.6, a categorisation of 
Al Qaeda members is provided, while section 2.7 briefly compares Al Qaeda’s military activism 
to guerrilla warfare in history. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter by outlining AQ(AP)’s use of 
the media and the rationale for selecting online magazines as an object of investigation.  
2.2. What is jihadism? 
The term ‘jihadism’ is derived from the Arabic word jihad, which literally means ‘striving’ or 
‘exerting oneself’ (Cook 2015). Classical and contemporary Muslim scholars provide 
definitions of jihad based on exerting the self for the sake of God and list different rankings of 
jihad, ranging from a spiritual rank anchored to the individual’s inner spiritual struggle to be 
virtuous to the religious duty of “justified war” or “fighting for the sake of God” (al-Luhaidan 
1978; al-Bouti 1993; al-Qaradawi 2010; Ahmed 2015). Cook (2015) rightfully argues that the 
definition of jihad has been – and is still – subject to debate between scholars providing 
apologetic definitions and others emphasising its destructive nature – particularly post-9/11 – 
as an inherent element of Islam. But the term comes from a religious context and is charged 
with a complex set of meanings throughout Islamic history. It should, therefore, be studied from 
a historiographic perspective. Cook (2015) conducted a compelling account of the historical 
usage of the term in Islamic history. He concludes that jihad – in its military form – is 
intertwined between historical events and religious beliefs and closely linked to the expansion 
of early Islam. He argues that military jihad is dominant while the spiritual is negligible. Ahmed 
(2015) undertook a similar and more comprehensive historiographic study and provided a 
sketch of the redefinitions of jihad by grounding the term in Islamic history. For him, jihad in 
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the Quran is geared towards steadfastness on the word of Islam, including fighting. The 
prophetic tradition features the military sense of jihad in defending Islam, while the canon of 
classical jurists reduces jihad to the military confrontation between dār al-ʾislām ‘the sphere of 
Islam’ and dār al-hufr/al-ħarb ‘the sphere of disbelief/war’. According to Ahmed, al-
mutaṣawwifah, ‘the mystistic sect’, gave primacy to the spiritual sense of jihad over the 
military, although a considerable number of both classical and modern mystics took part in 
justified wars.1  
Apart from the different definitions of jihad, I shall make a clear distinction between jihad as a 
historically loaded religious term and jihadism as a modern violent politico-religious ideology. 
In modern history, jihad as an Islamic concept has served as a resource base for anti-colonial 
liberation movements in different Islamic countries since the early nineteenth century, e.g. in 
Sudan, Algeria and India (Ray 1993). It has been adopted as a righteous and rightful defensive 
activity against external aggression, but not as political activism striving towards the 
establishment of Islamic rule in any form (Tarabishi 2008b). In its broadest sense, jihadism is 
a violent form of Islamism, a term denoting “a wide range of associations and individuals that 
call for establishing an Islamic system and Islamising state and society” (Kramer 2004: 536). 
There have been other terms used to describe this trend, such as ‘political Islam’, ‘Islamic 
revivalism’, ‘resurgence’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘new religious politics’, to name but a 
few. I prefer to use the terms Islamism and Islamic revivalism. The term fundamentalism, 
though widely used, is problematic. It was originally used to refer to a Christian movement 
working against liberal or modernist theology that questioned literal interpretation of the 
scriptures (Ruthven 2012). However, the case in the Muslim world is not symmetric because a 
considerable number of Islamists have adopted modernistic interpretations of the Quran. I use 
the term revivalist instead, for reviving an Islamic polity is the defining feature of this trend of 
political actors (al-Sayyid 2015). 
Islamism emerged in the 1920s in the wake of the abolition of the Ottoman Empire, of which 
Caliphate status was emphasised by a broad sector of Islamists as a pan-Islamist political order 
that is all-encompassing across Muslim communities. Although the status of the Caliphate has 
not been constant throughout Islamic history, the concept of the Caliphate has, indeed, accrued 
significance in the post-Ottoman world (al-Sayyid 2015). In other words, the concept has been 
                                                 
1 The Mahdist revolution in Sudan (1881–1899) and that of the Emir Abdul-Qadir of Algeria (1832–1837) are 
both liberation movements under Sufi leadership.  
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re-articulated and re-constructed in the discourse of early Islamist movements (Sayyid 2003).2 
To date, the restoration of the Caliphate manifests, to varying degrees, in the discourses of the 
different Islamist movements as their direct or ultimate political aim (al-Sayyid and Balqriz 
2013).3 In the post-Ottoman universe, the reconstructed Caliphate represents not only a sought-
after legitimate Islamic government, but also the great Islamic power that guarantees the 
independent and sovereign presence of Islam in the world (ibid.). That is, what is at issue is not 
only a legitimate contract between the ruler and the ruled but, more importantly, the political 
representation of the Muslim ummah, ‘the whole community of Muslim believers’.4 The 
establishment of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood5 in the wake of the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire in 1928 is considered to be one of the first forms of Islamism.  
The reader should note that, firstly, I shall make a clear distinction between Islam as a religion 
and Islamism as a political ideology, subsuming a heterogeneous trend of political actors who 
use Islam as a rubric for identity politics and political mobilisation, both in Sunni and Shiite 
Islam. Second, it is worth mentioning that I am concerned only with Islamism/jihadism in the 
Sunni context, although the Khomeini’s concept of wilāyat al-faqīh (Rule of the Jurist) is an 
articulation of a form of Caliphate that is more or less acceptable to Shiite persuasions as well 
(Mavani 2013). However, Shiite Islamism and its radical movements are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Third, Islamism is essentially understood as “Islamic activism”, which subsumes a 
wide range of political movements: progressive and atavistic, non-violent and violent 
(Hegghammer 2006: 12). To avoid the misconception of equating jihadism with Islamism, it is 
worth stressing that violent jihadist groups constitute a marginal part of the Islamist movements 
partaking in politics across the Islamic world. Hegghammer (2006) rightly maintains that their 
relation to Islamism is reminiscent of that of extremist Marxist guerrilla groups to socialism.  
                                                 
2 Indeed, the fall of the Ottoman Empire was a moment of symbolic collapse for the Arab/Islamic conservative 
elites at that time. This can be seen in the body of literary and poetic works of prominent Arabs and Muslims 
(Shawqi, al-Rafiei, Hafez Ibrahim etc.), who expressed extreme sorrow at the loss of the Caliphate (Tarabishi 
2008b). This can also be seen in Rashid Rida’s (1923) The Caliphate and the Supreme Leadership, in which he 
promotes the restoration of the Caliphate as the only model for establishing a state for Muslims. There was, 
however, an opposite strand in Arab political thought that was in favour of a nation-state system (Abdel Razeq 
1924). A compelling account of this can be seen in al-Sayyid (2015: 89–99). 
3 It is still the declared aim of ħizb al-taħrīr, ‘The Liberation Party’, founded in 1953, which prohibits democracy 
and capitalism and calls for the resurrection of Islamic rule (al-Sayyid 2015). 
4 The word ummah literally means ‘nation’, but it is used to refer to ‘the whole community of Muslim believers’. 
It is the equivalent of citizens in a modern Western nation state. 
5 The Muslim Brotherhood is a religio-political movement that was founded in Egypt in 1928. It is regarded as the 
most organised Islamist movement in the Islamic world, with local offshoots and affiliate groups in the Arab 
Middle East and Central, South and South-East Asia. Between the 1940s and 1960s, the Muslim Brothers’ military 
wing, al-jihāz al-sirrī, engaged in violence. However, since the 1970s, the group has embraced modern political 
rules and moved more towards the political mainstream, despite scepticism from some observers. 
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Militant groups have existed in the Islamic political scenery throughout history.6 Currently, 
jihadism can be regarded as a distinct political and intellectual movement or ideology. It is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon characterised by the strict embracing of takfiir – 
‘excommunication’, or more precisely ‘declaring a Muslim as non-Muslim’ – of Muslim rulers 
and/or Muslim societies. Far from being exclusively based on traditional Islam, the concept of 
takfir, among others, is a hybrid mixing of Islamic notions with revolutionary twentieth-century 
ideas (al-Sayyid 2015). The concept of jihad itself is revolutionised – as we will see in the 
analysis – through references to narrow interpretations of this Islamic concept. As far as Sunni 
Islam is concerned, it is worth mentioning, though, that jihadist ideologues and thinkers have 
been freelancers or religious autodidacts who have worked in their own capacity, not as 
members of any religious establishment in the realm of Sunni Islam (Ruthven 2012).  
2.3. Jihadism in modern politics 
Jihadism gained momentum with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (the Afghan War). This 
war, which lasted for ten years, from December 1979 to February 1989, represents an important 
and a decisive chapter in the story of jihadism. Therefore, I use it as a benchmark against which 
the history of the jihadist movement is considered. 
2.3.1. Pre-Afghan War (socio-revolutionary jihadism) 
Although Afghanistan in the 1980s represented the cradle of the jihadist movement, several 
jihadist groups operated independently across the Islamic world before the 1980s. In the 1960s, 
the first groups of violent Islamists appeared in the Middle East, in particular in Egypt. Their 
mission focused on state power and their fight was against local political regimes (Hegghammer 
2006; al-Sayyid 2015). At this stage, the scope of enmity was geared towards the enemy within, 
i.e. apostate regimes. Yet, this mission had to be justified. To radically establish an Islamic state 
and reshape society, jihadist theorists had to develop justifications for the anti-governmental 
jihad movement that might lead to the indiscriminate killing of apparent Muslims (Cook 2015). 
Influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Quṭb,7 the Egyptian 
jihadist groups, which were fighting the Egyptian regime, were the most active groups in this 
period. Quṭb’s ideas proved influential on the Islamic movements during the 1960s. He 
                                                 
6 Such as the early radical politico-religious movements of Kharijites, ‘dissidents’, who emerged from the 
controversy surrounding the fourth caliph, Ali. They regarded people who disagreed with them as non-believers 
and, thereby, targets of their violent activism.  
7 Sayyid Quṭb is an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue whose writings in the 1950s remain influential. He 
was executed in 1966 for his alleged plotting against the nationalist regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser (Gerges 2009). 
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introduced two revolutionary concepts that influenced radical groups (including Al Qaeda later 
on): ħākimiyah and jāhiliyah. Indeed, Quṭb himself was influenced by al-Mawdudi’s writings, 
which started to appear in the late 1940s (Rahman and Ali 2012; Toth 2013).8 Quṭb emphasised 
the notion of ħākimiyah (ةيمكاحلا), ‘God’s sovereignty’ or the ‘implementation of divine 
authority’ or ‘ruling in accordance with what God revealed’. He used the concept of jāhiliyah 
(ةيلهاجلا), ‘age of ignorance’ or ‘not knowing the Truth’, to describe the Muslim society (Byman 
2015).9 Quṭb’s (2006)10 influential book, Milestones, calls for legitimate governance that 
applies the teachings of Islam. It posits that modern societies, including supposedly modern 
Muslim societies (especially his home nation of Egypt), are in a state of jāhiliyah, straying away 
from Islam to materialism (Quṭb 2006).11 The two concepts are closely related, as illustrated in 
Quṭb’s (2006: 37–38) words: 
If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that 
the whole world is steeped in jāhiliyah, and all the marvellous material comforts and 
high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This jāhiliyah is based on rebellion 
against Allah’s sovereignty [ħākimiyah] on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest 
attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty [ħākimiyah], and makes some men lords over 
others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient jāhiliyah, but takes 
the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective 
behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what Allah 
Almighty has prescribed. 
Quṭb declared that faithful Muslims must form a vanguard to perform jihad in order to remedy 
the state of jāhiliyah by implementing God’s rules. His concept of jihad is an eternal fight 
against all obstacles that get in the way of worshipping Allah and upholding his divine authority 
on earth (Gerges 2009). He urged the jihadi vanguard to fight in order to bring to a close the 
entire jāhili political system before establishing a true, legitimate Islamic order. However, 
Quṭb’s influence on the Egyptian jihadist movement – which would later form a vital wing 
                                                 
8 Abu A’ala al-Mawdudi is an Indian/Pakistani Islamist, he was the founder of Jamaat-e-islami ‘The Islamic 
Community’, the largest Islamic organisation in Asia. In his struggle to establish an Islamic state/society on the 
Indian sub-continent, his ideas were influential in Islamic circles, particularly his views on establishing a Muslim 
state based on Islamic law, as opposed to secularism, by which he was extremely alarmed. After being translated 
into Arabic, his writings influenced Quṭb, particularly the two concepts of ħākimiyah and jāhiliyah (Toth 2013: 
70). 
9 As a term, jāhiliyah refers to the state of ignorance and polytheistic religious practices before the advent of Islam. 
10 This book was first published in 1954, while Quṭb was in prison. It was translated into various languages and I 
am quoting from a translated edition published in English in 2006.  
11 In this regard, Quṭb seems to take the concept of jāhiliyah a step further. Al-Mawdudi’s definition of jāhiliyah 
mainly refers to the ruler’s thoughts and way of life. Quṭb, on the other hand, claimed that the whole world lives 
in a state of jāhiliyah. 
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within Al Qaeda – was not only ideological but also personal. For example, Mahfouz Azzam, 
al-Zawahiri’s uncle, represented Quṭb during his trial. Sayyid Quṭb’s brother, Muhammed 
Quṭb, was an associate of Abdullah Azzam and a teacher of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, 
Quṭb’s trial and execution influenced Islamist circles both in Egypt and worldwide. His 
Milestones, which he wrote in a prison cell before his execution, became his final ‘will’ and 
provided religious justification for jihadi groups in Egypt and Algeria in the 1970s (ibid.). It is 
worth noting that the formation of jihadist groups is not imputed deterministically to Quṭb’s 
views, only it was then that jihadist activists sought revolutionary notions that went against the 
established interpretations of the Islamic canon. What the jihadist vanguard did, then, was that 
it took jihadism from intellectual discourse into a lived experience. 
Islamist revivalism gained further momentum in the 1970/80s, following the dramatic defeat of 
the Nasserist pan-Arab doctrine in 1967. This period saw an episode of political and 
social/cultural activism within Islamist movements, now known as the period of al-saħwa al-
islāmiyyah (henceforth, Sahwa), ‘awakening Islam’ (Lacroix 2011). Moreover, the period 
witnessed the Islamic Iranian revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Monarch of Iran and 
established an Islamic Republic. Jihadist activism flourished once more in this period. The key 
thinker of this time was Muhammed Abdel-Salam Farraj. Farraj was a key jihadist ideologue 
in Egypt in the 1970s, up until his execution shortly after the assassination of the Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat in 1981 at the hands of his followers in Egypt’s Islamic Group (EIG). 
He authored a pamphlet entitled al-farīḍah al-ghāʾibah, ‘The Neglected Religious Duty’, which 
refers to jihad. Farraj called for a dramatic act that, he believed, would trigger a popular 
revolution (Gerges 2017). The dramatic act was the assassination of Sadat, to which the 
regime’s reaction was extremely harsh and pushed his group and al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad 
(IJ) to flee Egypt for Afghanistan. 
‘The Neglected Religious Duty’ is a key development of the jihadist doctrine and its 
revolutionisation of tradition. This book breaks away from the canons of tradition in two 
respects. First, it promotes the obligatory nature of jihad by nominating it an obligatory duty, 
dissenting from the established consensus that jihad is a collective duty. Second, it transgresses 
the unanimous received opinion that jihad is only waged against an external threat, not against 
people within the Muslim community. Farraj’s novel juristic opinions reiterate Quṭb’s ideas of 
hākimiyah and jāhiliyah and cite the fatwas, ‘religious rulings’, of the 13th/14th century 
theologian Ibn Taymiya in his opinions regarding the Mongol attack on Baghdad.12 He 
                                                 
12 Ibn Taymiya was a 13th/14th century theologian, whose ideas are highly influential in the Salafist School. 
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specifically draws on Ibn Taymiya’s fatwa, stating that a Muslim’s faith is nullified if it is not 
accompanied by practising the duties of Islam – including jihad and defending the Islamic 
community. Al-Sayyid (2015) argues that Farraj’s instrumentalisation of traditional texts 
clearly violates the analogical principles between two contexts, as these texts were 
contextualised in conflicts where an external enemy was involved, not in conflicts with an 
enemy within the sphere of Islam. Farraj emphasised the illegitimacy of the Egyptian regime 
and theorised the revival of jihadist activism (Byman 2015). Again, Farraj justified his 
declaration of war on the Egyptian government by referring to its Western-derived laws and 
repression, which rendered it jāhili and un-Islamic (Farraj 1980). Farraj’s theorisation and 
strategic thinking highlighted the value of dramatic acts of violence and the role of propaganda 
in the jihadist mission. His strategy was effectively implemented by subsequent jihadist 
movements, in particular Al Qaeda (Byman 2015). 
On the whole, the priorities of the jihadist groups in this period primarily revolved around 
internal socio-revolutionary goals and concerns, not regional or international ones. Several 
factors contributed to the emergence of jihadism in this period; for example, the relative failure 
of the modern state in the Arab/Islamic world (Tarabishi 2008a), the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine (al-Sayyid 2015) and the state of stagnation and shock of modernity that gave rise to 
the question of identity and notions around the return to the Self (Shayegan 1997; 2004), or in 
the words of Habermas, ‘the melancholic longing for [an] irretrievable past’ (as cited in Ray 
1993: 131). Revivalism, or a return to the ‘Self’ in jihadist ideology, is manifested in its 
rejectionist view of the nation-state system, subsequent to the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate. 
For dissident jihadist groups, a return means taking up arms in order to seize power and Islamise 
society via a top-down autocratic fiat. Modern democracy, other positivist legislation and the 
nation-state system are all symptoms of Westernisation that are fundamentally rejected by 
radical Islamists and jihadist ideologues. Al-Sayyid (2015) rightly observes that radical groups 
are fuelled by and preoccupied with fears about religion and religious identity being eroded by 
the dominant Western cultural and political manners. In this vein, establishing Islamic rule is 
the ultimate articulation of religious identity, and of opposing the growing Westernisation of 
Muslims.13 
                                                 
13 Similar concerns about the Self are found in the Iranian context, e.g. Al-e Ahmed’s neologistic coinage of 
Westoxication, referring to the pervasive social preoccupation of manners and matters that are ‘Western’ in origin 
(Dabashi 1993: 73–78). Al-e Ahmed’s ideas later proved crucial in constructing an Islamic revolutionary ideology 
in Iran. 
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2.3.2. The Afghan War (classical jihadism) 
America wanted it to be a proxy war against the Russians, but the 
Arab mujahedeen – thanks to Allah – turned it into a call for reviving 
the neglected religious duty. (al-Zawahiri 2005a: 59) 
Prior to the 1980s, virtually all militant Islamist groups’ battles were to change political regimes 
(Hegghammer 2010b). As we have seen, Islamists such as Sayyid Quṭb and Muhammad Farraj 
were local socio-revolutionaries. Their jihad was first and foremost about removing corrupt, 
illegitimate and impious rulers, who had abandoned religion. External military aggression was 
not evident. However, a new cause for the jihadist movement emerged with the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, whereby a non-Muslim enemy performed an aggressive act on a Muslim land. 
With the purpose of propping up the Communist regime, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
unleashed a broad armed revolt by local opposition, joined by Islamist and tribal groups, 
collectively referred to as the mujahedeen, ‘Muslims fighting in the name of Islam’. Alongside 
local Afghans, mujahedeen from across the Islamic world were engaged in a model of ‘justified 
war’, similar to the traditional concept of jihad. The aim of this jihad was the liberation of an 
Islamic land from an infidel invader. During this period, foreign fighters were summoned and 
mobilised from different parts of the Islamic world and new jihadist wings were born in 
Afghanistan.14 It was during the Afghan War that multinational groups of jihadists could 
establish personal connections and develop organisational structures (Hegghammer 2010a). 
Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the situation, the response to the invasion was not automatic. 
Rather, the early years witnessed a relatively limited number of mujahedeen, many of whom 
started out as aid workers, and it took some time for a jihadist mission to actually evolve 
(Hegghammer 2010b). 
Pan-Islamism, which flourished from the 1970s onwards in the wake of the fading Nasserist 
pan-Arabism, and the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union set the stage for the 
gradual formation of a foreign fighter movement during the Afghan War (Hegghammer 2010a; 
Byman 2015). The pan-Islamist rise facilitated the emergence and evolution of a jihadist 
movement, i.e. pan-Islamism set the stage for jihadism to draw its key leaders, ideologues and 
recruits for subsequent struggles. The ideological and organisational father of this movement 
was the Jordanian-Palestinian Abdullah Azzam.15 Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood’s envoy 
                                                 
14 Indeed, Al Qaeda’s core was born in Afghanistan, as discussed below in section 2.3.  
15 Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Arab, was the leading ideologue of the jihadist movement in the Afghan War, 
he played a key role in mobilising Arab fighters (Hegghammer 2010a). He issued a fatwa entitled “Defence of 
Muslim Lands” in 1984 to rally the mujahedeen, arguing that fighting the Soviets was a religious duty not only for 
the Afghans, but also Muslims around the world. 
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in Pakistan, Kamal al-Sananiri,16 pan-Islamist Azzam believed that all Muslims are one people, 
with a religious duty to defend any Muslim land occupied by non-Muslim forces (Byman 2015). 
In 1981, he relocated to Peshawar, where he took a job at the International Islamic University. 
There, he founded maktab alkhadamāt, ‘Services Office’, and embarked on his ideological role 
by preaching and writing numerous magazines and pamphlets (including join the caravan 
pamphlet and al-jihad magazine, the mouthpiece of Afghan Arabs)17 with the aim of inspiring 
and motivating Muslims to go and fight in Afghanistan (Gerges 2009). Furthermore, his 
Services Office coordinated organisational efforts to fundraise and facilitate the flow of 
mujahedeen to and from Afghanistan (ibid.). The significance of Azzam’s early initiatives 
manifests in the fact that the majority of the fighters who travelled to Peshawar prior to 1986 
(including Osama Bin Laden) appear to have been influenced and encouraged by his writings, 
and/or assisted by his Services Office (Hegghammer 2010b). 
American aid to the anti-Communist forces began to flow before the Soviet invasion, growing 
steadily during the 1980s (Hegghammer 2006). By the mid-1980s, the Afghan mujahedeen 
received billions of U.S. dollars and relatively advanced arms. In addition, the flow of foreign 
fighters increased at this time. However, Byman (2015) and Hegghammer (2010b) dismiss the 
view that this influx of foreign fighters, known as Afghan Arabs, were supported by the United 
States and Gulf countries. They argue that there is no evidence that the Afghan Arabs received 
direct and systematic state support. Western and Arab Gulf states acquiesced to foreign fighter 
recruitment, but they neither organised nor paid for it. Instead, private donors and non-
governmental Islamic charitable sectors funded them. Hegghammer states: 
The view of the 1980s Arab Afghans as actively state supported is a widespread 
misconception that has given rise to the popular “blowback theory,” according to which 
the Arab Afghans (and by extension al-Qaida) were a U.S.-Saudi creation that later 
turned against its patrons. The misunderstanding stems from a conflation of Afghan 
mujahedeen, on the one hand, and foreign fighters, on the other; it is assumed that 
because states armed the Afghans, they also armed the Arabs. (2010b: 62) 
Regardless of this historical/political debate, the modern jihadist movement crystallised in 
Afghanistan as networks comprising fighters of many nationalities due to Azzam’s mobilisation 
and tours around the Arab world. This was the first occasion in modern history when such a 
                                                 
16 Al-Sananiri, a brother-in-law of Sayyid Quṭb, was sent as an envoy to Pakistan by the then Supreme Guide of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. He took a 40-day trip to Pakistan to assess the Afghan jihad and consider the scope of 
their involvement (Hegghammer 2010a). On his way back, al-Sananiri met Azzam and encouraged him to relocate 
to Pakistan. 
17 Arab foreign fighters in the Afghan War came to be known as al-ʿarab al-ʾfghān, ‘Afghan Arabs’.  
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multinational group of mujahedeen embraced the fight against an infidel invader, culminating 
in the defeat and withdrawal of the non-Muslim aggressor. However, Azzam’s jihadist doctrine 
differs from the pre-Afghan war jihad. As a Palestinian hoping for the liberation of his 
homeland, his doctrine did not consider other Muslim governments to be illegitimate and shifted 
the scope of jihad from apostate regimes to foreign invaders. Moreover, unlike former and 
subsequent models of jihad, he emphasised conventional military tactics, rather than terrorism 
(Byman 2015). His doctrine dominated the scene during the Afghan War, the end of which 
coincided with his assassination in Pakistan in 1989.  
The launch of jihad in Afghanistan was a timely advantage for the Egyptian jihadist movement, 
which faced a harsh crackdown in the wake of the assassination of Sadat. In his memoir Knights 
under the Prophet’s Banner, al-Zawahiri (2005a: 60) recounts that Egyptian jihad stumbled in 
Egypt due to the regime’s iron fist and Egyptian geography [sic], which was not suitable for 
guerrilla wars. He states that his group found on the Afghanistan battlefront a safe haven to 
pursue the mission that failed in Egypt. Nonetheless, al-Zawahiri seems not to have discarded 
the pre-Afghan War socio-revolutionary doctrine as he states that their jihad in Afghanistan 
was against both non-Muslim invaders and the “apostate regime complicit with the enemies of 
Allah” (2005a: 65). Gerges (2009) remarks that the multi-national vanguard of foreign fighters 
(including the Al Qaeda core) that formed in Afghanistan did not play quite as significant a role 
in the liberation of Afghanistan, but nevertheless they represented an unprecedented 
phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Hegghammer (2010b: 57–58) gives a 
compelling account, categorising foreign fighters as agents who: 
1. have joined, and operate within the confines of, an insurgency;  
2. lack citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions;  
3. lack affiliation to an official military organisation; and  
4. are unpaid. 
The majority of foreign fighters in Afghanistan hailed from Arab countries, while the remainder 
were native to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, the USA and Europe. 
The number of foreign fighters involved in the Afghan War is estimated to have been several 
thousand, a considerable number of whom subsequently embraced the concept of global jihad, 
as will be discussed in ensuing sections. Amongst the early adopters of Azzam’s Services Office 
were Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the founders of Al Qaeda, the would-be 
leading jihadist front.  
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2.3.3. Post-Afghan War (global jihadism) 
During the early years of the forming of jihadism in Afghanistan, the movement began to 
witness a split into two doctrines that differed both politically and ideologically. The pre-
Afghan War era is marked by socio-revolutionary jihadism associated with the ideas of Quṭb 
and Farraj, who focused on overthrowing local governments. A form of pan-Islamist jihadism 
dominated the Afghan battlefield. After the end of the war in 1989, the jihadist movement 
gradually began to diverge into two jihadist doctrines: classical and global jihadism. Although 
the boundaries at the level of grassroots jihadists seem to be blurred, Hegghammer (2010a) 
notes that classical jihadism is the more orthodox form of militant activism, closer to the 
traditional concept of jihad. This doctrine was led by Azzam, who argued for the immediate 
military involvement of all Muslim men to defend Muslim territories occupied by non-Muslim 
forces (as theorised in his book ‘Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after 
Faith’). The immediate involvement of Muslims has its ideological basis in the traditionalist 
conceptions of jihad, whereby it is the religious duty of all Muslims if an act of aggression is 
committed against a Muslim territory, regardless of its location. Azzam sought to pursue not a 
struggle against governments, but the liberation of occupied territories. This conceptualisation 
of jihad has similarities to that of mainstream ulema; however, Azzam differed in his emphasis, 
in that the religious duty falls on all Muslims, rather than on solely the local population of the 
land under attack. 
Conversely, the global jihadist doctrine was developed by Osama Bin Laden in the mid-1990s. 
This doctrine postulates that jihad is not limited to opposing the forces of non-Muslim 
aggressors in conflict zones, but expands to include all non-Muslim powers involved in 
oppressing Muslims and backing corrupt governments. Both classical and global jihadists 
prioritised the fight against a far enemy (the USA and its Western allies), rather than the near 
enemy (local rulers). The rhetoric of both doctrines sought to justify their fight against the non-
Muslim powers involved in the humiliation of Muslims. However, their methods and priorities 
were different. In the 1990s, a considerable number of Afghan Arabs retained their classical 
doctrine and joined subsequent conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya, which involved a fight 
against an external enemy invading Muslim territories. However, following the failure of the 
classical jihadists in Bosnia and Chechnya and the unsuccessful 1990s attempts of Egyptian 
groups (in particular EIG and IJ) to revive socio-revolutionary tactics (Brooke 2008), Al 
Qaeda’s doctrine of global jihadism has been at the forefront since the mid-1990s. 
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2.4. Al Qaeda  
Towards the Afghan war’s conclusion, in 1988, Al Qaeda’s core was officially founded in 
Peshawar by a group of Afghan Arabs. Their goal was to guarantee a military organisation that 
could operate after the war in Afghanistan. The group was led by Osama Bin Laden, a veteran 
Afghan Arab who had established his own training camp, thanks to his wealth and devotion to 
the cause. The group included key figures in the jihadist movement, such as Azzam and some 
veteran Egyptian jihadists. At that time, Azzam called for the formation of al-Qaeda al-
sulbah,18 a ‘solid base’ of Muslim jihadists, whose goal was to fight the oppressors of ummah. 
Al Qaeda began with a vague purpose. In effect, it aimed to sustain the vanguard of jihadists 
that formed in Afghanistan. Hegghammer (2010a: 100) argues that, in its early years, Al Qaeda 
remained “an alumni society … [that] did not possess significant buildings, training camps or 
financial resources of its own”. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the founding 
members pursued different political goals. 
However, in the mid-1990s, a new community of jihadists, led by Osama Bin Laden, reappeared 
and brought about drastic changes to the organisation’s tactics and scope of enmity. Bin Laden’s 
global jihadism took shape in the first half of the 1990s. Primarily, his doctrine was fuelled by 
the deployment of U.S troops in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War.19 He regarded it as 
yet another form of invasion. Leaving Saudi Arabia for Sudan, he started to reorganise his 
transnational networks of militants, particularly those who could not return to their home 
countries. The failed classical jihadist struggles in different places20 and the failed revolutionary 
Islamism in Egypt and Algeria gradually drove the classical and revolutionary jihadist 
communities to join Bin Laden’s ever-evolving organisational structure of Al Qaeda with its 
untried global mission (El Fadl 2001; Hegghammer 2010a). From 1992 onwards, Bin Laden 
objected to the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, seeking to increasingly converge on an 
anti-American worldview. Bin Laden’s anti-American rhetoric was further fuelled by the 
American efforts to deter the mujahedeen from playing a significant role in the Bosnian War. 
Later on, it developed into an all-out anti-American jihad, regarded by socio-revolutionaries as 
                                                 
18 The genealogy of the word ‘Al Qaeda’ can be traced back to this name, despite the fact that it was made popular 
after the FBI assigned it to Bin Laden’s affiliated radical activist groups during its investigation of the U.S. 
Embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998 (Burke 2004).  
19 The American-led coalition to liberate Kuwait after being invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in 1990.  
20 After the Afghan War, classical jihadists were prevented from pursuing their mission in different places. In 
Bosnia, they were deterred from forming a jihad battlefront and they played an insignificant role (Hegghammer 
2010a). The Pakistani government blocked them from creating a battlefield in Kashmir to avoid escalation of their 
own territorial issues with India (Byman 2015). 
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a means of undermining local regimes, while classical jihadists considered it a logical extension 
to their struggle against the USA as an oppressive non-Muslim power (Hegghammer 2010a).  
2.4.1. Pre-9/11 
As stated previously, the anti-Soviet Afghan War attracted jihad sympathisers from around the 
world. Al Qaeda’s core leadership was amongst those who joined the ranks of the mujahedeen 
in Afghanistan early for aid work and military involvement (Gerges 2009). After the war, Al 
Qaeda sought to sustain and inculcate its jihadist doctrine by finding safe havens in different 
places at different times. Thereby, Al Qaeda took the lead in the post-Afghan War era, attracting 
numerous classical jihadists and Muslim youths, and attuning them to its global jihadist 
mission. For example, the Northern Group, which fought in Tajik, eventually joined Al Qaeda 
in 1996. The new global jihadists were no longer performing classical jihad in conflict zones 
involving aggression against a specific Muslim territory. Although the founding fathers were a 
group of veteran Afghan Arabs, the term Al Qaeda is used widely to describe the organisation 
built by Osama Bin Laden following his relocation to Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 
(Bergen 2006). Al Qaeda’s territorial access to Afghanistan and its ability to set up training 
camps provided the organisation with a unique phenomenon in jihadist history (Byman 2015). 
Within this environment, radicalised Muslim youths from all over the world who fell under the 
influence of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and an ultra-violent culture, have been 
schooled in the ultimate goal, namely, striking the far enemy, particularly America.21  
By the early 1990s, Bin Laden had concluded that war with America was inevitable. Al Qaeda’s 
global mission culminated in February 1998 when Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Refa’a Taha 
took pan-Islamism to its most radical conclusion and declared a fatwa involving killing 
Americans everywhere, thereby marking the formation of an alliance called aljabhah 
alʾislāmiyah lijihād alyahūd wa alṣalībiyīn, ‘The Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and 
the Crusaders’. While Azzam’s classical jihadism advocated conventional (para)-military 
tactics and guerrilla wars against enemies in confined theatres of war, Bin Laden argued for 
international indiscriminate mass casualty tactics using all means in all places, as stated in this 
excerpt from the communiqué declaring the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad 
against Zionists and Crusaders (see the Appendix B for a full translation of this communiqué):22  
                                                 
21 Al-Zawahiri officially joined Al Qaeda in 1998. 
22 This declaration was published in the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper on 23 February 1998.  
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The ruling of killing Americans and their allies—whether civilians or military— is 
incumbent upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, 
in order to liberate the Mosque of al-Aqsa and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their 
grip, and until their armies leave the lands of Islam, punished according to the law, 
broken and unable to threaten any Muslim. 
Jihadist discourse is characterised by its long enumerations of places where Muslims are 
assumed to be victims of oppression occupation, but this exceptional declaration featured two 
new themes: (i) America’s oppression of Iraq – note that was prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
– and (ii) the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. The latter theme is based on a hyperbolic 
portrayal of the American presence in the region as an occupation, a recurring theme in the 
discursive construction of the USA, as will be shown later in the analysis. The declaration 
signified the launch of a campaign against Western and American targets worldwide at the 
hands of Bin Laden’s brothers-in-arms (Hegghammer 2006). Global jihadism crystallised in 
the second half of the 1990s. During this period, Al Qaeda’s organisational structure, 
operational activities and recruitment witnessed a dramatic increase (Hegghammer 2010a). Bin 
Laden’s organisation attracted many frustrated classical jihadists, who were no longer 
struggling for state power in a particular country, but instead working to target U.S. interests 
everywhere. Table 1 presents attacks attributed to Al Qaeda between 1995 and 2001:23 
Date  Location Description Number Killed 
1995 November Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Truck bomb 7 
1998 August Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassies 
bombed 
301 
2000 October Aden, Yemen USS Cole bombing 17 
2001 September  USA 9/11 attacks 3,000 approx. 
Table 1: Attacks attributed to Al Qaeda between 1995 and 2001 
  
                                                 
23 The table is adapted from http://npsglobal.org/eng/news/29-non-state-actors/1034-al-qaeda-attackss-death-toll-
more-than-4400-lives.html. 
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2.4.2. Post-9/11 
The 9/11 attacks were a turning point in the confrontation between Al Qaeda and the USA. The 
ensuing 2002 US-led invasion of Afghanistan stripped Al Qaeda of its territorial haven and 
removed the basis for its unique organisational concept – specifically, an educational hub for 
global terrorism and guerrilla warfare. However, this has not resulted in weakening its 
ideology.24 This stage may have witnessed Al Qaeda’s decentralisation, but its worldview 
expanded. Al Qaeda has transformed into Al Qaedism: the ideology or worldview that attracts 
different regional and national clusters of jihadists following shared models, precepts and 
methods. In more concrete terms, the pre-9/11 Al Qaeda network appears to have broken up 
into five regionally-defined groups, whose operational theatres are in Afghanistan/Pakistan, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia (AQAP), Southeast Asia, and Europe /North Africa (Hegghammer 2006). 
These regional clusters have shown the ability to recruit people and sustain the AQ’s new 
strategy. Even after decentralisation, Bin Laden acquired a symbolic status in the newly 
emerging local circles and was referred to as imām almujāhidīn ‘leader of the mujahedeen’ (as 
we will see in 5.3.1.2) and, therefore, exerted formidable ideological influence. These groups 
seem to have worked independently of each other. The Saudi network came to be known as ‘Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’.25 
2.5. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
The current project examines AQAP discourse between 2003 and 2005, during which time the 
Al Qaeda core decentralised and concentrated its efforts in the Arabian Peninsula – particularly 
Saudi Arabia – attempting to mobilise people in this region.26 As I have already noted, Al Qaeda 
gradually transformed from having a centralised structure, whose leadership functioned as a 
central hub focused on providing funding, contacts and advice to affiliated groups and 
individuals all over the Islamic world, to having a complex, decentralised and multipolar 
structure comprising different regional franchise networks. At this stage of decentralisation, Al 
                                                 
24 For example, Hegghammer (2006: 16) notes that “[s]ince the autumn of 2002, Bin laden and Zawahiri started 
referring to the Iraqi war in twenty-two of their statements. Seventeen of these mentioned Iraq and seven featured 
it as the main topic.” 
25 Other groups include the Somali group al-sabaab and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq. Al Qaeda in the Land 
of the Two Rivers formed in Iraq, while in the other three places there were no identifiable organisational structures 
(Hegghammer 2006). Since then, the spread of Al Qaedism has taken the form of giving bayʿah ‘pledges of 
allegiance’ (ةعيب). These pledges have been given by large radical groups around the world. This norm has 
continued with ISIS since its break with Al Qaeda and its proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate. Enormous radical 
groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS, whether online or in the real world, e.g. in Afghanistan, Nigeria, North 
Africa, Pakistan and the Sinai desert (Wagemakers 2015). 
26 In 2003 and 2004, Al Qaeda carried out six attacks inside Saudi Arabia, claiming the lives of 89 people. 
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Qaeda switched its strategy from striking the far enemy to striking both the far enemy (non-
Muslim powers) and the near enemy (‘apostate rulers’). AQAP is a franchise organisation 
following Al Qaeda’s core practices in terms of structure and military tactics. A similar Al 
Qaeda franchise group works in Iraq in parallel with AQAP, but this is beyond the scope of this 
study, for the data at hand are primarily centred on legitimising jihad inside Saudi Arabia. From 
2002 to 2006, the group became the leading Al Qaeda network (Rosler 2010). After the 
American invasion of Afghanistan, its sleeper cells started to establish several clandestine 
training camps inside Saudi Arabia.  
2.5.1. The Pre-2003 AQAP 
When Bin Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1996, he began to reconstruct his connections in 
Saudi Arabia and establish affiliated networks. Over the course of five years, his networks 
developed much more slowly than anticipated due to the arrest of many of his potential helpers 
following the 1995 Riyadh operation (as noted earlier in Table 1). With the declaration of The 
Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders in 1998, Al Qaeda’s media profile 
grew significantly, in parallel with Bin Laden’s popularity, which was boosted by the East 
Africa bombings five months after the declaration of jihad against the US. At that time, the 
would-be founder of AQAP, Yusuf al-Uyayri,27 was released from prison. Upon his release, he 
reconnected with the jihadist community and took up writing propagandist material, at a time 
when the Internet provided a platform for reaching a much wider audience. From 1998 to 2000, 
he was more of a classical jihadist concerned with the conflicts raging in Kosovo and Chechnya. 
He posted his writings on a website for Arab fighters in Chechnya, Sawt al-Qawqaz, ‘The Voice 
of the Caucasus’. Al-Uyayri was a very active user of the Internet, participating in a Web-based 
radio group-chat service, Paltalk, under the pseudonym ‘Azzam’ (Hegghammer 2010a). In 
2000, al-Uyayri began reconnecting with Bin Laden. He made a trip to Afghanistan in July that 
year too, became convinced of Bin Laden’s cause and started recruiting on his behalf.  
The main vehicle for AQAP’s recruitment efforts focused on the community of returnees from 
Afghanistan, who were systematically targeted for recruitment, along with their relatives and 
acquaintances (Hegghammer 2010a). Various cells are thought to have operated relatively 
independently in Saudi Arabia and Yemen between 2001 and 2003. The first was led by a 
Sudanese veteran called Abu ħudayfa, whose cell plotted to bomb the Prince Sultan Airbase in 
2002, before being arrested on 18 June 2002. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri led a second cell, which 
                                                 
27 Yusuf al-Uyayri, an Afghan Saudi veteran who fought in Somalia in 1993. 
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operated as AQ’s flagship network in the Arabian Peninsula in 2002. Al-Nashiri teamed up 
with Bin Laden in 1997 and he is thought to have masterminded the attack on the USS Cole in 
2000. In 2001, he fled Afghanistan for Yemen, via Pakistan. From there, his group is thought 
to have plotted several failed offensives inside Saudi Arabia. However, al-Nashiri was detained 
in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. But the most effective network was led by al-
Uyayri, which launched the 2003 jihad campaign. 
2.5.2. Post-2003 AQAP 
The discourse of Al Qaeda’s core between 2001 and 2003 castigated the Saudi government’s 
collaboration in the so-called War on Terror. Such an escalation might underlie its strategy to 
launch the campaign. But the decision to launch jihad in the Arabian Peninsula was a strategic 
one resulting from a heated debate between the (AQ)AP leaderships and the broader jihadist 
community since the autumn of 2002 (Obaid and Cordesman 2005). The debate within AQAP 
primarily centred on the question of whether to fight at home or abroad, particularly in Iraq. 
While the attacks on targets in Iraq might be carried out by organisations other than jihadists, 
such as those with a nationalist or resistance agenda, attacks in Saudi Arabia are undertaken by 
jihadists and directed at both American and Saudi targets. The debate is the result of fear of a 
negative response from sympathisers inside the Arabian Peninsula and from the circles of 
classical jihadists. This is because the attacks and subsequent clashes with security forces may 
involve killing Muslims. One critic of the campaign in Saudi Arabia is a Chechnya-based 
classical jihadist, the influential Abu Umar al-Sayf, who argued that the campaign would have 
negative consequences for the more legitimate Iraqi jihad. However, the AQAP network 
responded by publishing several articles in Sawt al-jihad positing that the campaign is 
legitimate and advantageous for the Iraqi jihadist cause (Hegghammer 2006).  
The backbone of the organisation is a group of jihadists cultivated and organised by Yusuf al-
Uyayri, since he joined Al Qaeda in 2000. Unlike Abu Hudayfa and al-Nashiri, al-Uyayri 
planned to build an organisation rather than plot premature attacks. As an ideologue, he had 
worked slowly and patiently to cultivate a community of grassroots jihadists. He relied 
enormously on propaganda, given his experience of prolific writing and posting on the Internet 
since the Chechnya’s phase of classical jihadism. Al-Uyayri himself directed ‘The centre of 
Islamic Studies and Research’ (CISR),28 which produced its own ideological texts and strategic 
studies for the global jihadist community (Hegghammer 2010a). Indeed, he was a founder of 
                                                 
28 Inspired by the Sawt Al-Qawqaz website to which he contributed, he established the CISR as a media office or 
a virtual publishing house for the global jihadist movement. The CISR was hosted by several jihadist websites.  
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strategic studies as a pragmatic genre distinct from purely ideological texts. Immediately prior 
to 2003, he placed great emphasis on building the military side of the organisation. As a veteran, 
he contributed on numerous occasions to writing about military tactics and training. He 
succeeded in accumulating underground material resources, such as safe houses, weapons and 
bomb-making factories. 
AQAP launched its campaign in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, with a series of large-scale terrorist 
attacks. The first issue of Sawt al-jihad was published at the beginning of the 8th month 
(shaʿabān) 1424 of the Islamic Calendar, which coincides with September 2003. This was 
almost five months after AQAP’s awkward start earlier in March, when a bomb went off 
prematurely in a Riyadh-based bomb factory. The incident, which the police contained and 
succeeded in collecting important intelligence from, was an early and massive setback for the 
organisation.29 This incident uncovered AQAP’s headquarters and exposed it to the eyes of the 
security forces. Consequently, the Saudi security forces took advantage of the intelligence 
resources discovered in this raid and undertook a massive campaign directed against the 
underground jihadist community in Saudi Arabia.  
Leader 
Yusuf al-Uyayri: The founder, he was killed in a car chase on 31 May 2003. 
Khaled al-Hajj: Believed to have assumed AQAP leadership after al-Uyayri, despite 
the lack of references to him in Sawt al-jihad. He was killed by the 
police in Riyadh on 15 March 2004. 
Abdulaziz al-Muqrin: Under his leadership, major operations, using various tactics, were 
executed. On 18 June 2004, the police hunted him and three of his 
companions near a gas station in Riyadh. 
Saud al-Otaibi: Along with a group of AQAP core militants, he was held up in a 
farm in al-Rass city and fought a bloody three-day gun battle with 
the security forces that besieged them following an alert from a local 
resident. The battled ended on 5 April 2005, leaving al-Otaibi and 
14 militants dead, five wounded and dozens of casualties on the 
police side. 
Saleh al-Oafi: He was killed shortly after his predecessor on 8 August 2005. 
Table 2: AQAP’s leaders up until mid-2005 
The continuing publication of Sawt al-jihad, despite AQAP’s setbacks, is seen as a way of 
exaggerating the size and strength of the organisation. However, the magazine eventually 
ceased publication in October until a special issue appeared in May 2005. This cessation of 
publication confirms that, by then, AQAP had become quite structurally incapacitated, given 
                                                 
29 In a recent officially produced three-episode documentary aired on the al-Arabiya channel, the Saudi authorities 
revealed insightful details about this awkward start and the ensuing security response 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLEI29WvZqk&spfreload=10. 
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their severe losses in manpower and resources. The period between March and September saw 
major setbacks on the AQAP side. The campaign, in this period, resulted in the killing of at 
least 26 militants, including AQAP founder Yusuf al-Uyayri and several senior leaders such as 
Turkī al-Dandanī. Al-Uyayri and one more militant were killed on 31 May during a car chase 
and al-Dandanī and two companions were killed on 3 July. A great number of Sawt al-jihad 
obituaries were devoted to Al-Uyayri and al-Dandanī. Furthermore, three key jihadist clerical 
ideologues, Ali al-Khudair, Nasser al-Fahd and Ahmed al-Khāldi, were arrested on 28 May. 
These setbacks, along with the detention of dozens of AQAP militants and the loss of crucial 
resources and safe houses, appear to have provoked Al Qaeda’s jihadist networks to establish a 
specialised media unit, Sawt al-jihad, as part of a reorganisation process and to compensate for 
the mid-2003 losses. Up until the publication of the first issue, AQAP executed a handful of 
isolated attacks that resulted in the death of some security personnel and Western foreigners. 
The police initiated other confrontations. Yet, by late 2003, other undiscovered AQAP clusters 
reorganised and increasingly escalated their violence towards mid-2004 in a series of major 
attacks that were discursively constructed in successive issues of Sawt al-jihad. By mid-2005, 
almost all AQAP leaders and key operatives had been eliminated. Several ideologues were 
either killed or detained. 
2.6. Al Qaeda structure and fighter categorisations 
Hegghammer (2006: 15–16) provides a compelling categorisation of Al Qaeda’s personnel 
structure. He argues that there are five categories constituting Al Qaeda: 
1. At the top of Al Qaeda presided Bin laden and al-Zawahiri. Both had symbolic status in 
the newly emerging local circles and, therefore, exerted formidable ideological influence. 
2. The second category is jihad scholars, who – unlike scholars of the palace – issue fatwas 
clarifying what is legitimate in the struggle against infidels. This category includes Abu 
Qatada al-Filistini, Nassir al-Fahad, Ali al-Khudair, Umar Abdul-Rahman, Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, amongst others.  
3. The third is strategic thinkers, who write books or articles explaining the best ways of 
implementing jihad. Brooke (2008) argues that jihadist strategic debates must have existed 
long before and fed into strategic studies as an independent hihadi genre, which then fully 
emerged after 9/11. Amongst the popular strategist thinkers are Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu 
umar al-sayf and AQAP’s Yusuf al-Uyayri. Other strategic thinkers are known only by 
their psyeudonyms (e.g. Abu Bakr Naji, author of ‘The Management of Savagery’).  
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4. Active militant organisations, such as AQAP, which execute operations and publish their 
own media products that justify their operations. The online platforms of these 
organisations also publish statements, audio and video recordings that cascade down from 
Al Qaeda’s central leadership. 
5. At the bottom of this complicated hierarchy lie grassroots radicals. These are thousands 
of anonymous jihadists. From this category emerge the muscle fighters and suicide 
bombers. Grassroots radicals can be active online as participants on radical forums and 
social media platforms, mostly with fake identities.  
An intriguing sub-category of jihadists belonging to the latter category of grassroots radicals is 
devolved jihadists or lone wolves (Rosler 2010; Byman 2015). Devolved jihadists are amateur 
individuals or small ad hoc groups, i.e. untrained, unfunded freelancers. They are radicalised, 
mostly online, to conduct terrorist attacks. This is a peculiar tactic of global jihadism. Several 
online magazines are dedicated to this goal, such as ṣadā al-malāħim, ‘Echo of Battle’, and 
AQAP’s recent magazine, Inspire. Such magazines are devoted to inciting lone wolves to 
launch terrorist attacks on targets, such as airliners and transport systems, wherever they are 
located. 
2.7. Al Qaeda’s activism: guerrilla warfare? 
Guerrilla warfare has been conducted throughout history and has taken varying forms. Laqueur 
(1977: 382–385) provides an overview of guerrilla warfare in modern history. He maintains 
that guerrilla wars have been fought by small and weak peoples against invading armies (e.g. 
the 18th century Spanish and Italian guerrilla wars against the French occupation, and the 19th 
century national liberation movements in Italy, Ireland, Macedonia and Poland). But guerrilla 
tactics were not only the war of the weak against the strong; rather, they were also adopted in 
the 19th century colonial wars by the colonial powers against local resistance forces (e.g. the 
French campaigns against Abdel Kader, and the Russians against Shamyl). The 20th century 
saw a few instances of guerrilla insurgencies during the First World War, then a great upsurge 
during the Second World War, both inside Europe against Nazi forces and beyond it with the 
rising tide of independence movements against the European colonial powers. Revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare gained political momentum with the communist modes of political behaviour 
and organisational principles. With communist forces, the organisation and ideology played a 
cultural and emotional propagandistic role in mobilising the masses; but on the whole, 
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revolutionary guerrilla wars are fought for reasons of national patriotism. In fact, many 
twentieth-century guerrilla wars (such as IRA, EOKA and IZL)30 owe little to Communism. 
Guerrilla movements cannot be covered in depth in this brief account due to the very fact that 
there are as many guerrilla movements as there are answers to the question ‘why do people 
rebel?’: occupation by a foreign country, economic crisis, tyrannical political regime, 
ideological assumptions or any social or economic discrepancies. At the bottom of every 
guerrilla movement is a feeling of grievance, be it national, social, ideological etc. Nonetheless, 
the fact that Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are awkward to describe is a case in point. That 
is, is Al Qaeda an army and/or an ideology? Is it a terrorist organisation with an identifiable 
leadership and/or an amorphous loosely networked constituency? Answers to these questions 
are far from reaching consensus in both scholarly and official circles (Hoffman 2003). Setting 
aside the disagreements on these questions, Al Qaeda and likeminded jihadist groups – as 
outlined in 2.4 through 2.6 – are insurgencies anchored to the ideology of jihadism and fuelled 
by Muslim grievances and suffering. Moreover, jihadist groups share a wide range of patterns 
common to many guerrilla movements: being clandestine and operating in areas difficult to 
locate; working in areas of war, conflict and underdevelopment; the use of propaganda and 
terror to demoralise and demonstrate strength; an emphasis on urban terrorism etc.  
Furthermore, since Al Qaeda’s commencement, Bin Laden and senior fellows stressed the 
virtues of guerrilla tactics, given the power imbalance between the group’s forces and their 
assumed enemies. In his 1996 declaration of jihad against the U.S., Bin Laden declared:  
But you are aware that this stage requires the adoption of suitable combat methods due 
to the lack of parity between our regular Armed Forces and the enemy's forces. Namely, 
through light and fast forces operating in complete secrecy. In other words, by waging 
guerrilla warfare in which the people's sons other than the Armed Forces take part. 
(FBIS 2004: 23) 
Later, in 2003, the senior Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel promoted the advantages of guerrilla 
warfare in a statement posted online under the title “Guerrilla Warfare Is the most Powerful 
Weapon Muslims have, and It is The Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader 
                                                 
30 EOKA, Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston, ‘National organisation of Cypriot Fighters’, is a group that 
fought a campaign against British rule in Cyprus in the 1950s. IZL, Irgun Zvai Leumi, ‘National Military 
Organisation’, is a Zionist militia that operated in Palestine, prior to the establishment of Israel. 
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Enemy” (Cassidy 2006: 12). In this statement, al-Adel invokes lessons of history in Vietnam, 
Afghanistan and Palestine to extol the advantages of guerrilla tactics. 
2.8. AQ(AP) and the media  
I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we 
are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our 
ummah. (al-Zawahiri 2005b)31 
Nothing is new when it comes to radical jihadist groups’ emphasis on propaganda and publicity. 
Historically, propaganda and terror have always been characteristic of and essential parts of 
guerrilla networks (Laqueur 2017). Thanks to modern technological innovations, political 
propaganda has become of greater importance than military operations for terrorist groups. Al 
Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups recognise the valuable role of propaganda in advertising 
their existence and cause, attracting supporters and sympathisers and undermining enemies. In 
1984, before the official birth of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden sponsored the magazine al-jihad, 
published by Azzam’s Service Office (Byman 2015). After taking this early step, Al Qaeda 
core leaders believed that they should not only urge would-be followers to join the fight, but 
also reach out to people and teach them how to think. In other words, the fundamental role of 
the media is to spread jihadist ideology. The mobilisation of people is then the outcome of 
people embracing jihadist ideology, which stipulates the requirement of jihad being the 
individual duty of every Muslim. For Al Qaeda, the media have been an effective tool. Prior to 
9/11, Bin Laden occassionally gave interviews32 and addressed people through the diffusion of 
audio and video recordings on Arabic TV stations and online. Subsequently, videotaped 
operations and/or statements or “wills” of jihadist suicide bombers have been a significant and 
effective strategy, with the purpose of glorifying martyrdom and jihad. The first will of a martyr 
was published in 1986, by al-jihad magazine (Byman 2015). Similarly, the first videotaped 
testimony of a suicide bomber was that of the jihadist who executed the failed attempt to 
assassinate the Egyptian Interior Minister in 1993. These tactics have always been used to great 
effect by the propaganda machine of Al Qaeda and its regional clusters. 
                                                 
31 This is a personal letter sent in 2005 from the then Al Qaeda deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leader of 
Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi. Both the original letter and its English translation are available on the 
website of the Combating Terrorism Centre (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-
translation-2).  
32 Such as Bin Laden’s interview with John Miller of ABC News in 1998. The full transcript of this interview is 
available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html. 
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From the very beginning, Al Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups have understood that 
violence is the surest means of promoting their organisations and thus developed the typical 
terrorist strategy of ‘let actions speak for themselves’. Therefore, the basic means of 
communication for Al Qaeda in the early stages was through the execution of shocking terrorist 
acts (Baines and O’Shaughnessy 2014). But this strategy is discursively complex and speaks in 
three ways: (a) the terrorist act itself or the propaganda of the deed; (b) the narrative that justifies 
the attack; and (c) the messages describing the ways the organisation intends to achieve its goal 
(Wilkinson and Barclay 2011).  
Recently, the Internet has become a place for people to explore their religion and identity (Bhui 
and Ibrahim 2013). Online radicalisation is not necessarily unique in its processes, but it is 
absolutely distinct in its consequences. Previously, recruitment to radical groups was restricted 
to the recruiter’s personal contact and acquaintance. Radicalisation has leveraged the power of 
the Internet – and more recently, social media platforms – and taken great leaps towards 
building a global following. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda’s media policy has changed and embraced 
more professionalised media practices, with the establishment of Al-Sahab, ‘the clouds’, as the 
organisation’s media wing. With the appearance of Al-Jazeera as the first Arabic TV network, 
and after the American War on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Bin Laden and his associates started 
to diffuse their videos and communications through Al-Jazeera to the global media (Nacos 
2010). Since then, Al Qaeda and the broader jihadist movement have also used the Internet and 
the many technological advances effectively to spread their propaganda on a global scale 
(Burke 2004). This new reality, with the unlimited free exchange of information, has facilitated 
the activities of radicalisation and recruitment, which have become entrenched online (Stevens 
and Neumann 2009).  
Between 2003 and 2006, the Internet was used effectively to propagate jihadist ideology and 
plot several attacks. Furthermore, this period saw the flow of leaked video recordings of Bin 
Laden, in which he addresses and mobilises the ummah (Hegghammer 2006).33 Activities and 
use of the Internet can be divided into three main categories: official websites (such as the one 
from which the data for this study were retrieved), chat fora and blogs and distributor sites, 
which share jihadist links and websites (Rogan 2006). Recently, a strategic shift has been 
observed towards the use of social media, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, as more 
interactive methods of radicalisation (Torok 2013). The 2003–2006 protracted wave of 
                                                 
33 Similar to real space, loosely linked cyber groups were active in producing and montaging video and audio jihadi 
material online, such as al-saħāb Media Production and al-furqān Media Production. 
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terrorism against targets in Saudi Arabia was characterised by exhibiting a pan-Islamist agenda 
for the first time as the rationale for their violent acts inside the Kingdom. Their agenda was 
exhibited through both actions and discourse. Before 2003, all attacks were on Western targets; 
but since then, Al Qaeda’s pan-Islamist ideology and strategy of struggle have expanded the 
scope of their attacks to new targets: security forces of the Interior Ministry and other official 
military and civilian personnel. Since 2003, thanks to technological advances, Al Qaeda has 
used online platforms to disseminate its publications, which focus on both the development of 
the ongoing confrontation and a general jihadist ideology.  
Jihadist magazines can be viewed as playing a significant role in mobilising, recruiting and 
publicising the jihadi cause as early as the Afghan cause in the 1980s.34 That the publication of 
Sawt al-jihad in September 2003 served to achieve different purposes is no exception in this 
respect as this magazine attempts to justify launching jihad inside the Kingdom and provide 
up-to-date statements about the various confrontations with the enemy.  
2.9. Chapter summary 
This chapter has explained the broad historical context leading to the emergence of AQAP. I 
have set out to explain jihadism and put it into context as a radical form of mainstream Islamist 
revivalism. After that, I reviewed the development of jihadist movements in the second half of 
the twentieth century. I take the 1980s Afghan War as a tipping point marking the emergence 
of transnational jihadism, leading to the formation of Al Qaeda and the World Front for Jihad 
against the Jews and Crusaders. Then, I reviewed the activities of Al Qaeda before and after 
9/11 and its personnel structure, followed by an account of AQAP’s formation in the years 
following 9/11. Finally, I have concluded by sketching out AQAP’s media practices. 
As this historical review reveals, the doctrine of jihadism has gone through a series of 
transformations since its inception in the 1960s. It started with the Egyptian socio-revolutionary 
activism, whose goal was to overthrow local regimes deemed un-Islamic. Then, Azzam’s 
classical doctrine of jihadism crystallised during the Afghan war. Classical jihadism propagated 
the liberation of Muslim lands occupied by non-Muslim forces. The post-Afghan-War period 
witnessed the emergence of global jihadism at the hands of veteran Afghan Arab warlord Bin 
Laden, who sought to unify the community of mujahedeen that formed in Afghanistan. His aim 
was to consolidate the jihadist effort against the far enemy, i.e. the Christian-Jewish alliance or 
                                                 
34 Azzam’s three treatises (e.g. ‘Join the Caravan’ and ‘Signs of the Merciful in the Afghan Jihad’) were 
compilations of his articles in early jihadi magazines published by the SB. 
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America and its allies. His movement gained territorial access in the late 1990s in Afghanistan, 
which hosted Al Qaeda as a centralised network of mujahedeen. From 2003 to the end of 2006, 
AQAP attempted to bring global jihad home to Saudi Arabia, attacking Western targets – 
mainly American – plus local ones, such as security and oil targets. The inception of AQAP 
marks the first operational transformation of Al Qaeda into a decentralised organisation 
comprising regional clusters, operating on a regional level and sustaining the global enterprise. 
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Chapter 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a critical overview of the theoretical framework that fits into the overall 
research project: an interdisciplinary approach combining social, linguistic and discourse-
analytic theories to answer questions about jihadism. First, it elaborates on the notion of 
interdisciplinarity and sketches out the different theoretical frameworks that will be brought to 
bear on subsequent analyses (section 3.2). Second, I aim to describe Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) and evaluate how it can provide a theoretical/methodological platform from which I can 
critically investigate the hidden/explicit ideological and argumentative loading of jihadist 
discourse (section 3.3). Here, I review the principal concepts of CDA in light of the research 
problem. In section 3.4, I briefly explain Bourdieu’s general social/critical theories – 
particularly his views on linguistic capital, discourse habits and more general concepts related 
in some way or other to language and symbolic power. The social theories associated with 
Bourdieu provide a social-theoretical approach that supports my analysis of jihadist discourse 
based on reflections of the Islamic/Arab world (section 3.5), i.e. the socio-linguistic system in 
which jihadist discourse is embedded.  
3.2. Synthesis of theories 
The social problem being analysed necessitates an interdisciplinary agenda that informs the 
theoretical and methodological approaches taken in this study. I draw on several theoretical 
traditions to tackle jihadist discourse. Before detailing the specific theoretical groundings, I will 
discuss how such theories relate to my research problem. CDA provides a framework that 
allows the integration of different disciplines to investigate a social problem (Wodak 2008). 
Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999: 16) make the point that CDA’s contribution lies in “bringing 
a variety of theories into dialogue, especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic 
theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what it 
itself theorises, in particular, is the mediation between the social and the linguistic”. As a 
research paradigm, CDA relates to different theory levels: social (grand and middle-range), 
discourse and linguistic theories (Meyer 2001: 19). As illustrated in Figure 1, grand social 
theories first attempt to link the social structure with social action: the macro- and micro-
sociological phenomena. At this level, this study is influenced by the Bourdieusian model of 
‘capital theory’ and ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 1989; 1991). I argue that Bourdieu’s 
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sociological conceptual schema seems especially appealing in terms of demystifying jihadist 
ideologies and investigating jihadist semiotic data. Inspired by Bourdieu’s constructive 
structuralist approach, this study conceptualises a top-down model whereby the social structure 
plays a major role in determining social action. I hold the view that religious discourse has its 
own sociology and plays the hegemonic role of shaping social reality. There are no rules by 
which a society is divided into rigid groups. Rather, the existing groups in a given society are 
more or less the outcome of political and discursive processes. Thus, jihadist ideologues and 
activists use religious discourses – with all the symbolic capital invested in them – as resources 
for creating novel constellations of words, sentences and arguments. This significant role will 
be discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 1: The three levels of theories (Wodak 2008) 
The second level is that of middle-range theories. Meyer (2001) maintains that middle-range 
theories address specific social phenomena (such as conflict, cognition, social networks) or a 
particular social sub-system (such as economy, politics or religion). The selection of these 
theories is driven by the research problem in question and its sociopolitical context. Therefore, 
along with Bourdieu’s theory, which highlights the symbolic power of language and religion 
(see section 3.4), my project draws on the epistemological role of sacred/religious texts in 
establishing the knowledge system to which jihadists belong (see section 3.5.1). Specifically, I 
will draw on several critical works of authors from within Islamic/Arab sociolinguistic culture 
who have addressed the epistemological principles of Classical Islam (Abu Zaid 1995; al-Jabiri 
2011). This interdisciplinary outsourcing to discourse analysis is indeed justified in order to 
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gain a proper understanding of how sacred texts play a crucial role in religious discourse 
generally and, in particular, jihadist discourse with respect to maintaining power relations and 
the contextualisation of knowledge. 
The third level comprises discourse theory, which focuses on realising discourse as a social 
practice and attempts to explore its genesis and structure. In this sense, discourse theory closes 
the gap between language study (the lowest level in Figure 1) and higher-level social-theoretical 
traditions (Blommaert 2005). This linkage aims to cover all levels of analysis: from the (micro-
) linguistic to the (meso-) institutional and ultimately wider (macro-) sociocultural. That is, the 
analysis – particularly in Fairclough’s CDA – moves from textual analysis to studying how 
texts are produced, consumed and distributed, and ultimately to the assessment of discourse as 
a sociocultural practice (Slembrouck 2001). Meyer (2001: 19–20) argues that, within CDA 
approaches, one may find different theories: micro-sociological theories explaining social 
interaction, socio-psychological theories focusing on the social conditions of emotion and 
cognition and a myriad of linguistic theories (e.g. theories of argumentation, grammar, rhetoric) 
which try to explicate patterns specific of communication and language realisations. At this 
level, I daw on linguistics, pragmatics and argumentation theories to investigate micro-patterns 
in jihadist discourse.  
3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDA is an academic school or scholarly movement that postulates that discourse is not only a 
carrier of ideology but also a socio-cognitive action in its own right (KhosraviNik 2015a). As 
an academic school, CDA emerged in the early 1990s as a network of scholars: the Amsterdam 
Group.1 Its notions and theories can be traced back to the 1970s and Critical Linguistics of the 
University of East Anglia, which turned into investigating the use of language in social 
institutions and its relations to power and ideology (ibid.). CDA notions are also linked with 
the 1970s rise of closely-related disciplines in humanities and social sciences (e.g. semiotics, 
pragmatics, conversation analysis and discourse studies). The theoretical origins of CDA are 
rooted in Western Marxism, specifically the Faircloughian approach, and emphasise how 
cultural dimensions (language and ideology, inter alia) play a significant role in reproducing 
capitalist social relations (Fairclough et al. 2011). Furthermore, the foundations of CDA can 
                                                 
1 Following a symposium at the University of Amsterdam in 1991, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunter 
Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met and discussed theories and methods of discourse analysis. The 
meeting made it possible to lay the foundations of what is now a movement of scholars who share a programmatic 
way of framing a range of theoretical approaches (for a brief history of the group’s formation, see Wodak and 
Meyer 2016: 4–5). 
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also be traced back to “rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, social psychology, 
cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics, as well as applied linguistics and 
pragmatics” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 2). Despite their different disciplines and diverse 
methods and objects of investigation, CDA theorists and practitioners share the following 
dimensions, as summarised by Wodak and Meyer (2016: 2): 
 an interest in naturally occurring language used by real language users; 
 a focus on larger units of analysis beyond the sentence (texts, discourses, conversations, 
speech acts or communicative events); 
 going beyond sentence grammar to action and interaction; 
 the extension to non-verbal aspects of interaction and communication; 
 a focus on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies; 
 the study of the functions of (social, cultural, situative and cognitive) contexts of 
language use; 
 analysis of vast numbers of phenomena of text grammar and language use: coherence, 
anaphora, topics, macro-structures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking etc. 
CDA subsumes a variety of analytic approaches that share a deep interest in critically analysing, 
understanding and explaining the semiotic dimensions of complex social phenomena 
(Blommaert 2005; Fairclough et al. 2011). Its approaches commonly view discourse as a social 
practice and highlight the distinctive dialectical relationship between discourse and society 
(Fairclough et al. 2011). This dialectical relationship is a two-way association, whereby 
discourse is both constitutive of and constituted by society. Thus, discourse not only represents 
social reality, but also has its own constitutive power. This power of discourse can be 
highlighted in the role it plays in textualising the social reality, constituting people’s 
knowledges and establishing identities and relationships between them (KhosraviNik 2015a). 
Such constitutive power of discourse has critical ideological effects and can make assumptions 
about any aspect of social life (Fairclough et al. 2011). The view of CDA that discourse has a 
dialectical role in the construction of the social world implies that some aspects of the social 
world function according to different logics, i.e. there may be economic logics in place 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). This view means that discourse is just one among other possible 
resources of social practice. This distinguishes CDA from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
discourse theory. Following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe view all social practices as 
discursive, i.e. discourse encompasses the social, and all material entities are parts of it. As a 
result, discourse is not dialectical but is, rather, fully constitutive of the social world.  
It is worth noting that CDA is not a method of analysis to be used detached from its theoretical 
and methodological foundations. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 3) convincingly lay more stress 
on the notion that CDA is:  
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… a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package … [that ] contains, first, 
philosophical (ontological and epistemological) premises regarding the role of language 
in the social construction of the world, second, theoretical models, third, methodological 
guidelines for how to approach a research domain, and fourth, specific techniques for 
analysis.  
CDA aims to expose and challenge the way social domination and power abuse are discursively 
(re)produced. Therefore, it is marked for its tendency to focus on politically-oriented text(s) 
and conduct various analyses, ranging from micro-textual to macro-discursive (KhosraviNik 
2015b). Based on the notion that language use is inseparable from social functions, contexts of 
actions and relationships (Halliday and Hasan 1989), all CDA approaches highlight this 
functional aspect of language (Titscher et al. 2000) and use the scope of linguistics to answer 
pressing social and political questions. Thus, problem-orientedness – previously “a taboo for 
linguists” (Blommaert 2005: 6) – is a characteristic specific to the CDA enterprise (Wodak and 
Meyer 2016). Problem-orientedness necessitates a third distinguishing characteristic of CDA: 
interdisciplinarity. In other words, the problem, rather than the discipline, is central to the 
universe of knowledge and all relevant disciplines are brought in as equal partners to address 
the problem in question (van Leeuwen 2005). CDA is, thereby, a perspective in the social 
sciences that utilises discourse/linguistic analytic tools and techniques to answer non-
disciplinary social-scientific questions (Blommaert 2005). It “works from the social to the 
linguistic” (Kress 1990: 87) and, as Jäger and Maier (2009: 56) rightfully argue, the appropriate 
procedure in CDA is chosen in accordance with the research question and the types of material 
used. Therefore, it is not a discrete discipline with a fixed theoretical and methodological stance, 
but rather a research movement that starts with a politically-driven research topic: a social 
wrong (Jäger and Maier 2009; Fairclough et al. 2011).  
Linguistic analysis has become one of many sources of evidence when researching a social 
problem. Informed by grand and middle-range theories, CDA studies conduct descriptive and 
explanatory analyses: descriptive analyses of texts and then taking such linguistic analyses to 
the explanatory level where they are contextualised and explained within the wider 
sociopolitical context. The source of evidence found in language is peculiar and substantial, 
due to the fact that language itself is a form of social practice that constitutes, and is constituted 
by, the social reality (Baxter 2010). Nonetheless, CDA has received sustained criticism for 
being a contentious political activity lacking scholarly content and systematic methodology 
(Widdowson 2004) and self-reflexivity (Billig 2003). Wodak (2006) provides a comprehensive 
response dismissing Widdowson’s critique that CDA lacks systematic methodological 
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principles and procedures. She convincingly postulates that there is a vast array of books and 
articles on methodology in CDA (including Chilton 2004; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van 
Leeuwen 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2001; 2009; 2016) and many articles dedicated to the 
systematic description of methodology. With regard to CDA’s critique enterprise and self-
reflexivity, CDA is political in the sense that it concerns the analysis of exercising power 
through language, but this political sense of CDA does not mean that it is “unscientific” (Hay 
2002; KhosraviNik 2015a). Fairclough (1985) argues that being critical means that the analyst 
engages in unpacking ideological-discursive formations. KhosraviNik (2015a: 51) maintains 
that critique is linked to the notion of contextualisation and can thus “influence all levels of 
analysis, from the identification of a social problem and data selection to methodology and 
textual analysis”.  
Sayer (2009) advocates criticality in the social sciences, and even calls for explicit critical and 
normative standpoints immanent to the societies in question. He argues that critical standpoints 
as an explanatory level of social science should be “immanent in the society in question, arising 
within its system of meanings, rather than external to it” (ibid.: 773). In this respect, I endeavour 
to provide a critique from a native perspective; in other words, the investigation of jihadism 
from a native point of view. A native point of view can be argued to have a pivotal role in 
critique and analysis because the interpretation of a given text is contingent to the context in 
which it is embedded. Context is practically everything beyond the text, and emphatically the 
knowledge of the participants. As an ‘insider’ in the universe of the recipients’ jihadist 
discourse, who is familiar with its peculiar norms, codes and conventions for interpretation and 
contextualisation, I endeavour, then, to uncover the diverse ideological-discursive formations 
underpinning jihadist discourse. Jihadism as an ideology/discourse is primarily rooted in a 
sociolinguistic-intertextual system which defines how texts and contexts relate to each other.  
Therefore, a more locally-socialised understanding is required for the analyst to relate text to 
other texts and the wider historical, sociopolitical and epistemological context. The theoretical 
synthesising and the definitions of terminology throughout this study take into account the 
peculiarity of jihadist discourse to arrive at a better interpretation and analysis of jihadist texts. 
This can be observed in my definitions of discourse and ideology, where the emphasis is on 
integrating an account of the sociology of religion and epistemological outlines, apart from the 
wider sociopolitical historical context. 
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3.3.1. Principal concepts of CDA 
Central to CDA are the notions of discourse, context, power and critique. This section provides 
brief conceptualisations that best match the object of this research. 
 Discourse and text  
As stated above, the view of discourse as a social practice is key to, and distinctive of, the CDA 
field of scholarship. A fundamental premise underpinning CDA is the fact that there is no such 
thing as non-social use of discourse (Blommaert 2005). In its broadest sense, discourse is 
conceived as an analytical category describing a wide range of meaning-making resources, such 
as words, pictures, symbols, designs etc. (Fairclough et al. 2011). In this vein, discourse can be 
used interchangeably with semiosis as a process of meaning-making; every human action can 
be meaningful and must be considered in theories of meaning-making (Lemke 1995). This 
understanding of discourse emerged parallel to the 1960–70s developments in humanities and 
social sciences, which witnessed an increased focus on aspects of human action in language, 
e.g. speech act theory, theories of politeness and finally pragmatics (van Dijk 2011b). As an 
abstract analytic category, discourse has evolved to be viewed as a dynamic construct of form 
and action, rather than the traditional duality of meaning and form. 
Yet, there exist a number of potentially different conceptualisations of discourse amongst CDA 
theorists. Different contextual elements may comprise and generate certain types of discourse. 
Blommaert (2005: 2) argues that the notion of discourse “has taken into account the 
interdisciplinary contacts between linguistics and other scholarly fields such as literary analysis, 
semiotics, philosophy, anthropology and sociology”. Discourses occur in macro-contexts, in 
social institutions, at particular times and places and so on (Titscher et al. 2000). Fairclough – 
influenced by Foucault2 and having a background in Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics 
(SFL) – adopts a conception of discourse that is concerned principally with the discourse 
practices of specific groups, institutions or societies; his main concern is the discourse of neo-
liberalism. To make it operationalisable, he provides a view of discourse in which any 
discursive ‘event’ is conceived simultaneously as an instance of text, discursive practice and 
                                                 
2 Fairclough is influenced specifically by Foucault in his use of orders of discourse and discourse formation 
(Blommaert 2005). Despite acknowledging the huge influence of Foucault on popularising the concept of 
‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ as a method, Fairclough (1992, pp. 37–38) regards Foucault’s approach to 
discourse as abstract. Fairclough argues that Foucault’s focus on discursive practices go beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics, which were then the dominant modes of investigation in social research. Foucault is concerned with 
the discourse of human sciences and the rules of formation defining ‘objects’, ‘subjects’, ‘concepts’ and ‘strategies’ 
of discourse. 
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social practice (Fairclough 1995; 2009). He advocates a three-dimensional view of discourse, 
based on Halliday’s (1989) dimensions of meaning or language functions. Discourse is (a) 
representational, constructing social reality, (b) relational, constructing social relationships, 
and (c) ideational, constructing social systems of knowledge and beliefs. Summing up 
Fairclough’s account, he regards discourse as “(a) representing some particular part of the 
world, and (b) representing it from a particular perspective” (Fairclough 2003: 129).  
On the other hand, van Dijk emerges from a cognitive orientation and maintains that the 
relations between discourse and society are cognitively mediated (van Dijk 2016). Like 
Fairclough, he is interested in ideological discourses, which are produced strategically and 
understood according to cognitive processes and representations. 
With a sociolinguistic/ethnographic approach towards anti-Semitism, Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001: 36) define discourse as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated 
linguistic speech acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as 
thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as texts that belong to 
specific types, i.e. genres”. Reisigl and Wodak’s definition highlights the two elements of (a) 
the relatedness to a macro-topic and (b) pluri-perspectivity (see Figure 2) in a way that is more 
or less in accordance with their choice of the respective object of investigation, e.g. the 
discourse of anti-Semitism (2001) or the discourse on climate change (2009; 2016). Several 
other studies have adopted this paradigm, e.g. the discourse on refugees and asylum seekers 
(Baker et al. 2008; KhosraviNik 2009; KhosraviNik 2010b) and the discourse on the Iranian 
nuclear programme (KhosraviNik 2015b).  
The current study follows the methods articulated in Reisigl and Wodak’s Discourse Historical 
Approach (DHA) (see section 4.2). The element of ‘macro-topic-relatedness’ applies to my 
project because jihadist discourse comprises thematically interrelated texts and topics; however, 
a macro-perspective defines this discourse rather than a macro-topic. My definition is 
reminiscent of the Faircloughian single-perspective account of discourse that represents a 
particular social group that sees the world from a specific perspective (Fairclough 2003). Such 
an account is equivalent to the discourse practices/ideologies of a specific social group: 
jihadists. This project realises that jihadism, as either a social practice or ideology, manifests 
discursively and has dialectical relationships with other forms of social practice. Jihadist beliefs 
and opinions are (re)produced, disseminated and legitimised by means of discourse and, 
simultaneously, discourse is constituted and (re)shaped by extremism. 
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Jihadist discourse manifests itself as religious discourse – with religious normative ways of 
coding and arguing – and the need for its constitutive and manipulative impact should be 
highlighted. Therefore, while I am aligned with the DHA’s hermeneutic approach to discourse, 
I am inclined towards a Foucauldian view of discourse, which emphasises the role of discourse 
in shaping reality and conceives of discourse as “an institutionalised way of talking that 
regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Jäger and Maier 2009: 35). In this 
respect, discourse is a knowledge system that informs social life and constitutes power. In this 
specific conceptualisation of discourse, the relationship between discourse and social structure 
remains dialectic; however, greater emphasis is placed upon the major ideological effects of 
discourse practices in passing off assumptions and worldviews of any aspect of social life.  
In summary, I consider discourse to be: 
 a cluster of context-embedded semiotic activities of an epistemic community; 
 a knowledge system (intersecting and overlapping wider knowledge systems); 
 socially constitutive and socially constituted; 
 related to a macro-perspective;  
 comprising different topics that are related to a macro-theme. 
This definition is based on the fact that jihadist discourse is, by all means, religious and it aims 
to persuade and incite the intended audiences. Jihadism, as an ideology and politico-religious 
movement,3 relies existentially on recruitment, thereby intentionally influencing people – 
Muslims – to embrace jihadist perceptions, attitudes and views of the world and ultimately to 
behave and act in a specific way (Abu Haniyah and Abu Ruman 2015). Thus, for jihadist 
ideologues, discourse is more or less an autonomous and manipulative actor, one which is meant 
to steer its recipients and influence their actions. The question of power is the supreme political 
question for jihadist discourse. Power is, essentially, about the struggle over the monopoly of 
the religious truth. The religious element manifests evidently in different aspects: discourse 
themes; argumentation and collective knowledge and memories that have been transmitted 
historically through generations. Also included would be traditional narratives about the 
                                                 
3 In discerning whether it is more prudent to see jihadist movements as politico-religious or religio-political, I 
prefer to opt for the former, principally because their motives and declared aims are in essence religious, not 
political. What is at stake for them is the religious role of the state, whose role in their paradigmatic view is 
promoting religion and maintaining God’s laws. I will return to this later in the course of the actual discourse 
analysis. 
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heroism and virtues of the Mujahedeen of salaf.4 Recipients who know the genesis of such 
propositions infer the intended content of jihadist discourse. 
For CDA, the text has become the relevant linguistic unit, in both theory and 
description/analysis (Kress 1990). Every text – whether written or spoken – or discursive event 
is unique and dialogic, i.e. not seen as a sender-hearer model of a communication event 
(Titscher et al. 2000). Moreover, it can be seen as an instance of some type of discourse that 
recurs in a community and is, thus, recognisable as such (Lemke 1995). Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001: 36) define texts as “materially durable products of linguistic actions”, which can be 
visualised, written or oral. As Figure 2 illustrates, texts belong to genres – particular types of 
discursive activities – and are parts of discourses.  
 
Figure 2: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). 
These intertextual and interdiscursive relations and socio-discursive habits play the role of 
ideological functioning and operate as ‘identity kits’ (Gee 1990). Intertextuality is a pivotal 
principle in the dynamics of discourse analysis (Slembrouck 2001). Thus, it should be 
highlighted because meaning is not elicited exclusively from texts, but from ‘textual chains’ 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 37) or from ‘text to text’ (Lemke 1995: 41). The importance of 
intertextuality lies in the process of transforming prior texts and restructuring textual traditions. 
Looking beyond the boundaries of a particular communicative event, the analyst must explore 
from where specific utterances arise and what histories of (ab)use, interpretation and evaluation 
stick to them (Blommaert 2005). Interdiscursivity refers to the overlap between discourses, e.g. 
by referring to (sub)-topics from other discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). In the current 
                                                 
4 In Islamic tradition, the word salaf means ‘predecessors’ and refers specifically to the first three generations of 
Muslims. However, it is also used to refer to ulema and Muslim figures beyond this period.  
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perspective-related discourse (‘discourse of X’ rather than ‘discourse on X’), interdiscursivity 
is linked explicitly in a contesting way to other discourses, as will be explored in the following 
sections. For ‘topic-related discourses’, interdiscursivity can often be open to the extent of 
having hybrid discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).  
Jihadist discourse has its own system of intertextuality, its own set of valued texts, preferred 
discourse topics and, in particular, the habit of deciding which texts should be read in which 
contexts. The overall jihadist discourse is not only the product of the deployment of lexis and 
grammar, but also, and more importantly, the product of deploying different discourse topics 
and voices, and the way they intertext and relate to one another. In the model of the discourse 
on X, interdiscursivity implies an overlap of topics and subtopics (Wodak 2008). However, in 
perspective-related X discourse, interdiscursivity refers to the interaction between perspectives 
and ideologies. Jihadist discourse has its own patterns of overlapping with texts from other 
discourses – other perspectives in conflict – in the sense that it has its own principles and 
customs for interpreting these texts and opposing them.  
 Context  
A defining characteristic of CDA studies is how linguistic analysis is related to context. This is 
based on the premise that language does not operate in isolation and meaning is always made 
in contexts where social extra-linguistic symbols and expectations and knowledges play a role 
(Lemke 1995). Thus, all discourses are historical and can only be analysed with reference to 
their respective relevant contexts (Meyer 2001). Nevertheless, context is not simply added to a 
text; rather, it defines the text itself, including its genesis, meanings and conditions of use 
(Blommaert 2005). Context is not offered solely by the speaker, it is also the product of a 
dialogical process in which different parties in the communication offer and generate contexts. 
An appropriate account of a context is not a context for a particular text. This account of context 
is partial and fails to explain much of what occurs during interaction.  
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Figure 3: Context levels’ interactions (KhosraviNik 2010: 67). 
As this figure illustrates, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 40–41) conceptualise four levels of context, 
which relate dialectically to the discursive event: 
 the immediate text-internal co-text; 
 the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and 
discourses; 
 the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of the specific 
context of a situation; 
 the broader historical sociopolitical context in which discursive practices are embedded 
and related. 
In this case, context is the structure consisting of all the relevant categories that have a 
contextual effect on the production and comprehension of discourse structures. That is, contexts 
are concerned with conditions of relevance (see Sperber and Wilson 1995: 118 ff.) and should 
consequently comprise knowledge and a shared set of beliefs. This can best be accomplished if 
context is conceptualised in a way that allows elements of the knowledge system, which I 
assume is an all-encompassing level of context, particularly in the case of investigating jihadist 
discourse as it is intended to address people from the same socioculture: Muslims. Blommaert 
(2005: 41) establishes that contextualisation “comprises all activities by participants which 
make relevant, maintain, revise, and cancel … any aspect of context which, in turn, is 
responsible for the interpretation of an utterance in its particular locus of occurrence”. 
Therefore, interpretation is the product of contextualisation. Re-contextualisation is a further 
process whereby an element of a given discourse is transferred into a new context (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001). Such a process entails the de-contextualisation of a given element and inserting 
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it into a new context. These two related processes – along with the concept of intertextuality – 
are particularly appealing to the analysis of the way certain sacred/symbolic texts are 
reproduced in AQAP discourse, a defining characteristic of jihadist discourse.  
 Power 
As stated above, CDA approaches are united by an interest in semiotic dimensions of power, 
of which the deepest outcome is inequality and manipulation. Foucault (1996: 394) defines 
power as “a whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, that seem capable of 
inducing behaviours or discourses”. Power may exist in different modalities: coercive physical 
power, symbolic power and the power to influence and manufacture consent. In all of these, 
language often plays a critical role that means something to everyone. This role is of an 
ideological nature, which ought to be “one of the major themes of modern social sciences”, as 
rightly argued by Fairclough (2001: 2). The connection between discourse and power is 
twofold: power of discourse and power over discourse. 
In line with the adopted Foucauldian conception of discourse, the power of a discourse is linked 
to its constitutive power. This can be in the flow of knowledge(s) determined by discourse that 
affects the way people interpret reality and organise their discursive and non-discursive 
practices. Power in this sense is not understood only as something which people possess and 
exercise over others, but rather as that which produces the social and ascribes meaning to it 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). To varying degrees, discourses (and discourse genres, too) 
conventionalise, negotiate, constitute and perpetuate power hierarchies, norms and assumptions 
(KhosraviNik 2015a). I do not hold a deterministic view of the concentrated power of discourse 
as necessarily guiding people and forming their consciousness. However, in the case of jihadist 
discourse, discourse formation is intended to be like that, given the role of religion and the 
epistemological weight assigned to sacred texts, which is intentionally exploited at the stage of 
text production in order to influence the audience, or radicalise them. With regard to power 
over discourse, not all people have the same access to the repertoire and the means of 
communication. The repertoire is the set of linguistic resources or ways of speaking (Blommaert 
2005). In the case of jihadist discourse, an important element of the repertoire is the 
management of sacred texts and religious discourses, and how these are de-contextualised and 
re-contextualised in emerging contexts. With regard to the religious repertoires, people have 
different social positions, and thereby different opportunities for influence. 
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 Critique 
The critical attitude of CDA towards semiotic power relations and power abuse is another 
defining characteristic. Influenced by the Frankfurt School’s critical approach towards the 
social sciences (particularly that of Jürgen Habermas), CDA seeks not only to describe the 
linguistic and discursive mystification of power disparity, but also to critique and change it 
(Wodak and Meyer 2016). The critical attitude seeks relative emancipation from and resistance 
of domination or, as Foucault (1996: 384) puts it, “not being governed so much”. Such an 
emancipatory stance highlights the need for the production and dissemination of critical 
knowledge in order to challenge domination through self-reflection (Wodak and Meyer 2016). 
The critical stance of CDA manifests in its interdisciplinary work, which aims for a proper 
understanding of how language plays a significant role in transmitting knowledge, organising 
social institutions and exercising power (ibid.). A critique’s impetus is fundamental to CDA at 
all levels of investigation: from the identification of a social problem, to the selection of data, 
to contextualised linguistic analysis. 
The systematic description of textual/linguistic characteristics is part of CDA. However, a 
‘critical’ discourse analysis is accentuated by demystifying the link between linguistic choices 
and the political/ideological stance of the text producer. Such an explanation of textual findings 
is one dimension of the critical impetus. Another dimension is accentuated through the 
contextualisation of these findings. However, the embeddedness of the analyst in the social 
structure should be reflected in the critique. Critique can by no means be drawn from “an outside 
position” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 7). However, being ‘critical’ implies that the analyst should 
be distanced from the data in order to contextualise the linguistic analysis and make the 
respective political stance explicit (Wodak 2007). Therefore, self-reflection is a central element 
of critique that should not be overlooked. The DHA follows a model of critique that integrates 
three related aspects (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 25): 
1. ‘Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims to discover incosistencies, (self)-
contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures. 
2. ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’ is concerned with uncovering the – particularly latent – 
persuasive or ‘maipulative’ character of discursive practices. Here, we rely on our 
contextual knowledge and draw on social theories and other theoretical models from 
various disciplines to interpret discursive events. 
3. ‘Prospective critique’ seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines 
against sexist language use or by reducing ‘language barriers’ in hospitals, schools and 
so forth). 
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Sayer (2009: 769) argues that, since the 1970s, critique in the social sciences has tended to be 
rather weak and reduced to mere criticising or, as he puts it, “the reduction of illusion [of power] 
in society”. He ascribes this neither to positivist value-freedom nor to postmodern suspicion of 
normativity, but to the fact that social scientific critiques “rarely set out their normative 
standpoints [and] their conceptions of the good” (ibid.: 768). He argues that, in the context of 
the social sciences, critique should – indeed cannot – avoid such normative standpoints that 
require consideration of ethics and well-being. To avoid inconsistencies and contradictions, 
critique should be based on a belief in “what is true or more true than what is false or less true” 
(ibid.: 770). According to Sayer, critique should not only identify false beliefs and what 
practices such beliefs inform but also explain why these false beliefs exist.5 The DHA’s model 
holds a normative standpoint and bases its discursive critique on the discourse ethics of 
deliberative democracy (see, for example, the ten rules of argumentation in Reisigl and Wodak, 
2001: 70–71). Similarly, van Dijk (2009) asserts that CDA’s research policy implies an ethical 
assessment; therefore, it should be based on internationally-recognised human and social rights. 
Based on such a normative standpoint, application of the results is aspired to. Wodak (2007: 
209) maintains that for all those concerned with CDA, the application of the results is important, 
whether “in practical seminars for teachers, doctors and bureaucrats, in the writing of expert 
opinions, or devising schoolbooks”. 
3.4. Symbolic power and discourse habits 
Marx’s economic interpretation of capital is incomplete and unsatisfactory, as “man is not 
simply an economic animal” (Fukuyama 2006: xvi). Economic interpretations cannot explain 
jihadists’ belief-related motives that may well drive individuals to martyrdom. The individual’s 
willingness to die for a certain cause – including jihadists – cannot be explained in economic 
terms. It is for this reason that I turn to Bourdieu’s theory of capital that makes room for non-
materialist accounts. Pierre Bourdieu’s capital theory goes beyond economic theory and takes 
the notion of resources in the social world beyond the traditional economic form. Bourdieu 
(1986: 241) states that:  
[C]apital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which 
is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in 
the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain 
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of 
educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations 
                                                 
5 I will endeavour to accomplish this explanatory level by incorporating the epistemological dimension of religious 
texts and traditions. 
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(‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital 
and may be institutionalised in the forms of a title of nobility. 
Furthermore, he provides a theory of social habitus with a range of complex immediate notions 
capable of bridging between texts (or any semiotic events) and the larger social system in which 
these texts/events occur. Thus, Bourdieu highlights the dimension of struggle and interaction, 
and states that the resources at stake in the various social fields6 are economic, cultural/symbolic 
and social capital. Yet, these forms of capital are mutually convertible in the social world, which 
is structured by relations of power and domination. Actors’ capital is acquired through struggle 
and is partly institutionalised and partly incorporated (Wodak and Meyer 2016). Every social 
field has its own evolving system of dispositions, habitus, which ensures actors perceive and 
think according to the rules of the field. In this vein, actors engage in discourses and follow the 
discursive games specific to relevant social fields, i.e. they are equipped with their own 
linguistic system of dispositions or habits of meaning-making (ibid.). 
In line with his capital theory, Bourdieu (1991) provides a framework of power that integrates 
diverse concepts of power. Of greater importance here is the intriguing concept of symbolic 
power. The question of power is central to the investigation of jihadist discourse. Language is 
not powerful per se, it gains power from powerful people (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Thus, we 
cannot ignore that jihadist discourse is essentially religious, is produced by religious strategic 
thinkers and is delivered by religious clerics or other speakers appealing to the authority of 
religion. Here, the relationship between language and the social position of the speaker is best 
understood in Bourdieu’s model of symbolic power, which highlights this symbolic value in 
the dynamics of social power relations. In fact, such symbolic power is, to a considerable 
degree, appealed to in jihadist discourse, given the symbolic value of religion in the cognition 
of the intended audience. Thus, there emerges the question of power from outside language: a 
type of power that comes to discourse from religion. As stated eloquently by Bourdieu (1991: 
107): 
…[t]he power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the 
spokesperson and his speech – that is, the substance of his discourse and 
inseparably, his way of speaking – is no more than a testimony, and one among 
others, of the guarantee of delegation which is invested in him. 
                                                 
6 Social fields are “dynamic systems, characterised by struggles among the actors within this field over the 
distribution of resources” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 11). 
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Bourdieu (1991: 13) proposes that “the body is the site of incorporated history” and the 
symbolic capital assigned to some speaker or institution is accumulated prestige or honour. He 
convincingly posits that “words are loaded with unequal weights”, based on “who utters them 
and how they are said” (ibid.: 1). It is through these specific social and political conditions of 
language formation and use that he criticises structural linguists for overlooking. As with other 
social practices, texts cannot be analysed adequately as the outcome of conscious calculation; 
rather, they must be regarded as “products of particular histories which endure in the habitus” 
(ibid.: 15).  
So, text formation and interpretation are influenced by the speaker’s social position in terms of 
accent, grammar and lexis and semantic disposition; moreover, in using particular registers and 
genres to deliver recognisable types of discourse in order to invoke definite meanings or 
viewpoints on their subjects. For Bourdieu, the immediate context is particularly important as 
a key element for identifying the value of an utterance in the market of linguistic exchanges. 
Part of the context is the different formations (codes, genres, registers etc.) which systematically 
define, and are defined by, the macro-social relationships in the community (such as classes, 
genders or any significant sociopolitical division of any kind). In this sense of economic 
metaphor, speakers with higher social status, and consequently higher symbolic capital, have 
greater argumentation capital and greater ability to persuade and influence certain actions in the 
real world. Bourdieu continues that those who hold the most capital need only to speak to 
receive linguistic profit, irrespective of what they say (ibid.). 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power is relevant to the investigation of jihadist discourse. I 
argue that there is a peculiar form of symbolic power in the use of religious discourse and scared 
texts; this symbolic power relies, in part, on the symbolic value of religion for Muslims as the 
wider epistemic community. Bourdieu (1991: 164) argues that “symbolic power is that invisible 
power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that 
they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it”. Such invisibility appears to play 
a significant role in concealing the potential force stemming from the influence of religious 
discourse (Abu Zaid 1995). Within the Arab/Islamic world, there is a tendency amongst lay 
Muslims to regard religious discourse as mere discourse rather than having the potential to 
wield considerable power (ibid.). Religious discourse(s) can be exploited to (re)shape public 
opinion and to (re)produce social wrongs (such as discrimination, exclusion, incitement etc.) 
by legitimising these actions with the religious politics of truth. The Bourdieusian notion of 
habitus more or less resembles and goes hand-in-hand with Foucaultian discourse. They both 
exert power and transport context-specific knowledges and frameworks for making sense of 
 50 
things, which subsequently shape individual and collective actions – reality (Jäger and Maier 
2009; van Leeuwen 2009). 
To conclude, Bourdieu’s models of symbolic power and discourse habits consider the 
idiosyncrasies among sociolinguistic/cultural systems and the dynamics of social power 
specific to them. To adequately investigate jihadist discourse, the adoption of such a flexible 
social theory helps to identify the relationships between discourses and the social positions of 
their producers. Such discourse-imminent symbolic power seems to be of no less influence than 
the coercive actions of jihadism in the real world. This is because the recruitment of jihadists 
begins with the exposure of lay people to jihadist discourses that are heavily loaded with the 
symbolic capital of sacred and valued texts.  
3.5. Knowledge management  
Knowledge is an important category of context. Van Dijk (1995) points to the importance of 
knowledge management as a crucial means of contextualisation. He argues that interlocutors 
not only need to have knowledge about the world or the current communicative situation, but 
also mutual knowledge of each other’s understandings. Consequently, power abuse and 
manipulation in communication involve specific discursive strategies of knowledge 
management. When we speak about the discourse of a specific social group, we should consider 
not only discourse structures but also the knowledge and beliefs its producers share with the 
assumed audience. Contexts are concerned with relevance; therefore, it is an important role of 
the CDA researcher to explicate the ways in which socially shared beliefs are discursively 
created and propagated and how certain beliefs are abused in the maintenance and legitimisation 
of domination.  
Radicalisation is, in essence, a matter of knowledge management. Therefore, demystifying 
strategies of knowledge management in jihadist discourse is an integral part of the current 
research. This is because jihadist ideologues have, or cite people who have, preferential access 
to religious knowledge and/or discourse; consequently, they have the power to influence 
people’s knowledge formation. To understand how jihadists discursively manipulate how 
recipients understand an event or discourse, we have to look at the reasoning universe, in which 
both the jihadists and their assumed audience are situated. That is, we have to look at what 
criteria the jihadists use to establish specific beliefs to be treated as true, whereas others are not. 
Therefore, it is wise to shed some light on the knowledge system to which Salafist jihadism, as 
an ideology, belongs.  
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3.5.1. The epistemological background  
Islam is a religion of revelation which is deposited in the Quran. For Muslims, the latter is 
believed to preserve the precise words spoken by God and revealed to Muhammed throughout 
his mission. The Quran was codified and disseminated 30 years after the Prophet’s death on the 
orders of the third Caliph, Othman bin Affan (al-Jabiri 2013). In addition to the Quran, Muslims 
preserved and later codified the Sunnah ‘example practice’, which includes details about the 
Prophet’s life, instructions and explanations. In its entirety, the Sunnah represents the model 
early Muslims saw in him as the perfect human life lived in accordance with the divine will of 
God (Burton 1994). The Sunnah comprises a vast literature of reports known conventionally as 
ħadith (pl. aħādīth).7 The Quran and Sunnah are regarded as the two main sources of knowledge 
in Islamic tradition; the former is the exact words of God, the latter contains the words of his 
messenger: who “nor does he speak from his own inclination. It is not but a revelation 
revealed.”8 According to classical Islamic doctrine, the distinction between Quran and Sunnah 
(often referred to as Hadith) is of form only, not of substance (Brown 1996). As such, it has 
been a received opinion amongst Muslim jurists and scholars that the Hadith (the Prophet’s 
instructions by word and example) has the status of revelation and is the second source of 
knowledge and wisdom, after the Quran (ibid.).  
The question of al-ʿaql ‘reason’ and al-naql ‘transmitted sources of revelation’ is centuries old, 
within the Islamic tradition. There is much to say about the epistemological aspect because it 
intersects with major philosophical questions that surround the debate about modernity and 
Islamic tradition (e.g. Haj 2008; Hallaq 2014). Here is a brief account. The tendency to intertext 
with sacred texts – as explored in depth in the analyses in Chapters 5 to 7 – calls for considering 
their contextual and epistemological weight. To make connections between what is said in the 
discourses in question and the knowledge systems in which they operate, I turn to what is 
perhaps the most influential Arab/Islamic philosophical treatise of the twentieth century, 
namely A Critique of Arab Reason by the Arab philosopher Mohammed al-Jabiri.9 For al-Jabiri, 
reason “is nothing other than ‘thought’ (fikr)”, not as a totality of all thoughts but rather as in 
Emanuel Kant’s usage of the term, i.e. a knowledge system or an instrument that generates 
                                                 
7 The word ħadith literally means ‘utterance’, but it is used technically in Islamic tradition to refer to narrations of 
Mohammed’s acts, words, orders, prohibitions, recommendations, approvals or disapprovals about ritual, personal, 
public, political, commercial, military and administrative aspects of life. 
8 Quran, chapter 53, verses 3–4, from now on I will reference Quranic verses as follows: (Quran, 53: 3–4). 
9 Al-Jabiri is a Moroccan Professor of Arab and Islamic Philosophy, whose legacy focuses entirely on the question 
of “tradition and modernity” in the Arab/Islamic world. His seminal series Critique of Arab reason has been widely 
debated since the 1980s. His works were later translated into English (e.g. al-Jabiri 2008; 2010; 2011). 
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knowledge (Sabry 2007). Drawing on the work of André Lalande (1948), al-Jabiri (1984; 2011) 
distinguishes between two kinds of reason: al-ʿaql al-mukawwin ‘constituent reason’, which 
refers to the mental creativity that creates knowledge and constructs meaning, and al-ʿaql al-
mukawwin ‘constituted reason’, which refers to reason that is already constituted. 
Al-Jabiri (2011: 59–76) maintains that when considering the Arab/Islamic tradition, one must 
establish ʿaṣr altadwīn ‘the Era of codification’10 as the referential framework, which gave rise 
to ‘constituent reason’. He argues that it is the turning point at which Arab/Islamic culture 
transformed from an oral culture into a ‘scholastic’ one, whereby fiqh “religious jurisprudence” 
forms its genesis. He justifies his argument with the fact that what we know about the epoch 
antecedent to the Era of Codification was indeed structured in that same period; moreover, what 
followed cannot be understood unless it is linked to it in some way. He argues that 
‘Arab/Islamic reason’ formed during this period; subsequently, the diverse ideological fields 
and systems of knowledge in Arab/Islamic culture ensued. It is important to note that Hadith 
was codified and a vast corpus of individuals’ narratives of eye-witness accounts of the 
Prophet’s words and acts were collected (Burton 1994). For the codification of Hadith, an entire 
scholarly field of study emerged during this period to guarantee the authentication of Hadith by 
studying the ʾisnād ‘chain of transmitters’ or the series of people who narrated the matn ‘the 
text’ or the content of the reported Hadith (Burton 1994). Throughout the second century in the 
Islamic Calendar and the early part of the third century, a number of great collections were 
gathered following procedures of varying degrees of strictness for authenticating reported 
Hadiths. 
In attempting to classify the knowledge systems formed during the Era of Codification based 
on the epistemological historiography of Arab/Islamic thought, al-Jabiri provides a ternary 
classification of Arab/Islamic knowledge systems. His classification takes into account the 
internal structures of different fields of knowledge and defines their cognitive paradigms. For 
him, Arab/Islamic thought is divided into the following three knowledge systems (al-Jabiri 
2011: 415):  
1. al-bayān ‘explicational’ knowledge system which prevailed in jurisprudence, syntax, 
theology and rhetoric. This knowledge system is based on a single cognitive system that 
depends on analogy (see the paragraph below) as a methodology of knowledge 
production. 
                                                 
10 Al-Jabiri refers here to the period from 760 to 860 AD. 
 53 
2. al-ʿirfān ‘mystic’ knowledge system that prevailed in Sufism, some Shiette thought, 
Isma’il philosopgy, alchemy and predictive astronomy. This epistemological system is 
based on the methodology of ‘disclosure and communon with the divine’. 
3. al-burhān ‘demonstrational’ knowledge system, including logic, mathematics, branches 
of the natural sciences and discussions of divine attributes, which are founded on 
rational thinking, either by experimental observation or reasonable deduction. 
The first knowledge system is relevant to this study. The explicational knowledge system was 
the first to be established in the early scholastic Arab/Islamic tradition, whereby Arab thought 
exercised the first scientific activity before embarking on a direct dialogue with the legacy of 
ancient heritage – the mystic sciences. The production of knowledge in this system is based on 
a single cognitive method, which depends on “analogising the unseen (in absentia) on the basis 
of evidence (in praesentia)” (al-Jabiri 2011: 415); in other words, by explicating the religious 
texts (Quran and Hadith) codified during the Era of Codification. This methodology established 
knowledge of al-bayan ‘explication’, which includes religious and non-religious disciplines. 
The religious text has been, and is still, referred to as the daleel (ليلد) ‘evidence’ in Islamic 
studies within this knowledge system. Epistemologically, the explicational knowledge system 
is based on what has come to be known as Usool al-Fiqh (هقفلا لوصأ), ‘the fundamentals of 
jurisprudence’, founded by Muhammed ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (died 204 AH, 819 AD).11 These 
formed the epistemological and methodological principles that have to be followed to derive 
valid rulings of fiqh and Sharia law, i.e. principles for rational thinking within the explicational 
knowledge system.  
According to al-Shafi’i’s principles, which have been adopted by major schools of thought in 
the explicational knowledge system, sources of knowledge are ordered hierarchically as follows 
(see al-Shafi’i 1961: 88-ff): 
1. First and foremost, The book of God, the Quran and its exegesses, presents the 
foundational source of knowledge. 
2. The second source is the authority of the Sunnah, as codified in the various treatises of 
Hadith. 
3. The third epistemological source is consensus of the community of scholars, ulema, 
though the definition and validity of the principle of consensus is disputed amongst 
religious individuals themselves (Abu Zaid 2006). After the death of the Prophet’s 
companions, no new consensus could be admitted (al-Sayyid 2015). 
                                                 
11 Al-Shafi’i established the rules of the methodological science of Usool al-Fiqh in his book al-Risalah fi Usool 
al-Fiqh (Treatise on the Fundamentals of Fiqh), which remained the general framework for the production of 
knowledge within the explicational knowledge system. 
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4. For matters of doctrine that have not been mentioned in the first two sources, nor is there 
a verdict known to be consensual to the Prophet’s companions, one then can resort to 
reasoning via analogy to an established rule only in the absence of the above principles.  
These principles established the superiority of Hadith as the sole legitimate source of Sunnah 
over the understanding of Sunnah as accepted practice during and after Muhammed’s era 
(Brown 1996). Thus, al-Shafi’i established the principles of authority in favour of ahl al-ħadīth 
‘people of Hadith’ at the expense of ahl al-ra’ay ‘people of opinion’ or ‘legal pragmatists’ (Abu 
Zaid 1995). Based on such a hierarchy, one can observe the crucial role that analogy to the texts 
of Quran and Sunnah can still play (as will be discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 7). It is an 
established rule across the schools of jurisprudence and theology that laws are constantly 
derived afresh from the original sources: the Quran and the Sunnah, whose authority cannot be 
overridden by political or legal systems. The employment of religious texts to prop up one’s 
viewpoint is not restricted to theology, it is ubiquitous in all Islamic literature. Various fields 
of history, Quran commentary, law politics, linguistics and even literary criticism, display a 
constant tendency to prop up statements with external narratives, particularly Quranic and 
Hadith texts (Burton 1994). Al-Jabiri (2011) maintains that due to the potential limitations of 
dealing with religious texts, Islamic sciences stagnated at the epistemological level shortly after 
the Era of Codification, giving way to what he terms ‘the constituted reason’. 
Abu Zaid (1994) maintains that Islamic religious thought has ever since been revolving around 
religious texts, recontextualising to varying degrees religious texts to endorse the view adopted. 
He justifiably points out that recent religious thought seeks authority in athar, ‘transmitted text’, 
attributed to earlier salaf who are regarded as closer to the Islamic Golden Age and, 
consequently, as having better understanding and the ability to interpret Islamic traditions. This 
procedure is referred to by Abu Zaid as “transforming secondary sources into primary sources” 
(Ibid.: 67).12 
In summary, in order to understand the prominent role of sacred texts in any discourse – 
particularly in the discourse under investigation – one must consider its crucial epistemological 
thrust in the ‘politics of truth’, in the words of Foucault (1996: 386), in the explication 
knowledge system. The symbolic value of sacred texts and knowledge the society has about 
them cannot be identified without considering their historical genesis and epistemological 
                                                 
12 This is clearly seen in the AQAP discourse, as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 6, in a discussion of how 
these secondary sources are inserted into Sawt al-jihad in a manner reminiscent of primary sources. 
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weight. Examples abound regarding the role of sacred texts in the jihadists’ politics of truth and 
legitimacy (as will be explicated in the course of the analyses in Chapters 5–7). 
3.5.2. Ideology as identity 
There are different conceptualisations of ideology, but the common denominator is how it links 
meaning to the enactment of power. In its broadest sense, ideology is a “coherent and relatively 
stable set of beliefs and values” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 8). Conversely, Fairclough (2003: 
218) defines ideologies as “representations of aspects of the world which contribute to 
establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation”. Such an account 
of ideology conforms to the traditional Marxist definition of (capitalist) ideology as a means of 
hegemony in reproducing social relations. Furthermore, this definition conceives ideology as 
the construction of practices from a particular perspective and, consequently, conforms or 
equates to the Faircloughian definition of discourse provided in section 3.3.1.1. Thus, for 
Fairclough, ideologies equate to discourses and both are ways of seeing the world. This might 
be confusing since the two concepts originate from different theoretical traditions.13 For the 
investigation of jihadism, I adopt such an account of ideology; however, in my case, jihadism 
is not a dominant ideology, as in the case of capitalism in the Marxist view.  
Van Dijk (2011a: 382) views ideologies in a top-down fashion as “shared mental 
representations of social groups which in turn control the social practices of members”. In other 
words, ideologies are worldviews constituting the social cognition of an epistemic community. 
In the Western context, CDA researchers are interested in hidden or latent ideologies that appear 
in everyday common-sense linguistic realisations (Wodak and Meyer 2016). This is a model of 
a general and all-pervasive ideology defining a society or system. However, there are also 
group-specific ideologies, e.g. class ideologies, gender ideologies, ethnic-group ideologies and 
so forth (Blommaert 2005). Under specific social, political and historical conditions, social 
groups develop their own ideologies to defend their interests and guarantee their cohesion (van 
Dijk 2011a). The ideology of jihadism is group-specific, i.e. it is an explicitly codified and 
historically contingent mission. Moreover, it has a clear origin, influenced by the ideas and 
writings of seminal ideologues that have a mission and work to accomplish it within the totality 
of a sociopolitical system. Such system functions were once operated by a number of strata of 
                                                 
13 Ideology originates from the Marxist tradition, whereas discourse comes from linguistics in modern social 
theory. 
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social actors. The ideology of jihadists underpins their discourse, which is devoted to creating 
the identity of the Self as opposed to the Other. 
Jihadist ideology is not a hidden ideological common sense that ceases to be common sense 
when it is uncovered. Rather, at all levels of text production and text interpretation, ideology is 
tantamount to faith. Following Shayegan (1997: ix), ideology – in the case of jihadism – is the 
“ideologisation of Tradition”, whereby religious tradition and values are revived and employed 
for the ultimate political goal of changing the social structure and imposing a specific way of 
life. As for the ideologisation of tradition in the case of jihadist groups, their ideology is often 
expressed directly and brought out blatantly as warrants or conclusions in their argumentation. 
Moreover, it can be expressed in more specific social issues and domains and practices that 
reflect the attitudes of jihadists. In this context, discourse plays a role in the political 
reproduction of religious traditions. As such, what can otherwise be regarded as taboo is not 
coded, but is expressed linguistically as an act of faith – an absolute truth spoken by God. And 
in this vein, ideology “functions in such a way that it recruits subjects among the individuals (it 
recruits them all), or transforms the individuals into subjects” (Althusser 1994: 130) Therefore, 
in essence, an ideology is a definitive and existential condition for jihadists, as a social group. 
Their ideology serves as an overarching worldview explaining the relationship between the 
individual, on the one hand, and society and history, on the other. It is also a revolutionary one, 
attempting to correct the status quo that does not conform to its idealistic value system. 
3.6. Chapter  
In this chapter, I have run through the theoretical framework that will inform my analysis of 
AQAP jihadist discourse: the CDA tradition and key concepts, Bourdieu’s theories of capital 
and symbolic power and finally an explication of the knowledge system to which jihadists 
adhere. The next chapter will review the methodological approach of the current study. 
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Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the DHA research programme 4.2, which explains how 
I survey the literature on jihadism. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the methodological 
tools employed in the three-part analysis of the data: referential and predicational strategies, 
intertexuality and topoi analysis. After that, section 4.4 discusses how the data were selected, 
and how they were sampled for analysis. A review of the translation/transliteration methods 
employed is also offered here. Finally, the chapter concludes in 4.5 with a discussion of the 
ethical challenges I have encountered. 
4.2. DHA research programme 
Several methods have been proposed under CDA’s broad scope to analyse the distinctive 
(mis)representation and (de)legitmation of the Self and the Other. The discourse-analytic 
approaches under the umbrella of CDA provide different methods that vary in form and content 
according to the theoreticial orientation (KhosraviNik 2015a). In the meantime, there are two 
methodological approaches to CDA: deductive and inductive (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 18). 
Deductive approaches start with prior claims and assumptions and illustrate them with a few 
examples (e.g. Fairclough’s Dialectical-Relational Approach and van Dijk’s Socio-Cognitive 
Approach). On the other hand, other discourse-analytic approaches with an inductive 
perspective remain at the meso-level and choose their reseach problems and carry out in-depth 
case studies on larger volumes of data (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak’s Discourse-Historical 
Approach (DHA), van Leeuwan’s Social Actors Approach and the corpus linguistic approach). 
The present study adopts the DHA, which offers an inductive approach to the research. 
In line with the methodological steps suggested by Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009; 2016) for 
conducting a discourse-historical research project, the current study set out in Chapter 2 to 
review the preceding literature on jihadism within and beyond the field of critical discourse 
studies. I have been pursuing and formulating the socio-theoretical grounding that consolidates 
the multi-disciplinary underpinnings of the research problem under analysis. A general 
social/epistemological theory is needed to understand how the discourse at hand is invested 
with resources for saying and doing things and how it manages and de/re-contextualises the 
repertoire of old knowledges of the epistemic community to which the speaker and hearer both 
belong. 
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4.3. Analytic tools 
The DHA offers a research programme that is open to integrating the necessary theories and 
methods that lead to an adequate explanation of the research problem (Reisigl and Wodak 
2016). To operationalise discourse analysis, the DHA proposes a three-dimensional analytic 
programme (ibid.: 32–33). The first dimension is identification of the overall content or topics 
of the discourse under analysis. Then, the discursive strategies involved are investigated. Third, 
context-specific linguistic realisations (types) are examined. For a more localised heuristic 
analysis, one should consider the following five questions (see the corresponding strategies in 
Table 3, below): 
1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred 
to linguistically? 
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, 
phenomena/events and processes? 
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?  
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated? 
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The DHA’s five discursive strategies are illustrated below in Table 3 (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 
33): 
Table 3: A selection of discursive strategies 
Strategy Objective Devices 
NOMINATION discursive construction of 
social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events, 
processes and actions 
membership categorisation devices, 
deictics, anthroponyms etc. 
tropes such as metaphors, metonymies 
and synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum 
pro parte) 
verbs and nouns used to denote processes 
and actions etc. 
 
PREDICATION discursive qualification of 
social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events, 
processes and actions 
(positively or negatively) 
(stereotypical) evaluative attributions of 
negative or positive traits (e.g. in the 
form of adjectives, oppositions, 
prepositional phrases, relative clauses, 
conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses 
and participial clauses or groups) 
explicit predicates or predicative 
nouns/adjectives/pronouns 
collocations 
comparisons, similes, metaphors and 
other rhetorical figures (including 
metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, 
euphemisms) 
allusions, evocations, 
presuppositions/implicatures etc. 
 
ARGUMENTATION Justification and 
questioning of claims of 
truth and normative 
rightness 
 
topoi (formal or content-related) 
fallacies 
PERSPECTISATION positioning the speaker’s or 
writer’s point of view and 
expressing involvement or 
distance 
deictics 
direct, indirect or free indirect speech 
quotation marks, discourse 
markers/particles 
metaphors 
animating prosody etc. 
 
INTENSIFICATION 
OR MITIGATION 
Modifying (intensifying or 
mitigating) the 
illocutionary force and thus 
the epistemic status of 
utterances 
diminutives or argumentatives 
(modal) particles, tag questions, 
subjunctives, hesitations, vague 
expressions etc. 
hyperboles, litotes 
indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead 
of assertion) 
verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc. 
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It is worth mentioning that these strategies are not mutually exclusive. They are more or less 
intentionally adopted and practised to achieve a particular goal and are located at different levels 
of linguistic organisation and complexity (Reisigl and Wodak 2016). But for the sake of analytic 
categorisation, I will follow a three-part analysis, as explicated in the following subsequent 
sections. 
4.3.1. Representational strategies  
There is no escape from representation when it comes to exploring the jihadist worldview. 
Indeed, the construction of the Self and the Other plays a significant and decisive role in the 
discourse of a social group primarily concerned with identity politics, such as AQAP. That said, 
the DHA seems to provide a more elaborate formulation of referential and predicational 
strategies (as shown in Table 3) that exhaust the possible discursive realisations for 
constructing, labelling and attributing the Self and the Other. Nomination concerns the 
discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions. On 
the other hand, predication has to do with the discursive qualification of social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events, processes and actions, be it positively or negatively. Both nomination and 
predication strategies involve the labelling of social actors. The boundary between them is 
blurred. The act of nomination evokes a set of connotations, which more or less bear the feature 
of predication (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Likewise, the act of predication might implicitly 
evoke allusions to specific nominations. Furthermore, the semantics of predication might imply 
a tendency of naming things indirectly, e.g. via figurative and metonymic attributes. Such a 
grey area between nomination and predication may, in a certain sense, be a form of mitigating 
the illocutionary force of utterances.  
Perspectivisation concerns the framing of the overall discourse and the degree to which the 
speaker expresses his/her point of view, while intensifying and mitigating strategies modify the 
force of the utterance, whether by strengthening it or toning it down. For a perspectivised 
discourse like the jihadist type, varying elements of the five discursive strategies sketched out 
in Table 2 are strategically amalgamated and deployed to constitute the desired social world, 
including its subjects and objects. No one strategy can work in isolation. Of the DHA’s five 
discursive strategies, perspectivisation seems to be an all-encompassing strategic feature that 
can manifest in almost every macro/micro-level choice in the process of discourse production 
(KhosraviNik 2010a). Therefore, the analysis of perspectivisation processes and mechanisms 
is the desideratum of the present study that is brought in for all levels of analysis. Finally, there 
are mitigation strategies, on the one hand, and intensifying strategies, on the other. Both of these 
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work on qualifying and modifying the epistemic status of a given proposition (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001). These strategies are ubiquitous and fulfilled by means of a wide range of lexical 
and grammatical tools. Although I do not dedicate one of the analyses in Chapters 5–7 to them, 
they will be integral to all aspects of the analysis and will be explicated when they are relevant.  
Representational analysis looks into how social actors/actions are constructed through 
nomination and predication. Since my aim in Chapter 5 is to investigate the representation of 
social actors/actions, I choose to put more emphasis on nomination and predication. But I begin 
with the identification of the overall content of Sawt al-jihad through exploring salient 
discourses/discourse topics. After identifying the overall content of the data, I examine how 
social memberships are constructed, and how positive or negative evaluative predicates are 
attributed to relevant social actors/actions. I do this by categorising the linguistic realisations of 
both the nominational and predicational strategies employed in Sawt al-jihad. I have gone 
through the sampled data and noted the salient discourses/discourse topics about jihad and all 
the linguistic realisations of nominating and predicating associated with relevant social actors. 
Then, I categorised all these linguistic realisations according to their respective actors and 
divided them according to their discursive themes, as presented in Appendix C.1 The results of 
the representational analysis are presented in Chapter 5. 
4.3.2. Intertextuality  
In its broadest sense, intertextuality is a notional concept stating that any text is a link in a chain 
of prior and subsequent texts. Emerging from literary studies, the term was initially coined by 
Julia Kristeva (in essays such as ‘The Bounded Text’), when she introduced the Russian literary 
theorist M. Bakhtin and his ideas to the French-speaking world (Allen 2011). The introduction 
of Bakhtin’s work, particularly intertextuality, occurred at a highly charged moment, when the 
atmosphere was significantly polarised between structuralism and post-structuralism.2 Bakhtin 
criticised Saussure’s view of language as a synchronic system and criticised his neglect of how 
prior texts shape utterances, while simultaneously anticipating subsequent ones (Fairclough 
1992; Allen 2011).3 Thus, Bakhtin paid particular attention to the communicative functions of 
language based on the fact that language exists in particular social situations and is ultimately 
                                                 
1 There is more about translation methods in section 4.4, below. 
2 Kristeva stands beside other post-structural figures, such as Jacques Derrida, Ronald Barthes, Michael Foucault 
and Louis Althusser. 
3 While Bakhtin’s criticism remains true, we should not ignore the fact that we can cite Saussure as the origin of 
ideas concerning intertextuality, at least at the abstract level, as for him a sign only produces its meaning through 
its similarity and difference from other signs (Allen 2011). 
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bound up with specific evaluations that are socially predicated. He convincingly argues that the 
actual meaning of a given utterance “is understood against the background of other utterances 
on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions, points of view, and value 
judgements” (Bakhtin 1981: 281). However, the background is not an abstract one, such as 
Saussure’s langue. Rather, it is “the manner in which language embodies and reflects constantly 
changing social values and positions” (Allen 2011: 18). Besides the profound impact of 
intertextuality on literary studies, the concept is extraordinarily influential in the social sciences 
more broadly as well as in linguistic anthropology and CDA. 
Intertextuality has been incorporated as both a characteristic of and an analytic tool in CDA. 
The importance of intertextuality lies in the process of transforming previous texts and 
restructuring textual traditions. Looking beyond the boundaries of a particular communicative 
event, the analyst must explore from where specific utterances arise and what histories of 
(ab)use, interpretation and evaluation stick to them (Blommaert 2005). The concept of 
intertextuality – as adopted by the early poststructuralists in literary studies – appears to be less 
concerned with specific intertexts. Instead, it is tied to the entire cultural code of discourses. In 
such a holistic view, context is regarded as distinct from text and intertextuality (Allen 2011). 
While the entire code of discourses remains relevant in CDA, highlighting specific intertexts is 
inevitably crucial in discourse analysis so as to develop a more solid analytic framework. 
Furthermore, context plays a substantial role, in which intertextuality is integral, so that it is 
regarded as a constitutive element (as explicated earlier in Figure 3). 
Intertextuality is a pivotal principle in the dynamics of discourse analysis. It more or less 
implicates ‘the insertion of history into a text and of this text into history’ (Kristeva 1986: 39). 
While a given text may be unique, it still derives from already established texts or discourses. 
Therefore, texts should be read in the context and against the background of other texts and 
discourses (Lemke 1995). The significance of intertextuality in CDA stems from the fact that 
every discourse is dialogical and utterances are always understood against what has been said. 
There are several critical accounts directed towards intertextuality within CDA that link its 
micro discursive workings to the macro sociopolitical context. Titscher et al. (2000) insist that 
intertextuality is one of the necessary formal criteria of any communicative event that links 
texts.4 Conversely, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) regard it as a contextual notion. Gee (1990: 155) 
conceives of the intertextual relations of a given discourse as operating like an ‘identity kit’.  
                                                 
4 Other criteria include coherence, cohesion, intentionality, accessibility, informativity and situationality (Titscher 
et al. 2000: 22 ff.). 
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Indeed, my approach to intertextuality has been inferred in an abductive manner, i.e. it is 
inferred while going back and forth between the data and prior theoretical constructs on 
intertextuality, both within and beyond CDA. Therefore, my approach to intertextuality will be 
fully explicated with examples substantiating it in 6.2. 
4.3.3. Argumentation: topoi analysis 
The study of argumentation has a long history that can be traced back to antiquity, especially 
in the writings of Aristotle (van Eemeren 2015). Reisigl (2014) argues that argumentation is the 
art of persuading the addressees – either by convincing them with sound arguments or 
influencing them suggestively or manipulatively with fallacies. He views argumentation as “the 
linguistic and cognitive action pattern which follows the aim of justifying or questioning 
validity claims that have become problematic or have been questioned” (2014: 73). On the other 
hand, pragma-dialectics “enables the analyst of argumentative discourse to make a normative 
reconstruction of the discourse that results in an analytic overview of all elements that are 
pertinent to a critical evaluation” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2015: 381). Argumentation has 
the pragmatic purpose of persuading the addressees. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 69–70) define 
persuasion as “intentionally influencing a person so that she or he adopts, fixes or changes her 
or his ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, objects and ideas, and dispositions 
to behave or act in a specific way”. Charteris-Black (2011; 2014), on the other hand, views 
‘being right’ as central to the interactive process of persuasion. He convincingly suggests that 
there is no such a thing as unsuccessful persuasion because the model of rightness, by means 
of which an orator can get the audience to believe that he or she is right, is not a zero-sum 
process.  
The DHA is one of CDA’s analytic approaches, which have a strong focus on argumentation, 
as one of its five discursive strategies. Drawing on Kienpointner’s (1992; 1997) and Wengeler’s 
(1997) argumentation approaches, and by making references to the pragma-dialectical rules of 
critical discussion, the DHA offers an integrative argumentation framework that connects 
formal, functional and content-related aspects of argumentation. Its argumentation framework 
is based on analysing and evaluating the topoi used in a given discourse. Topoi analysis has 
been regarded as a useful approach in finding and uncovering deeper meanings in discourse and 
in critiquing arguments in an efficient and productive manner (e.g. Ochs 1969; Kienpointner 
1997).  
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Topoi (τοποι) is a classical term from the Aristotelian topical tradition, it literally means ‘places’ 
(Kienpointner 1997). It has been revived by many scholars within and beyond argumentation 
theory (Zompetti 2006). However, this Aristotelian term has been understood and defined in 
different ways. Wilson and Arnold (as cited in Ochs 1969: 419) define topoi as a “system that 
can draw one’s thoughts to the best hunting ground where ideas suitable to a particular speaking 
assignment can be found”. Rubinelli (2009: 13) looks at topoi from a functional angle and 
therefore dismisses the definitions that construct the topos as a static concept. Rather, he views 
it as a dynamic and pragmatic concept, i.e. “strategies of argumentation for gaining the upper 
hand and producing successful speeches”. For Kienpointner (1997), topoi can be either search 
formulas for finding argument or warrants guaranteeing the transition from argument to 
conclusion. Kienpointner’s (1997) approach to topoi is a formal one, in which he distinguishes 
between nine classes of formal argumentation schemes.5  
Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001) approach to argumentation departs from the formal view of topoi 
as an abstract formal typology and inclines towards material topoi: topic-related and field-
dependent topoi. In this approach, topoi are formalised as recurring content-related conclusion 
rules that are typical for the respective social domain and the discourse in question. Reisigl and 
Wodak (2001; 2009; 2016) have utilised topoi analysis in exploring the argumentation 
structures of anti-Semitic discourse and the discourse on climate change. They regard topoi as 
obligatory parts of argumentation, whether explicit or implicit, and define them as “the content-
related warrants or conclusion rules that connect the argument or arguments with the 
conclusion, the claim … and justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the 
conclusion” (2001: 75). The goal of the DHA’s argumentation framework is to identify, analyse 
and more importantly evaluate the topoi used, particularly in Self and Other construction. 
AQAP discourse is both dialectical and rhetorical, combining the formal logic of the former 
with the informal and emotional potential of the latter. Aristotle’s theory of topoi was developed 
for a similar purpose. Although the theory of topoi has primarily focused on dialectical 
argumentation as a philosophical exercise, Aristotle proposed a set of topoi as a means for 
persuading an audience in his Rhetoric (Houtlosser 2007). The theory of topoi provides a set of 
flexible schemata that can be used in a wide range of practical contexts (Rubinelli 2009). This 
set of schemata can be used to locate the arguments and logical relationships that exist in a 
certain discourse. As rightfully argued by Rubinelli (2009: 23), the selection of appropriate 
                                                 
5 These nine topoi are: topos of definition, topos of the species and the genus, topos of 
comparison/similarity/difference, topos of the part and the whole, causal topos, topos of contradiction, topos of 
authority, topos of example, and topos of analogy (Reisigl 2014: 76).  
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argumentation scheme(s) is a matter of the researcher’s ‘understanding of the interlocutor’ and 
his/her ‘general knowledge of the subject’. 
Although topoi analysis appears to be a good analytic framework for exploring the 
argumentative strategies of a given discourse by reconstructing the topoi underlying it, the very 
notion of topos is notoriously far from reaching scholarly consensus. Therefore, it seems 
necessary to provide a working definition as far as the data in question are concerned. From the 
literal meaning of topos – ‘place’, the spatial metaphor implies a location from which a speaker 
chooses to locate or develop (an) argument(s). That is, as (Miller 2016: 105) puts it, this 
metaphor “seems to require us to conceive of topoi not as propositions but as sources from 
which propositions (or terms, in dialectic) may be obtained”. Therefore, I align myself with 
Slomkowski’s (1997: 44–67) view of topos. Slomkowski points to the fact that Aristotle does 
not define the notion of topos in Topics, but he does refer to it in Rhetoric as being synonymous 
to an element “under which many enthymemes fall” (Aristotle 2006: 192). From this reference, 
Slomkowski develops an understanding of two related terms: topos and enthymeme. The topos 
can be defined as some sort of “law, or a principle … in the form of ‘If P, then Q’” (1997: 45). 
On the other hand, enthymemes are “instances of topoi; or … arguments which are warranted 
by the principle expressed in the topos” (44). To illustrate this distinction, Slomkowski (1997: 
44) states that the enthymeme that reads: A man who strikes his father also strikes his 
neighbours is an instance of the corresponding more/less topos that reads: If the less likely thing 
is true, the more likely thing is true as well. Aligning to Slomkowski’s (1997) account facilitates 
a topoi analysis that (i) provides a way for classifying arguments based on the already 
established universal topoi, and (ii) gives a way for making a distinction between universal and 
culture-specific arguments.  
Indeed, a number of scholars have called for differentiating universal and culture-specific topoi. 
For example, Amossy (2002), in her sociocultural approach, divides topoi into two categories: 
universal topoi, those relying on logico-discursive universal patterns, and culture-dependent 
topoi, built on cultural beliefs specific to a given ideology. This approach to argumentation or 
any other form of linguistic enquiry helps the analyst infer appropriate analytic categories that 
best explain the research problem. This is based on the fact that any political group has its 
language and portrays itself, the world and the past via this means (Wodak 1989). However, 
while Amossy’s sociocultural approach seems relevant and plausible, she does not make clear 
how such a distinction is made technically. In this study, I attempt to make this distinction 
through topos/enthymeme distinction. That is, the analysis of the arguments is made on two 
levels:  
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 First is the topos level, which adheres to the universal classification, e.g. topoi of 
definition, authority etc.  
 Second is the level of enthymeme, which is a specific rhetorical demonstration of a 
corresponding topos.  
Sociocultural variation occurs at the second level, while the first remains universal. In this way, 
enthymemes are arguments that emerge from the data. And it is the task of the researcher to 
construct his/her own enthymemes that best finalise the analysis of the discourse in question. 
Universal topoi provide a systematic analytic tool for both locating and classifying actual 
enthymemes. The results of the argumentative analysis are presented in Chapter 7. 
4.4. Data 
4.4.1. Data selection 
Several steps were taken to select the data for analysis so as to arrive ultimately at potential 
units of analysis. In the first instance, one must consider the context knowledge that underpins 
the data chosen for analysis. Despite the apparent ideological similarity of jihadist networks, a 
thorough macro-, meso- and micro-textual analysis is required so as to gain sufficient 
familiarity with the context world in which these groups operate. In that regard, I have chosen 
to study the AQAP network exclusively. As I noted earlier in 1.1, I am analysing the discourse 
of AQAP for two reasons. First, AQAP stands as a good case study for jihadist groups. The 
group’s body of data seems to be available, sufficient, representative and rich in terms of 
jihadist discursive forms and contents. Second, and despite the group’s secretive nature and the 
lack of information about text production, this choice was made because I have considerable 
background knowledge about the context levels of the group’s discourse, discourse topics and 
discursive events. Contextual information about the group, i.e. its historical development and 
media activities, is readily accessible on account of their publication activities via the Internet 
which has revolutionised jihadist media. Al Qaeda media operatives have been vigorously 
active online since the 1990s and have adopted Web-based platforms as distribution sites for 
the exchange of texts as well as audio and video- recordings. Despite the frequent hackings and 
closures of their websites, media operatives keep moving between various Internet addresses 
and temporary host sites (Hegghammer 2010a). 
Abundant jihadist texts (spoken and written) are available online in Arabic and other languages 
(such as English, French and Urdu, inter alia). The jihadist material is of various genres: books, 
leaflets, articles, fatwas by radical clerics etc. However, given my research questions, which 
are mainly concerned with the representation and (de)legitimation of the Self and the Other, I 
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focus on a specific genre within jihadist discourse whose texts are to be used for analysis: media 
publications that aim to address and mobilise laypeople. Media representations play a decisive 
role in creating and sustaining political identities (Talbot 2007). Publishing propagandist 
magazines is an old practice in the universe of jihadism that dates back to the 1980s al-jihad 
magazine, which was published from Azzam’s Services Office in Peshawar (as noted earlier in 
2.2.1). The field of action, within which these publications lie, is the formation of public 
attitudes, wills and opinions. Moreover, such magazines are more or less representative of other 
genres because they tend to include samples and quotations from, and references to, jihadist 
materials, books, articles, video and audio statements etc.  
With respect to methodological choices, there is also the question of how material from AQAP 
publications is to be selected as representative in a broad sense. AQAP’s remarkable textual 
publications in Arabic include five series:6 
1.  Sawt al-jihad ‘the voice of jihad’, which was published in 29 issues, ranging from 30 
to 50 pages each. 
2. Muaskar al-Battar ‘Camp of the Sabre’, published in 22 issues, again ranging from 30 
to 50 pages each.  
3. Al-khansāʾ ‘a proper name referring to a well-known female Muslim poet at the time of 
Prophet Mihammed’, a single issue. 
4. Al-taqrīr al-ʾikhbāri ‘the news report’, 23 issues published. 
5. Al-bayān ‘the statement’, around three issues. 
Although AQAP has released these e-magazines and other supplementary text, audio and video 
statements, the group seems to have relied on Sawt al-jihad as its central means for online 
Arabic propagation at that time (Bakr 2013). For instance, Muaskar al-Battar ‘Camp of the 
Sabre’ is directed at those who are already radicalised and convinced of the AQAP’s ideology, 
and therefore it provides them with practical military courses and tactics. Sawt al-jihad, on the 
other hand, aimed to establish a coherent ideological structure comprising the group’s 
ideological messages and responses to criticisms from political and religious establishments. 
Therefore, while addressing multiple audiences, as far as mobilisation is concerned, it has 
targeted the population of Saudi Arabia in particular. It has been the longest running of the 
various output streams – with its 29 issues released in the period between 2003 and 2005 – and 
it has played a significant role as the AQAP’s mouthpiece platform for mobilising the public, 
spreading its ideology and recruiting new members for the 2003 jihadist cause inside Saudi 
                                                 
6 AQAP also published several films which provide remarkable details about their operations, e.g. shuhadāʾ al-
muwājahāt ‘Martyrs of the confrontations’ – referring to confrontations with the security forces, waṣāyā al-
shuhadāʾ ‘wills of the martyrs’, Badr of Riyadh etc. 
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Arabia. Among the five publications listed above, it is the only magazine that offers timely 
statements, replies, commentaries and news about the ongoing campaign. Moreover, the 
magazine projects a persuasive Self-presentation and provides sections authored by multiple 
jihadist ideologues and participants, many of whom are members of AQAP and others who 
write under their noms de guerre. Nevertheless, little is known about the process of production 
and magazine circulation, apart from releasing it online. In almost all the issues of Sawt al-
jihad, specifically in epilogues, the magazine editors urge the audience to circulate the output 
among relatives and personal connections. 
After obtaining the necessary ethical approval, I downloaded the magazine issues from the host 
site minbar al-tawħīd wa al-jihād “The Platform of Monotheism and Jihad”, which is an online 
public domain.7 
  
Figure 4: Cover page (left) and last page (right) of the first issue of Sawt al-jihad. 
The magazine was published in Arabic by AQAP’s media centre for media production, which 
seems to have been in a house in Riyadh. It demonstrated a relatively basic aesthetic quality 
throughout its release. It is not as professional as recent jihadist magazines such as Dabiq of 
ISIS. Nonetheless, Sawt al-jihad adopted many of the trappings and features of a generic 
magazine. For example, it has a front cover page, with low quality graphics, that bears the name 
                                                 
7 I downloaded the magazine from this website: http://www.hed.ws/c?i=339, which is no longer available. Sawt 
al-jihad and all the archives of minbar al-tawħīd wa al-jihād were, however, available on two host sites, 
http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/d.html and http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis), at the time of submitting 
this thesis. 
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of the magazine, a logo that reads “we care about jihad and mujahedeen in the Arabian 
Peninsula”, and a dateline showing the Hijri month and year of publishing. The front page also 
includes headlines with the most attention-grabbing content (Figure 4, left). Sawt al-jihad has 
back cover pages which constantly feature an epilogue and some of the next issue’s highlights 
(Figure 4, right). Apart from the cover pages, the remainder of the content is merely textual, 
with almost identical sections devoid of any graphics. They include short and long articles, 
ranging from half a page to four pages. The precise authors are not identified and pseudonyms 
are preferred, though real names are often provided when the authors are declared leaders or 
are those who have already died. These articles are permeated with pull quotes, highlighted 
excerpts from symbolic and valued texts and advertisements for books, releases, articles and 
fatwas by radical clerics.  
 
Figure 5: Monthly breakdown of material (according to total word count).8 
None of the magazine’s editorial staff seems to have had experience in journalism, so they 
follow amateur norms developed within jihadist media networks. The magazine’s total material 
amounts to 549,093 words. As shown in Figure 5, the first issue appeared in the eighth month 
of the Islamic calendar 1425, which corresponds to September 2003, almost four months after 
the launch of AQAP’s campaign in May of that year. Exact issue dates are not given but the 
magazines seem to have maintained a steady fortnightly schedule throughout 2003, up until it 
ceased with the publication of the 28th issue in October 2004. Three months prior to this halt, 
on 20 July, the Saudi police raided the house where the media centre was located (as noted 
earlier in 2.4.2).  
                                                 
8 I convert the Hijri month, which is shown at the beginning of each issue, to the corresponding Gregorian one. 
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Figure 6: The volume of the issues according to word count 
4.4.2. Data sampling  
Having selected Sawt al-jihad, I then needed to decide how much of this selection I should 
qualitatively analyse. There are different ways of sampling used in social research, through 
which one can arrive at analysable material from selected data. These types of sampling are 
normally associated with quantitative social research. They are concerned first with the question 
of representativity, i.e. the observation of a small number of objects is taken as a means of 
reaching empirical conclusions generalisable to the whole class (Titscher et al. 2000). It is 
indeed problematic, from the perspective of conventional research, that the samples involved 
in discourse-analytic research are too small to permit representation and thereby 
generalisability. Wood and Kroger (2000: 77) provide a plausible account with respect to this 
methodological dilemma: 
The differences between the nature of discourse-analytic and conventional claims 
mean that there are also different procedures for warranting claims in discourse 
analysis … In conventional work, the validity of a claim depends upon the use of 
the appropriate statistical test, which both supports and depends upon the adequacy 
of sample size. In discourse analysis, warranting procedures do not depend on 
statistical tests. This reflects in part the discursive nature of claims; it also reflects 
the requirement in discourse analysis that claims must not simply apply to the 
sample as a whole, but must also account for every instance relevant to the claim. 
As such, according to Wood and Kroger, statistical tests for the adequacy of the sample size are 
not needed. Thus conceived, and given that the volume of Sawt al-jihad – as shown in Figure 
6 above – is too large to be fully assessed, the aim of my study is not to make claim statements 
about statistical relationships between quantified variables but rather to deductively ensure that 
the central categories of analysis in the selected material are represented sufficiently well to 
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facilitate the most detailed and precise analysis possible. One way to decide on the sufficiency 
of the selected sample is via the notion of saturation. This concept in qualitative research means 
that the analysis of data is carried out until no new categories are obtained (Wood and Kroger 
2000). Hence, I started with the first issue of the magazine and kept on recording linguistic 
realisations for the categories of analysis (e.g. linguistic realisations for nominating and 
predicating evaluative attributions for the Self and the Other) until no new ones emerged. The 
endpoint does not mean that the linguistic realisations of relevant discursive strategies are 
comprehensively exhausted. Rather, it means that the discursive strategies are saturated and the 
linguistic realisations collected are sufficient to make a solid argument.  
I have thoroughly read all twenty-nine issues of Sawt al-jihad, but for data sampling I started 
with the first issue and manually recorded linguistic realisations for the categories of analysis 
in 4.2.3: (i) discourse topics and referential and predicational strategies, (ii) intertextual 
connections and (iii) legitimatory topoi. The point at which I found that the categories of 
analysis were saturated and no new discursive themes emerged was the eleventh issue. To 
ensure that the first eleven issues exhausted the categories of analysis, I systematically went 
through every other issue until I reached the 29th, i.e. odd-numbered issues 13–29. After 
scrutinising these, it turned out that no further discursive themes emerged. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that this method means that the discursive themes scrutinised can still be 
considered representative of the data of Sawt al-jihad as a whole.  
4.4.3. Translation and transliteration of the data 
The translation of the Sawt al-jihad material from Arabic into English is my own. I have 
attempted to put this content into an equivalent readable form in English. However, maintaining 
equivalence when translating jihadist content that contains a wide range of classical and 
religious genres is not a straightforward task. So, I have had to take into consideration: (a) the 
classical variety of Arabic that is used in AQAP discourse (temporal variation) and (b) the 
variations arising from religion as field of discourse. Thus conceived, I have drawn on Cruse’s 
(1986: 270–280) four types of utterance meanings: propositional meaning, expressive meaning, 
presupposed meaning and evoked meaning. Propositional and expressive meanings are primary 
meanings conveyed by lexical units. The propositional meaning of an utterance is determined 
by its truth-conditions as conceived by language speakers. The expressive meaning of an 
utterance has nothing to do with its truth-conditions but rather relates to the speaker’s feelings 
or attitude (e.g. ‘I felt a sudden sharp pain’). Presupposed meaning concerns semantic traits 
which are taken for granted in the use of an utterance. Presupposed traits are not asserted but 
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rather arise from semantic relations (e.g. entailment) or co-occurrence restrictions (e.g. 
collocation). Finally, evoked meaning is a consequence of a language having different dialects 
(e.g. geographical, temporal and social variations) and registers that arise from situation-
specific appropriateness. While propositional and expressive meanings are the most important 
types of meaning and utilised by the speaker to convey the intended message, presupposed and 
evoked meaning – though secondary – add further meaning to the intended message and 
cohesiveness to the discourse (ibid.: 277).  
Being aware of Cruse’s categorisation of meaning helped me with translating the material for 
analysis. Indeed, equivalence at text level when translating jihadist discourse is difficult to 
achieve, given its intertextual complexity. However, to maintain the intertextual relationships 
between the data in question and the Quranic and Hadith traditions, I attempted to use the 
translations available for Quran and Sunnah traditions. Thus, I made use of widely circulated 
and more established translations that take into account equivalence at register and dialect levels 
and therefore use classical words and structures. For Quranic verses, there are several available 
translations with distinct merits to each of them. For convenience, I have used the online 
translation available at https://quran.com/. This website provides English translations side-by-
side with the original Arabic text. The key advantage of this website is that it offers a keyword 
search service, in both English and Arabic. The online search service proved very helpful to me 
when looking for particular expressions and word usages. Apart from the translation of full or 
part verses, the online search enabled me to maintain equivalence when any of the types of 
intertextual relations are involved (explicated further in Chapter 7). Similarly, I have relied on 
the website at https://sunnah.com/, which provides translations for all the prophetic tradition 
treatises. This site also gives side-by-side English translations and has a similar keyword search 
service, which thus made the translation of all intertextual connections possible. 
When relevant, translations are accompanied by transliterated forms. I do this for conceptual 
notions, proper names and linguistics realisations for respective discursive strategies in the 
course of the analyses. Except for anglicised words and names (e.g. ulema, ummah, jihad etc.), 
I have tried to use the transliteration system of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, with minor changes. 
I use q rather than ḳ for a voiceless uvular stop (see Appendix B). When necessary I put three 
dots ‘…’, ellipsis, to indicate that parts of the original text have been skipped. I resort to this 
when translating lengthy texts, or to avoid repeated patterns. Additionally, I use square brackets 
[ ] in the translated texts to provide words or phrases that relate to presupposed meanings or to 
add further explanation of a certain word or phrase. For instance, the bracketed phrase [the 
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mujahedeen] in (1) relates to what the pronoun ‘those’ refers to, while [false gods] provides an 
explanation of the word tawāghīt.  
those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the tawāghīt [false gods] on earth 
4.5. Ethical challenges 
Certain challenges arose from the attempt to collect jihadist data: chief amongst those is the 
protection of myself as a researcher when downloading such security-sensitive material. For 
this, I have done two things. First, I liaised with Newcastle University Research Office before 
starting data collection. This was necessary to make the university aware that whatever websites 
I browsed and whatever material I reviewed was for the sake of genuine research. Similarly, all 
downloaded material has only been stored on space officially provided by the university. 
Second, I was rightly required to obtain the university’s full ethical approval before I embarked 
upon any data collection. The university’s ethics committee processed the project requirements 
and evaluated the risk against university-wide and sector-wide guidelines and regulations and 
officially confirmed that there were sufficient safeguards in place to grant ethical approval for 
me to be able to download the intended data from the website of minbar al-tawħīd wa al-jihād, 
just before it was taken down, shortly after collecting data.  
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Chapter 5 REPRESENTATION OF THE SOCIAL WORLD, SOCIAL 
ACTIONS/ACTORS IN THE DISCOURSE OF AQAP 
5.1. Introduction 
In this and the two ensuing chapters, I analyse the ideological workings of jihadism in the 
discourse of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or let me call it – following Wodak 
(2015) – the micro-politics of jihadism. The analysis of ideological forms and contents in the 
texts involves explication of how the social world and its social actors are constituted. This 
chapter explores how AQAP (re)produces its ideologies and violent exclusionary agendas on 
two levels: through sketching out overall discourse networks and topics on jihad (5.2) and 
seeing how the Self and the Other are discursively constructed in sections 5.3–5.6.  
5.2. The discourse on jihad 
One of the most important characteristics unique to AQAP, among other Al Qaeda affiliate 
groups, is that it was the first combat group to branch out from AQ Central in the wake of the 
American invasion of Afghanistan. AQAP emerged at the hands of jihadist veterans, who did 
not lack organisational experience, whether in recruitment – through both media and personal 
connections – or operational capabilities. More importantly, the founding figures of AQAP had 
had considerable experience in the use of online publishing and media activities, particularly in 
support of the Chechnyan cause (as stated previously in 2.3.1). In this vein comes Sawt al-jihad 
as a flagship magazine involved in a very sophisticated media campaign aimed at delivering a 
coherent narrative for the AQAP cause. Among the various strands in AQAP’s set of symbolic 
representations that serve the jihadist purpose is its name: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 
AQAP has taken the prophetic Hadith “Expel the polytheists [disbelievers] from Arabia”1 as a 
slogan to inspire its very name. Two discourse-analytic aspects are evident in this choice of 
reference. First, the name appeals to a Prophet’s saying, which is part of the hearers’ repertoires 
of old knowledge. The Quranic and prophetic texts comprise a closed corpus with a strong 
epistemological significance, upon which AQAP builds its politico-religious philosophy. 
Second, the name evidently reveals the group’s rejectionist stance towards the existing political 
order. Although the name AQAP was first adopted in November 2003, in a statement that 
                                                 
1 Bukhari, 3949. 
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appeared in the fifth issue of Sawt al-jihad,2 initial statements adopted a similar name, “the 
mujahedeen of the Arabian Peninsula”, without declaring the group’s allegiance to Al Qaeda. 
Even after pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda, AQAP strategically practised camouflaging, 
through mysterious groups claiming attacks on security forces with different names, e.g. ‘truth 
brigades’ and ‘ħaramayn brigades’.3 Regardless of AQAP’s aim to exaggerate the size of the 
then-mysterious group, these names are likewise not devoid of the two aforementioned 
characteristics: the former appeals to a form of truth politics based on Divine authority, while 
the latter’s local orientation refers to Arabia, rather than conventional official state names. 
Overall, as already noted, Sawt al-jihad is primarily located in the field of politico-religious 
advertising. It comprises a broad range of discourse genres (e.g. fatwas ‘religious rulings’, 
religious debates, news reports and statements about specific incidents, interviews with jihaists 
and supporters of jihad, biographies of jihadists and respected figures in jihadist circles). A 
systematic examination of the data in the selected analytic period reveals that there is a plethora 
of interdiscursively and intertextually overlapping discourses. The primary discourses include 
‘a discourse on jihad’, ‘a discourse on the mujahedeen’, ‘a discourse on ummah’, ‘a discourse 
on Saudi Arabia [alongside references to other states in the Islamic world]’ and ‘a discourse on 
the Crusaders’, or the Christian and Jewish alliance. These discourses are not mutually 
exclusive as they share some topics or explicitly refer to each other’s texts.  
Sawt al-jihad’s overall aim is to deliver AQAP’s jihadist manifesto in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that a considerable amount of its content is devoted to the construction 
of jihad. The discourse on jihad is replete with a war of ideas and doctrinal polemics covering 
almost every conceivable issue related to jihad, among other theologically-related propositions. 
These ideas range from core beliefs to the fine theological details and jihad-related juristic 
issues that cannot be fully exhausted in the current study. However, it is worth summarising the 
macro-topics as displayed in the following diagram: 
 
                                                 
2 In a statement entitled bayān ħawl al-tarājuʿāt al-ʾakhīrah, ‘a statement on the recent repentances’, commenting 
on the appearance of three clerics on TV repenting their extremist views, as noted earlier in 5.3.2.3. 
3 These names later turned out to be those adopted by certain AQAP clusters (Hegghammer 2010a). 
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The focus on jihad is obviously salient as a criterion of belonging in jihadist identity politics. 
Therefore, it is worth exploring how jihad is constructed in Sawt al-jihad through examining 
strategies4 of nomination and predication. The data show that there are three main topological 
strategies for the construction of jihad in AQAP discourse: militarisation, religionisation and 
religio-politicisation. 
5.2.1. Militarisation 
Jihad as a signifier is essential in the semantics of jihadist discourse. As previously noted, the 
word jihad is a noun derived from the verb jaahad (دهاج), which means ‘struggle’. In Islamic 
tradition, jihad is used to denote both military and inner, spiritual struggle, as explained earlier 
in 2.2. However, the data reveal that it is used exclusively to indicate the former. Furthermore, 
jihad is referred to in terms of classical synonymous terms, such as qitāl fighting, ribāṭ ‘firm 
hold [in fighting]’, nafīr and ‘going forth [to fight]’. These references are of particular 
importance because they are known juristic terms imported from sacred texts. Their intertextual 
                                                 
4 Strategy, in this context, represents social actors/actions in terms of social activities (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). 
DISCOURSE TOPICS ON JIHAD
•the status of jihad 
•the obligation of jihad as regards self, knowledge and wealth
•the rewards for jihad
•the sinfulness of holding back from jihad
•conditions permitting jihad
•the case for mujahedeen not seeking permission from parents
•self-sacrifice operations
•the legitimacy of killing non-combatant infdels
•apostacy and nullifiers of Islam
•the case for the kufr 'disbelief' of governments
•the case against alliance with disbelievers 
•the defence for certain cases of takfir
•the sedition of polytheism, more than killing
•polytheism in non-Sharia legislation
•the case against Sahwa preachers
•the case against dialogue with rulers
•the expulsion of polytheists from Arabia
•the case for daf' alsail, 'repelling the agressor'
•Muslim suffering at the hands of non-Muslims
•American aggression against Muslims
Figure 7: Discourse topics on jihad 
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relations with sacred texts are intended to give weight to the religious obligation of jihad and 
to be picked up by the assumed Muslim audience.  
(1)  
...and his [Abdullah Azzam’s] books, speeches and lectures are filled with mentioning the virtues 
of fighting in the path of Allah gained by the Mujahed in this world and the hereafter. 
Issue 1, September 20035 
 
(2) 
...and that a day and a night in the firm hold are better than this world and all it contains. 
Issue 21, July 2004 
 
(3) 
The call to go forth from shaikh Osmah bin Laden  
op-ed headline, Issue 8, December 2003 
All three references in (1–3) are particularising synecdoches substituting jihad with other 
semantically narrower terms: ‘fighting [in jihad]’, ‘the firm hold [of jihad]’ and the act of ‘going 
forth [to jihad]’.6 Such particularising synecdoches belong to militarisation as a shared field of 
reference and features in both reference to it and predication. For instance, the noun phrase al-
ʾithkhānu fī al-ʿaduw is similarly a linguistic realisation that features in both nomination and 
predication, as the following two examples reveal. This noun phrase would translate as 
‘inflicting a massacre/slaughter upon the enemy’. This reference is frequently realised in the 
magazine and violently asserts the military nature of the jihad being propagated. 
(4) 
...so once anyone finds the opportunity to harm the Crusaders, he seeks Allah’s help and never 
hesitates, and within the magazine what makes you ready for inflicting a massacre upon the 
enemy 
Issue 7, December 2003 
A vital category of references that Arabic morpho-syntax allows is heavily employed in Sawt 
al-jihad. In Arabic, the word jihād is a verbal noun from a trilateral root – jāhada. This may be 
used in Arabic as the equivalent of the English gerund or infinitive. This facilitates the 
formation of noun phrases used as verbal expressions comprising a gerund and its object. This 
construction is employed in abundance in both nomination and predication, and it utilises 
                                                 
5 For reasons of space, all the original texts for the examples presented throughout the analysis are listed in 
Appendix A with their respective numbers.  
6 The references qitāl, ribāṭ and nafīr are included as synonyms for jihad in standard jurisprudential treatises. They 
are standardised based on the occurrences of these terms or their derivational forms in the following Quranic 
verses. For instance, nafīr is inspired by the Quranic verse: (‘Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your 
wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah’), Quran, 9: 41. The recontextualisation processes of these and other 
sacred texts will be elaborated in the next Chapter. 
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interchangeably the verbal nouns jihād and qitāl. Both verbal nouns in context mean ‘fighting’. 
Table 4 illustrates a few samples of these constructions: 
The verbal expression Translation 
jihād/qitāl al-kuffār/al-kafireen 
jihād/qitāl al-mushrikīn 
jihād/qitāl al-murtaddīn 
jihād/qitāl al-amrīkān 
jihād/qitāl al-ṭughāh 
‘fighting the disbelievers’ 
‘fighting the polytheists’ 
‘fighting the apostates’ 
‘fighting the Americans’ 
‘fighting the tyrants’ 
Table 4: A sample of verbal expressions using the verbal nouns jihaad and qitaal 
In all the constructions in Table 4, the second term of the compound nominals is the object of 
the underlying verb. This is a significant construction through which jihad is nominated with 
reference to the ideological identity of the Other, against whom jihad is propagated. Conversely, 
the verbal noun may be part of iḍāfa ‘compound nominals’, whereby the second term is the 
possessor or subject of the underlying verb. This construction defines jihad in terms of the 
identity of those implementing jihad or the identity of the Self. This category includes: jihādunā 
‘our jihad’, jihād ikhwāninā ‘our brothers’, jihad’, jihād al-muslim(īn) ‘Muslim(’s) jihad’ and 
jihād al-ʾummah ‘ummah’s jihad’. 
Apart from references, there is a host of predications that reinforce the military sense of jihad. 
One of the predicational themes of jihad (see Table 8 in Appendix C) positively propagates 
jihad as an effective means for resistance. In this vein, jihad is predicated with an array of 
attributions, such as: 
  a means to repel aggression and occupation 
discomposing the internal and external enemy 
a hit on Western colonisation 
the language of force that works with enemies 
the effective power to thwart the plots of infidels and hypocrites. 
In tandem with the mainstream rhetoric of Al Qaeda, AQAP discourse makes it clear that the 
perceived struggle with America and its allies – inside and outside of Saudi Arabia – is a war 
against Crusaders. Following Gulf War II,7 Al Qaeda discourse portrays Arabia – the Holy land 
– as being occupied by American troops. Sawt al-jihad speaks incessantly of the American 
occupation of Arabia. These predicates function as a crucial legitimatory topos, in which 
analogical conceptions are drawn between contemporary political realities and the Crusades.8 
                                                 
7 The American-led coalition to liberate Kuwait after being invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in 1990. 
8 The Crusades refers to a series of European-led military campaigns over two centuries (1097–1291 AD) in the 
Holy Land, part of the eastern Mediterranean coastal strip. The Crusades figure heavily and have a considerable 
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Thus conceived, jihad becomes an inevitable mission assigned to the us-group – ‘the 
mujahedeen’ against them, the ‘disbeliever invaders’ and ‘their agents’, apostate rulers.  
5.2.2. Religionisation 
Most of the discourse on jihad goes towards presenting the idea in general and, more 
importantly, strives to persuade the reader that AQAP’s jihadist mission is legitimate. The basic 
legitimatory arguments are always based on religous authority as an acceptable basis for 
legitimacy between the speaker and the assumed audience. Therefore, Sawt al-jihad reminds 
the audience of the Quranic and Hadith texts that state the obligation of jihad and fighting 
generically. Furthermore, the audience is addressed with texts of a juristic nature that discuss 
the debate over whether jihad is a defensive, collective duty for the community or an offensive 
permanent duty for the individual. Summing up AQAP’s account on this topic, the answer is 
straightforward: the necessary conditions for the latter are fulfilled because Muslim lands are 
under the occupation of infidel forces and local apostate rulers. As for the juristic rules of 
current jihad, AQAP ideologues and jihadist theorisers of all colours contrast with both 
mainstream religious scholars and the very foundation of classical schools of thought in the 
world of Sunni Islam that conceive of jihad as a collective duty for the whole community. 
Jihadist ideologues (including Al Qaeda’s) claim that old juristic rules do not apply because 
Muslims are under attack and they rank jihad second, if not equal, to faith.  
The discursive practices manifested in Sawt al-jihad confirm a notable correlation between 
jihad and tawħīd, 9 ‘the profession of faith’, so as to express the view that jihad is the practical 
profession of faith. By ranking jihad equal to the profession of faith, jihad is then constructed 
as both a means to an end and, simultaneously, an end in its own right. It is a means to an 
important variety of goals, but the principal two are the eviction of the Crusaders from the 
Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) and the establishment of Islamic rule. To reveal a snapshot 
of the juristic arguments, it is now worth looking at the op-ed article of the first issue of Sawt 
al-jihad: 
  
                                                 
relevance and resonance in AQAP’s Sawt al-jihad, as this period is closely linked to modern European colonialist 
strategies, American wars and the Western presence in the Islamic world. 
9 The correlation between jihad and tawħīd can be observed in the jihadist kinetic names and slogans. An example 
of the former is Al Qaeda’s al-tawħīd wal jihād ‘Monotheism and jihad’ (داهجلاو ديحوتلا) group led by the Jordanian 
militant Abu Musʿab al-Zarqāwi that operated in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 and developed into what later came to be 
known as the Islamic State in Iraq. 
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(5) 
…Allah has ordained a great command for us, it is jihad for the sake of God. The Almighty has 
said: ﴾Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate 
a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah 
Knows, while you know not﴿ 10 … God has ordained jihad for reasons all of which are available 
in our time, from repelling the aggression of the unbelievers to fighting the apostates, supporting 
the oppressed, and freeing prisoners, let alone offensive jihad against the infidels until they give 
the jizyah [poll tax] willingly while they are humbled. These are either personal or collective 
duties, but they are now obligatory as the commitment of Muslims to these duties is insufficient. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
This op-ed article, which can be regarded as AQAP’s manifesto, puts forward a Quranic verse 
calling for fighting, and inter-discursively relates to the classical jurisprudence of jihad and fiqh 
al-jihad, and lists legitimate causes for launching jihad. The article strategically sets out two 
categories of jihad – defensive jihad and offensive jihad – lumping them together under the 
rubric of defensive jihad, fighting both a far enemy (aggressive disbelievers) and a near enemy 
(the apostates). In terms of infidelity, apostates are on an equal footing with non-Muslims as 
they are all worthy of attack. However, while jihad against non-Muslims is either obligatory 
jihād al-dafʿa, ‘defensive jihad’, or collective jihād al-ṭalab, ‘offensive jihad’, fighting apostate 
rulers is regarded as being altogether mandatory. The op-ed continues: 
(6) 
One of the greatest places where jihad is obligatory is bilād al-ħaramayn [the land of the two 
Holy Mosques], wherein the occupying Crusader enemy, who steals its resources, determines 
its policies and fights the Muslims from this land. Also, therein is the apostate puppet 
government that implements the plans of colonisation, and allies to disbelievers, and governs 
according to laws other than those of the Almighty God. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
Furthermore, the above excerpts specify the two enemies of AQAP jihad in Saudi Arabia: the 
external enemy – the Other-Outwith; and the internal enemy – the Other-within. Both enemies 
are defined in religious terms: Crusaders and apostates, and the AQAP jihadist mission then 
becomes legitimate and rightful as the necessary conditions for jihad are fulfilled.  
It is worthnoting that excerpts 5–6 stress elevating the status of jihad in a manner breaking, in 
many respects, away from both traditional and mainstream religious scholars. Hallaq (2014: 
94–98) points out that all classical juristic works insist that not every war is jihad. Many wars 
fought between Muslim emirs and kings, whether in early or late Islamic history, were not 
regarded as jihad. Moreover, Hallaq argues that Muslim jurists acknowledge jihad as an 
important obligation, but they do not privilege it as equivalent to faith. More than that, he 
                                                 
10 Quran, 2:216. 
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stresses that it is not even privileged “over mundane obligations”, such as the contingency of 
debtors partaking in jihad with the permission of lenders (ibid.: 94). Even when jihad is deemed 
mandatory on all male Muslims, the obligation remains moral and “there is no prescribed 
earthly punishment in the Sharia for refusal to join jihad” (ibid.: 95).  
In the bulk of references, the religious obligation of jihad is pushed to the fore. This is observed 
in a category of references to jihad that explicitly name jihad as a religious duty. This group of 
references includes farīḍah, which literally means ‘religious duty’. Some other references 
highlighting the religious obligation include: shaʿīrah ‘ritual’ and faḍīlah ‘virtue’. This category 
of references is usually accompanied by the word jihad to form idhafa, ‘compound nominals’, 
using jihad as the second term, e.g. farīḍat al-jihād ‘the duty of jihad’ and shaʿīrat al-jihād ‘the 
ritual of jihad’. This category incorporates [noun+adjective phrases] that give a further explicit 
sense of obligation and militarisation. Such phrases include: al-jihād al-wājib and al-mutaʿayin, 
both meaning ‘obligatory jihad’ and al-jihād al-ʿaskarī ‘military jihad’. 
(7) 
…my crime is that I am doing this absent farīḍah [duty], which is jihad for the sake of Allah.  
Issue 8, May 2004 
 
(8) 
We will not ask you to wait for the next issue, but we would like you to be busy with al-jihād 
al-wājib [obligatory jihad] as this is the purpose of issuing this magazine. 
Epilogue of Issue 1, July 2004 
Furthermore, jihad is referred to by using complex noun phrases, such as al-daʿawah ila allah 
‘a call to Allah’ or ‘the propagation of faith’, al-jihād fī sabīl allah ‘jihad in the path of God’, 
thirwatu sanām al-islām ‘the head of the matter in Islam’ etc. These expressions construct the 
legitimacy of the jihadist mission by alluding to specific prophetic sayings from which these 
terms are derived. The above references bear the feature of predication, as they all presuppose 
the mandatory nature of jihad, but predication specifies further qualities and assigns them to 
jihad. Howerver, the degree of its religious obligation is articulated in two different ways in 
these predications: (i) the classical appraisal of jihad as a legitimate altruistic act or (ii) an 
obligatory religious act equivalent to the articulation of faith.  
A traditional appraisal of jihad and the mujahedeen is common in jihadist literature and can be 
traced back to the 1980s. The classical themes focus on selected references to sacred texts that 
sanctify jihad and mention the rewards for mujahdeen. Among the common traditional 
prejudiced traits predicated explicitly to jihad in AQAP discourse are: 
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 one of the rituals of Islam 
obligatory when the enemy enters a Muslim land 
necessary in the struggle against infidels 
a duty ordained on the believers 
sanctified in the sacred texts. 
This religionised category of predicational themes emphasises that jihad is a permanent duty. 
In employing these mobilising themes, AQAP rhetoric is no different to classical jihadist 
rhetoric. On the other hand, a broad range of predicates work collectively to form a theme 
emphasising jihad as an embodiment of faith. This theme ranks jihad as equivalent to the 
articulation of faith. It constructs jihad as Holy Islamic law, and more importantly, as ordained 
worship in its own right that should be performed once its conditions have been met. This theme 
draws on an array of sacred texts and is closely linked to the important argument of ħākimiyah 
by drawing on the political and moral resources of tradition (see section 7.2.1.1). This is a 
sample of attributes emphasising the central ideological status of jihad in the discourse of Sawt 
al-jihad. 
Jihad is the externalisation of tawħīd to God 
is the head of the matter in Islam 
is a worship akin to prayer and fasting 
is not deserted but by hypocrites 
is a struggle between what is true and what is false 
is the sign of the ummah’s return to Islam 
is a creed issue determined by religious texts 
is an ordained act of worship, whether won or lost 
Tawħīd, ‘unification’ or ‘making one’, is key to AQAP discourse in this regard. It is technically 
the most central belief in the representation of Islam and is reinforced in the first of five rituals 
of Islam: shahādah, ‘testimony’, or the articulation that “there is no God but Allah. Muhammed 
is the Messenger of God.”11 This belief in Allah as an omnipotent God who has no partners is 
based upon the authority of the Quran and Sunnah. What is at issue here, though, is the notion 
that associating partners with Allah – particularly implementing man-made rules – is shirk 
‘polytheism’ or ‘associating partners with God’. Committing shirk – by placing rules other than 
God’s as equal to His – is a violation of the first pillar of Islam and qualifies the perpetrator of 
this violation to be excommunicated. In this vein, performing jihad embodies the head of the 
matter in Islam and results in the externalisation of God’s oneness. Consequently, jihad is 
                                                 
11 Tawħīd is ranked first in both ʿibādāt ‘rituals’ and ʾīmān ‘beliefs’ defining Sunni Islam. The former is recognised 
as five rituals (the testimony of shahādah, prayer, paying zakāh, fasting during the month of Ramadhan and 
pilgrimage to Makkah), while the latter is defined in terms of one’s belief in God, His attributes, His prophets, His 
angels, the sacred books, the Last Day and predestination. 
For more about tawħīd, see The Encyclopedia of Islam: a brief account of its genesis can be found under the entry 
‘relihous belief’ pp. 583–584, and for its development as a theological discipline within the Salafi school of 
thought, see ‘Salafiya’, pp. 608–610. 
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constructed as a Holy Islamic law that demarcates the Self from the Other within the community 
of believers. Predicates pertaining to tawħīd are used in argumentation. We will see in Chapter 
6 how they are used functionally used as premises or antecedents for conclusive propositions 
mobilising the audience to ‘go forth’ and join jihad – against the Americans and their allies.  
The construction of jihad as an embodiment of faith generates a further theme protraying jihad 
as a perpetual endeavour: 
(9) 
Jihad will continue until the Day of Judgment, as the master of mankind and the Imam of the 
mujahedeen – peace be upon him – told us.  
Issue 4, October 2003 
The construction of jihad as a perpetual duty indispensible of faith is dispersed across the 
magazine in several columns discussing tawħīd-related issues, whether in juristic debates or 
texts adapted from valued sources.  
5.2.3. Religio-politicisation 
However, the construction of jihad is by no means consistent. Jihad can be a goal in its own 
right, and a means to an end, too. The latter composes a theme for the bulk of predicates. As 
far as the magazine goes, AQAP’s mission has a project of retrieval, namely as an all-
encompassing Islamist paradigm. Jihad is the driving force in such a paradigm or mode of 
existence. That is, it is the means for both establishing and maintaining the sought-after Islamic 
state. In this respect, jihad is constructed as a means for ridding Muslims of infidel tyranny by 
establishing the Caliphate on earth and implementing God’s laws. A considerable amount of 
the discourse on jihad is devoted to a pan-Islamist politics centred on the ummah: the Islamic 
community. The ummah in Sawt al-jihad’s narrative is the supreme political structure. But 
ummah is not presented as a social or even a religious reality compatible with the existing 
political order, as adopted in the mainstream pan-Islamist rhetoric. Rather, it is maintained as a 
universal politically unified structure. It is the focus of unity, and the symbolic externalisation 
of the form of Islam perceived and sought to be proclaimed by AQAP. In such references, 
ummah is often collocated with predicates portraying it as a vulnerable and dismantled entity. 
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(10) 
One must look at the dangers surrounding the ummah and the American unjust war on Muslims 
in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan… 
Issue 1, September 2003 
 
(11) 
in this painful reality experienced by the ummah, the forces of global infidelity gathered 
against Muslims 
Issue 3, October 2003 
 
(12) 
…at a time when the wounds of the ummah are increasing, due to the treachery of those rulers 
who were working hard, and continue to do so, to satisfy the infidel West… 
Issue 10, January 2004 
As far as ummah is concerned, references are always collectivised. They highlight either 
identity by means of references incorporating ideological anthroponyms (e.g. ‘Islamic ummah’, 
‘Muslim ummah’, ‘Muslims’ etc.) or grievances by means of nationalising references featuring 
parts of the Islamic world where there is a struggle with non-Muslim forces (e.g. ‘Afghanistan’, 
‘Iraq’, ‘Palestine’ etc.). In line with Al Qaeda’s anti-American global jihad, AQAP’s list of 
grievances is different to the list of classical jihadism, as it includes all countries that have 
American bases, particularly Saudi Arabia. As far as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States are 
concerned, AQAP’s discourse on jihad portrays the American presence in these areas as an 
occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, jihad is portrayed as:  
(13) 
...and it [jihad] is a means repelling the aggression, a means of the call to God, a means to 
establish the Caliphate and implement God’s laws in God’s land  
Issue 5, November 2003 
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5.3. AQAP’s social world 
The aforementioned themes constitute the predominant legitimatory arguments concerning how 
jihad is constructed in Sawt al-jihad. Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffi (1985: 112), jihad, 
per se, can be regarded as the “nodal point” in AQAP’s discourse. Pragmatically, by means of 
the practice of articulation in AQAP’s field of discursivity and system of intertextuality, jihad 
gets constituted as a privileged sign around which other signs are ordered. Therefore, jihad is 
then the fundamental leitmotif that textualises the world as a tripartite one. This overarching 
worldview abandons national and social divides and starkly constructs new socio-religious 
divides: the Self as the true believers implementing jihad in the path of Allah, the Other-within 
as the misbelievers who abstain from jihad, and the Other-outwith as the disbelievers. Identities 
are discursively constituted through these divides, and members of the assumed audience are to 
choose their camps in the presented discursive structure they are thus expected to identify with. 
Based on the data, AQAP discourses can be categorised into four discourses that represent the 
jihadist worldview. The dominant discourse is the discourse on jihad, which appears to be the 
overarching master discourse that defines the semantics of AQAP discourse. This 
categorisation allows AQAP’s tripartite division of the world into: (i) the Self camp, which 
comprises the mujahedeen and true believers, (ii) the Other-within camp, which comprises 
misbelievers, or those who are declared non-Muslims and (iii) the Other-outwith camp, which 
comprises the world of disbelievers. In fact, there is hardly a text that is devoid of this tripartite 
division. It is notable that the discourse on jihad – as the master discourse – determines the 
relationship between the us-group on the one hand and the them-groups on the other, both within 
and outwith the world of Islam. The semantic macro-structures of this discourse offer a 
multitude of ideologically-loaded argumentative strategies legitimising the Self and the jihadist 
mission and delegitimising the Other, whether it is within or outwith. 
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Figure 8: An overall categorisation of Sawt al-jihad discourses. 
It is worth noting here that such a tripartite division is technically a binary one bifurcating the 
world into the Self and the Other. This bifurcation is defined in religious terms, as we will see 
below. However, the binary division of the world into dar al-Islam ‘the sphere of Islam’ and 
dar al-kufr/ħarb ‘the sphere of disbelief’ – which very often shows up in scholarly works on 
jihadism – is absent in the AQAP narrative. That is not to say that it has nothing to do with the 
jihadist ideology but it appears that AQAP propagandists are wary of lifting this banner for 
practical reasons. The use of a dar al-kufr/ħarb slogan entails the aporia of collective takfīr 
‘excommunication’, an accusation that caused major setbacks to the reputation of the 1970s 
jihadists in Egypt. The alternative for AQAP is a discursive emphasis on expelling the U.S. 
forces and fighting apostate rulers. 
The overall preliminary analysis above leads us to the core social actors/actions represented in 
AQAP discourse, to which the remainder of this chapter is dedicated. Therefore, the following 
section examines the referential and predicational construction of jihad, the Self, the Other-
within and the Other-outwith, respectively. A full categorisation of the concrete referential and 
predicational examples of these social actors is provided in Appendix C. These concrete 
examples cannot be comprehensively reviewed in this chapter; however, the subsequent 
sections focus primarily on the common discursive strategies employed in the construction of 
the respective actors. 
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5.3.1. The Self 
The micro-politics of jihadist discourse are visibly devoted to creating a jihadist vanguard as a 
prototypical us-group. The presentation of the Self in Sawt al-jihad is not fulfilled in isolation 
of the Other. Rather, it is is linked overwhelmingly to the Other throughout the magazine, be it 
the Other-within or the Other-outwith. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the thematic 
characterisation of social actors presented here is only for the sake of maintaining a rigorous 
analysis. To begin with, the sphere of the Self, in a broad sense, is the ummah as the supreme 
social structure. Yet, the ummah is employed as a ‘floating signifier’, i.e. it can be invested with 
different content by the different articulations in Sawt al-jihad. The considerable use of the 
word ummah (e.g. ummat Moħammad ‘the community of Muhammed’, ummat al-islām ‘the 
community of Islam’, al-ummah al-islāmiyah ‘the Islamic ummah’ etc.) denotes an a-historical 
Islamic community. Such generic and a-historical ummah is discursively constructed as passive 
and powerless and, therefore, in need of a saviour jihadist vanguard. 
Although the magazine makes references to supporters of the mujahedeen as part of the in-
group, AQAP militaristic jihadists systematically predominate the scene. For obvious security 
reasons, the former are referred to in terms of generic rather than specific references, and 
specifying them as identifiable individuals is always avoided. Rather, they are referred to by 
using definite plurals12 (e.g. al-mutaʿāwinūn ‘the collaborators’, muħibbī al-jihād ‘the lovers of 
jihad’ and almuħsinīn ‘the philanthropists’). This group is positively dentoted as ‘ʾṣṣādiqīn 
‘honest people’, whose actions confirm their words and as brave and altruistic individuals who 
courageously provide moral and material support to the mujahedeen. However, what the 
magazine dwells on more is a positive representation of the mujahedeen, who are both 
genericised and specified. I shall first consider the generic representation. 
 Genericisation 
The generic construction of the mujahedeen – including AQAP members – can be divided into 
three overlapping referential strategies: religionisation, association with jihad, and assimilation 
with ummah. First, religionisation constitutes an emotionally familiar basis for group identity 
and legitimacy. But in the case of AQAP, religionisation is indispensible of the AQAP revivalist 
approach that elevates the status of jihad and constructs it as being equivalent to faith. 
Therefore, the most distinguishing feature of the new jihadists is the extensive appeal to the 
                                                 
12 Genericity and collectivity are expressed in two ways in Standard Arabic: definite singular or definite plural. 
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Divine authority to legitimise the Self. This is reflected in the systematic reference to the Self 
in terms of the religious qualities that are predominant across all referential categories. 
Religionisation, too, functions as a fundamental legitimatory tenet because AQAP’s enterprise 
involves both the infidel and Muslim blood, and sustaining jihad that involves Muslim blood 
requires a religious legitimacy that goes beyond the classical jihadist rhetoric based solely on 
the right to defend Muslim lands. Therefore, the emphasis on the notion of tawħīd ‘God’s 
oneness’, as we have seen in the construction of jihad, plays a significant politico-religious role 
in the micro-politics of inclusion and exclusion in AQAP rhetoric. 
By using a set of references associating the AQAP mujahedeen to God and His oneness, this 
strategy not only presents the mujahedeen as doing something divinely ordained but rather as 
doing the divinely ordained. The key reference to the Self in this regard is the one that relates 
to the concept of tawħīd, ‘God’s oneness’, i.e. the singular and plural collectives: al-
muwaħħid(ūn) ‘the monotheist(s)’ – those who do not associate partners with Allah. The 
importance of referring to the Self in terms of God’s oneness springs from AQAP’s ranking of 
jihad as the articulation and practice of Allah’s oneness as opposed to the Other, apostates or 
polytheists, who associate partners with Him. 
(14) 
...why didn’t you [the ulema] deter them [apostate rulers], the unjust and criminal chasing and 
killing of the muwaħħidīn ‘monotheists’… 
Issue 17, May 2004 
The dichotomy between the Self and the Other is emphasised through the juxtaposition of 
references such as God’s worshippers vs ṭawāghīt’s worshippers, God’s soldiers vs ṭawāghīt’s 
soldiers etc.13 Such dichotomies emphasise the jihadists’ stark division of Muslims into 
monotheists and polytheists. It follows then that being a mujahed is the ultimate display of 
being Muslim.  
However, the association with God can be implicit. Consider this excerpt: 
(15) 
It is a great joy to be among these strangers who – God willing – are the al-firqah al-nājiyah 
‘the winning group’ and al-ṭāʾifah al-mansūrah ‘the supported sect’, which is not harmed by 
those who oppose or discourage them until the Day of Judgment. 
Issue 6, November 2003 
                                                 
13 The word ṭawāghīt is the plural form of ṭāghūt. 
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For instance, references to the mujahedeen as alfirqah alnājiyah ‘the winning community’ or 
alṭāʾifah almanṣūrah ‘the supported sect’ are pragmatically intriguing for two reasons. First, 
these references intertextually relate to the repertoire of the old (sacred) knowledge. Several 
sacred texts are relevant in this respect and the following are just a small selection: 
- The prophetic saying: “I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, my nation will split 
into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell”;14 and 
 
- The prophetic saying: “A group of people from my ummah will continue to obey Allah’s Command, 
and those who desert or oppose them shall not be able to do them any harm. They will be dominating 
the people until Allah’s Command is executed [i.e. Resurrection is established].”15  
Second, and more importantly, the [passive participle+noun] construction entails the existential 
presupposition of a set of propositions whose truth is taken for granted. These proposals 
include: 
1. A sect [supported by God] exists among Muslims, and 
2. This supported sect is the mujahedeen. 
Furthermore, the intertextual allusion to the sacred texts implies the attributions included in the 
sacred texts above, i.e. that God supports the mujahedeen and that the mujahedeen are the 
people who: 
 practise true Islam, 
 continue to obey Allah’s commands, 
 desert or oppose them that shall not be able to do them any harm, and 
 are promised to dominate before the Resurrection. 
Closely related to the theme of God’s oneness, the reference to the mujahedeen as ‘the 
strangers’ presupposes in the game of truth politics that the mujahedeen represent the true 
Muslims at the end of the world. This is stated in the aforementioned prophetic saying: “Islam 
initiated as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange, so good 
tidings for the stranger.” 
(16) 
I saw him sitting alone, immersing himself in silence and bemoaning the conditions of ummah. 
He said; “We the few and the strangers are the ones bearing the burden of returning the ummah 
to the religion of Allah.”  
paying tribute to a jihadist killed in Jeddah, Issue 4, October 2003 
 
                                                 
14 Sunan Ibn Majah, 3992. 
15 Sahih Muslim, 1037. 
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In its post facto rationalisation, AQAP discourse displays an intentional way of systematically 
presupposing religious truths to achieve Self-legitimisation through monopoly of the Divine 
truth or religious authenticity. A further referential strategy is the construction of the 
mujahedeen in terms of their positive (religious) attributes. This category defines the Self by 
expressing religious qualities, e.g. ‘the pious’, ‘the virtuous’, ‘the patient’ and ‘the pious youth’. 
This strategy is closely linked with predications that express the mujahedeen’s sincere and 
legitimate intentions of helping the oppressed and working for the good of religion. 
The second category of reference to the Self is made in terms of an association with jihad as 
both a doctrine and a practice. The doctrine renders a strategy of ideologisation, while practice 
creates militarisation. Moreover, references to the Self in terms of jihad appear inseparable 
from religious references. AQAP’s rhetoric makes overwhelming references to this category. 
These define the Self as collectively: al-mujāhidīn ‘the mujahedeen’, al-murābiṭīn ‘firm holders 
[of jihad]’, ahl al-jihād ‘people of jihad’ etc. At this level, the demarcation between the Self 
and the Other is not between Muslims and non-Muslims but rather between the mujahedeen 
and Muslims supporting them on the one hand and the remainder on the other, regardless of 
whether or not they are Muslim.  
Several minor referential strategies overlap the construction of the Self by association with 
jihad. Spatialisation is an important strategy, e.g. ‘the mujahedeen of the Arabian Peninsula’ 
and ‘ħaramayn Brigades’. The spatialisation strategy dwells on the sacred in these references 
and avoids the official names of places and states. By and large, references to the official names 
of the Gulf States in Sawt al-jihad (such as, Saudi, United Arab Emirates etc.) are kept to the 
minimum and are mostly intertextually related to voices other than those of Sawt al-jihad 
editors. There is also a tendency to overlap with references in terms of age, almost always with 
youth, e.g. ‘the youth of jihad’ and ‘the Mujahed youth’. Through further positive attributes of 
altruism, such engaging references are closely linked to the relevant persuasive strategy of 
mythologising the Mujahed and the martyr. Furthermore, militarisation is heavily used in 
references in terms of jihad. For reasons of mobilisation, Sawt al-jihad tends to exaggerate the 
scale of the jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia. This is achieved through the use of plural nouns 
in references, e.g. ‘ħaramian brigades’, ‘the mujahedeen brigades’, ‘the mujahedeen troops’, 
‘the mujahedeen cells’ etc. These references are abundant in statements on jihadist operations 
and confrontations with security forces. These statements make use of military references to 
the Self and demonstrate a tendency to exaggerate the size and scale of AQAP and its 
operations. 
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The third category strategically assimilates to the Muslim audience, ummah and magazine 
readers. Assimilation can be by means of reference in terms of kinship relationyms. Addressing 
potential in-group Muslims and using second-person possessive pronouns, AQAP mujahedeen 
are constructed as ‘your brothers’ and ‘your sons’. Such kinship relationyms are also affixed 
with the first person in references: ‘our brothers’ and ‘our sons’, presupposing a shared we with 
the audience. The alternative method of assimilating the mujahedeen and jihadist ideologues is 
via positive nominations in terms of socio-religious qualities valued by the socio-epistemic 
community, to which the audience belongs, e.g. using the metaphors ‘lions’ and ‘beacons of 
dignity’, the positive actionyms ‘reformers’ and ‘preachers of’, and through collective attributes 
such as ‘the proud’ and ‘the honourable’. Nevertheless, such references are aimed at a positive 
presentation of the mujahedeen in the eyes of the ummah. The relationship between the 
mujahedeen and the ummah is one between saviour and victim. 
Aside from the three aforementioned strategies, pronouns play a significant role in the strategic 
construction of the Self in relation to the wider members of the Muslim community: ummah. 
The first-person plural pronouns naħn, -na, ‘we’ and ‘us’, are used ubiquitously to 
systematically denote the innermost Self circle in the assumed Muslim community: the 
mujahedeen. Sawt al-jihad data reveal a propensity to use such pronouns in a way that could 
refer to either the speaker alone, the editorial team or to the entire AQAP mujahedeen. But what 
matters most in all instances of naħn ‘we’ and -na ‘us’ is their ideological workings. Overall, 
AQAP speakers perceive themselves as part of a ‘shared we’, thereby reflecting the jihadist 
identity using statements regularly predicated to identify and illustrate this perception. Consider 
the following excerpts: 
(17) 
...today, with the bounty of God, we and our brothers on the battlefronts that we have sought to 
liberate from the profanity of treacherous rulers and before them the profanity of the Crusader 
Americans and their allies. We ask God for victory and the empowerment of our brothers… 
Issue 2, September 2003 
(18) 
…verily with the bounty of Allah, our fight with the enemies of Allah is continuous everywhere, 
and the mujahedeen blows frighten and intimidate the enemies of Allah worldwide. Our jihad 
in the Arabian Peninsula is enduring, to the delight of the believers and the outrage of 
disbelievers. We will not leave the Americans occupying the Holy Land in peace and security. 
We will not stop our jihad until we liberate every inch of Muslim lands.  
Issue 6, November 2003 
Such apparently patriotic and truthful perceptions of the Self satisfy the overall goal of the 
magazine providing a legitimisation narrative for the AQAP and its identity to its readership. 
However, an inclusive pronoun we, relating to magazine readers, is used rhetorically throughout 
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the magazine. Although stylistic characteristics will be discussed in the next chapter, it is 
important here that the following excerpt includes the use of we as inclusive of the readers. This 
type of pronoun is part of a phrase at the start of every rhetorical question. The repetition of we 
adds emphasis to a shared identity with the readers and intensifies the meaning at hand. 
(19) 
…finally, dear brother Mujahed, until when do we say and do not do? Until when do we hear the 
cries for help and we just watch? And to what extent of the war on Islam shall we wait before 
we wake from our coma? O you who have believed, why do you say what you do not do? It is 
most hateful to Allah that you say what you do not do... 
Issue 1, September 2003 
 
(20) 
Until when that we just watch? Until when that our honour and sanctities are violated? Until 
when that we watch our clerics are caught up in prisons? Until when that we see our leaders are 
killed? Until when that we watch the Crusaders, and the Jews are promoted and honoured in our 
land? … Until when that we accept that the American aeroplanes fly over our heads to demolish 
the houses of our brothers in Iraq and Afghanistan?… 
Issue 2, September 2003 
Conversely, and to a lesser degree, the data reveal a tendency to use we to function as a floating 
signifier. This could refer to generic identity groups whom the speakers consider to be 
representative. This strategic use of the deictic expression naħn, -na goes hand in hand with 
other collectives that can be co-referential to each other – such as ‘Muslims’, ‘ummah’, ‘the 
ummah of Muhammed/Islam’, ‘people of Sunnah’16 and so forth. Consider this excerpt: 
(21) 
.. and I ask every Muslim reading these words [1]: 
Where are we from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman who is in America’s prisons? [2] 
Where are we from the Mujahed Ramzi Yousef and the Mujahed Abu Hajar who are in America’s 
prisons? [3] 
Where are we from our prisoners in Guantanamo? [4] 
Where are we from the captured Muslim scholars in the prisons of ṭawāghīt and apostates? [5] 
And where we are from the rest of the oppressed Muslims who languish behind the walls? [6] 
And today our dead and our prisoners are in hundreds and thousands, and we do not move a hair 
and do not pledge allegiance to God, an honest pledge of allegiance so that we have our sins 
forgiven!! [7] 
Where are those who are true to what they promised Allah? [8] 
Where are the youth of Islam? [9] 
Where are those seeking revenge for their religion, honour, brothers and their ummah? [10] 
Our religion has been fought, and our God and our Prophet have been insulted, and our lands 
have been taken and we are busy and oblivious!! [11] 
And our money has been taken and we are inattentive! And our heroes are killed and we are 
still? [12] 
Till when, O ummah of Islam? Till when? Till when? [13] 
Issue 13, March 2004 
                                                 
16 ‘People of Sunnah’ – ahl alsunnah – is one way of collectively referring to the Sunni sect, as opposed to other 
Islamic sects such as Shiism and Sufism. However, the jihadist discourse can refer to a narrower account, given 
the correlation between jihad as a crucial component of Sunnah in the jihadist worldview. 
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Initially, this emotional appeal addresses all Muslims and makes use of nouns, pronouns and 
the individual names of specific participants. The speaker here uses the realisations of ‘we’ – 
the subject pronoun naħn and its object pronominal affix -na – to refer to different groups 
representing the Self. Therefore, it is crucial to work out which identity group is implied in each 
context. In this excerpt, the speaker uses ‘we’ to refer to a number of different groups. First, 
every Muslim is referred to in the pronoun included in the anaphora ‘where are we from’, which 
is repeated in [2–6]. The rhythmic repetition of this rhetorical scheme is accompanied by the 
explicit identification of certain jihadist individual by their names (see the underlined names). 
This style of delivery foregrounds the names revealed (e.g. Omar Abdel Raħman and Ramzi 
Yousif) and their ideological anthroponyms (e.g. Sheikh and Mujahed) and associates them with 
the collective identity of ‘all Muslims’. This anaphora leads to an anticipation involving the 
audience emotionally by referring to the tragic situation of the Self as ‘our dead’ and ‘our 
prisoners’. The solution to this situation is jihad, as implicitly presupposed in seeking the 
audience to pledge allegiance to Allah. The speaker here uses ‘our’ to refer to the mujahedeen. 
However, the vague use of ‘our’ is politically valuable as it conflates the identity of ‘the 
mujahedeen’ with that of ‘all Muslims’. Similarly, another anaphoric scheme repeating the 
phrase ‘where are’ in [8–10] involves the audience cognitively by referring to their repertoire 
of old knowledge when it constructs a prototypical we ‘the youth of Islam’ in terms of positive 
attributions mentioned in a Quranic verse, i.e. those who are true to what they promised Allah.17 
The use of the possessive pronoun ‘our’ in the repeated patterns ‘our religion’, ‘our God’, ‘our 
Prophet’, ‘our lands’ and ‘our money’ constructs a group of individuals perceived as sharing 
all these things, i.e. the pronoun here refers to ummah. On the other hand, the pronoun in ‘our 
heroes’ refers to the mujahedeen and again conflates the identity of Islam with that of jihad. 
 Specification 
Unlike the Other-presentation, the presentation of the Self draws extensively on the 
individualisation of jihadist actors. The foregrounding of identifiable jihadist individuals plays 
a remarkable role in the positive presentation of the jihadist Self. Indeed, a considerable amount 
of the magazine’s content is devoted to the charismatic projection of the mujahedeen, who can 
be regarded as the incarnation of the archetypical Self.18 The analysis of naming specific 
                                                 
17 This reference relates intertextually to the verse “Among the believers are men true to what they promised Allah. 
Among them is he who has fulfilled his vow [to the death], and among them is he who awaits [his chance]. And 
they did not alter [the terms of their commitment] by any alteration” (Quran, 33: 23). 
18 All magazine issues include at least one column dedicated to a mujahed or martyr. For instance, there are Knights 
Under the Prophet’s Banner (five episodes), The Biography of a Martyr (eight episodes), An Interview with one 
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individuals from the in-group involves identifying the system of values underlying the choice 
of names given to them. The nomination is typically realised by their names and/or their 
teknonymics.19 Teknonymics can function as nomination realisations or as informal honorifics 
preceding given names (there is more on the ideological role of teknonymics in 6.3.2). Other 
pre-nomination forms of honorification include titles with possessive constructions such as ‘our 
sheikh’, ‘our leader’ and ‘our brother’, which are commonly used for the honorification of 
fellow mujahedeen. Specific prayers (e.g. ‘may Allah save him’, ‘-protect him’) are often used 
as post-nomination honorification. Other nominations predominantly associate them with jihad 
and entail some form of differentiation between them and others, and this reinforces the jihadist 
ideology. Look at the use of ‘imam of the mujahedeen’ in these two examples: 
(22) 
The speech of our Sheikh, Imam of the mujahedeen, Osama bin Laden, may God support him, was 
delivered on this stage…. 
Issue 8, December 2003 
 
(23) 
Jihad is permanent until the Day of Judgment according to the words of the Imam of the mujahedeen 
[Prophet Mohammed], peace be upon him… 
Issue 4, November 2003 
A noteworthy point has to be mentioned about the word imam. Political thought, within the 
paradigm of Sunni Islam, identifies imāmah as the supreme sovereign authority in the Islamic 
community. The individual who holds this office is called an imām. The political term imām –
head of the Islamic community – is derived by extension from the religious domain, as it 
literally denotes “the man who leads prayer”. Therefore, imām can be translated as ‘leader’, 
‘head’ or ‘chief’, but with a politico-religious diacritic. This view conforms to AQAP’s 
revivalist political approach, which seeks to revive the pre-modern political paradigm, in other 
words, Islamic rule under a sovereign head and incorporating all Muslim lands. Apart from 
reinforcing the elevation of the status of jihad, ‘imam of the mujahedeen’ constructs jihad as 
the baseline for moral and political homogeneity among the us-group. The homogenous Self in 
AQAP is linked well with the historical Self. This is witnessed in the prophetic reference to 
Osama bin Laden as ‘imam of the mujahedeen’, a reference used to denote the Prophet 
Mohammed, as the second example above reveals. 
                                                 
of the Wanted (two episodes), An Interview with a Mujahed (nine episodes), apart from varying statements that 
give detailed accounts of the various attacks and confrontations with security forces. 
19 It is a common reverential naming in the Arab world, but it is more common for jihadists especially for their 
pseudonyms. It is almost a norm that the choices of these teknonymics refer to some respectable historical figures. 
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Predication plays a significant role in Self-presentation. The full range of referential forms 
explored above bears the feature of predication based on whether there are explicit denotations, 
indirect connotations or presupposed propositions. Through linguistic predications, the Self – 
be it generic or specified – is assigned further evaluative positive qualities. The attributions 
ascribed to the mujahedeen serve to fulfil Self-legitimatory topoi, which will be explicated in 
detail in Chapter 7, particularly the enthymeme of epitome. By and large, the predicational 
content can be divided in the following discursive themes that present the Self as: 
- rightful and committed to a Divine mission; 
- altruistic and having noble pan-Islamist goals;  
- brave and successful;  
- organised and having goals;  
- as victims; 
- resistant and uncompromising; 
- the true sect; 
- seeking martyrdom and winning in the next world; 
- caring for fellow Muslims. 
5.3.2. The Other-within 
This part of AQAP’s social world subsumes a host of social actors explicitly or implicitly 
excluded from the community of believers. The juristic and theological polemics in Sawt al-
jihad propagates a set of acts that disqualify their commissioners from being Muslim, and they 
are then declared non-Muslim or apostate. In contrast to the Self, Sawt al-jihad offers clear 
answers to all the perceived grievances of ummah by perpetually constructing an internal enemy 
in the Islamic community, namely, ‘the Other-within’. The Other-within is constantly 
associated with the external infidel enemy invading Muslim lands. The construction of the 
Other-within is first and foremost fulfilled through generic references, e.g. ‘ṭawāghīt’ as 
opposed to ‘God’, ‘polytheists’ as opposed to ‘monotheists’, ‘people of false’ as opposed to 
‘people of right’ etc. Among other references, these are frequently used as empty signifiers that 
define the Other-within primarily in religious terms. Sawt al-jihad focuses on the immediate 
geographical context of Arabia – principally Saudi Arabia – but it by no means does so in 
isolation of the broader framework of the Islamic ummah. Throughout the magazines, 
references are made to other countries, but for reasons of space, I will focus on the AQAP’s 
view of the Other-within in the Saudi context. 
Whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, this camp of social actors in AQAP’s worldview is quite 
complicated. As far as the magazine goes, there exist three types of foregrounded social actors: 
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the ruling elites, security forces and men of religion – both ulema and preachers. The first type 
is the political rival, the second is its hand in the struggle, while the third is the source of 
legitimacy. All these social actors are Muslim, and since AQAP’s motive is religious and its 
referential domain is Sharia law, their jihad must abide by the rules of Sharia. According to 
Sharia, it is not lawful to make war with Muslims unless they abandon Islam and, when they 
do, they become murtaddīn ‘apostates’.20 However, neither rulers, nor security personnel, nor 
men of religion abandoned Islam and chose another faith for jihad against them to be legitimate. 
Herein lies the importance of takfir ‘excommunication’, whereby jihadist ideologues and 
theologians preserve the right to issue a fatwa, a ‘religious ruling’ denouncing someone as kāfir 
‘disbeliever’, murtadd, ‘apostate’, or other labels implying that s/he is no longer Muslim.  
Thus, charges of apostasy are of paramount importance in the jihadist global doctrinal and 
political approach. Discursively, a noticeable difference exists in AQAP language in the degree 
of excommunication between the political elite and the other two groups. Sawt al-jihad levels 
charges of apostasy against the Saudi regime/government, and to a lesser extent against the 
security personnel and even less against ulema. Therefore, I shall follow this order. 
 The regime 
It is worth mentioning that Sawt al-jihad actually started by stating a conservative declared aim 
– expulsion of the American troops occupying Arabia – and avoided explicit takfir of the Saudi 
regime. There exist references to murtaddīn ‘apostates’, but they are used as generic references 
which only implicitly denote the Saudi regime. The apparent reason for this is to rid AQAP of 
the notorious label of takfir.21 It was only from the third issue onwards that Sawt al-jihad 
explicitly denounces the Saudi government as kāfir, in the same statement in which AQAP 
pledges its allegiance to the Al Qaeda leadership. As far as the data show, a broad range of 
references are employed to represent the Saudi political regime: the more generic ḥukūmah 
‘government’, niṭḥām ‘regime’ and dawlah ‘state’, and the more specified ʾāl suʿūd ‘the house 
                                                 
20 From riddah, ‘apostasy’, which has lots of definitions in the Islamic tradition but in its broadest sense it means 
the case when someone had been or had become a Muslim and then abandoned Islam to unbelief (Khadduri 2006: 
147–153; Lewis 1988: 84–87; for an overview of classical and modern prescriptions pertaining to apostasy, see 
Peters and De Vries, 1976). The notion of apostasy is notoriously used to legitimise the killing of Muslim 
individuals or groups.  
21 The 1980s in Egypt witnessed the failed jama’at altakfir wa alhijra ‘the community of takfir and hijra’ that 
practised denouncing the whole of society as kāfir and called for the believers to migrate to the house of Islam. 
Relevant in this respect too is the extremist notion of jāhiliyah ‘the age of ignorance’ that I pointed to earlier in 
2.2.1. Notions of takfir have ever since become notorious and used as a counter-argument against jihadist groups. 
As a result, jihadist groups have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e. they have to be cautious 
as regards the dilemma of practising takfir that is too integral to any jihadist mission involving the killing of 
Muslim individuals or groups. 
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of Saud’ (henceforth, Al Saud), or any combination made of these references. The use of the 
words ḥukūmah and dawlah in the jihadist context needs some clarification. The modern usage 
of the word ḥukūmah ‘government’ refers to the group of people involved in the exercise of 
authority, and dawlah means ‘state’. However, the Arabic words ḥukūmah and dawlah are 
ancient and have a range of meanings other than those in common parlance. In the context of 
Sawt al-jihad, hukūmah and dawlah are used in the sense of ‘rule’ or ‘regime’.22 Thus, the 
expressions ʾalḥukūmah ʾalsuʿūdiyah, and ʾaldawlah ʾalsuʿūdiyah, that are literally translated 
into English as ‘the Saudi government’ and ‘the Saudi state’, are both understood to mean the 
‘regime’ and the ruling members of the royal family. This distinction is particularly important 
in order to understand to which specific social actors the respective attributions, particularly the 
ones involving takfir, are assigned, as demonstrated below. 
The data reveal a range of strategies for constructing the Saudi regime. First is the category of 
neutral expressions that include references in terms of the proper name Al Saud, or references 
with regard to political actionalisation hukkām ‘rulers’, or the aforementioned words denoting 
the regime: niṭḥām, dawlah and hukūmah. The other category comprises a range of references 
that involve takfir. This includes references using noun phrases that include the above nouns to 
which attributive adjectives such as kāfir, apostate and ṭāghūt(i) are assigned. 
(24) 
Also therein is the apostate puppet government that implements the plans of colonisation, allies 
to disbelievers, and governs according to laws other than the Almighty God’s laws. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
 
(25) 
...the authorities of the apostate ṭāghūti regime have arrested some of the youth returning from 
the land of Afghanistan... 
Issue 7, December 2003 
Such generic assigning of kufr and apostasy to the government and the regime is vague, in the 
sense that it does not state the specific individuals to whom the characteristics of kufr are 
attributed. In other words, it is not obvious whether this explicit takfir applies to all people 
involved in the exercise of authority or just the ruling members of the royal family.23 However, 
the key and the most frequent takfiri element is the word ṭāghūt and its derivatives. The term 
                                                 
22 This meaning is still common in contemporary Arabic in the sense that ħukm al Saud means the ‘rule of the 
House of Saud’. The polysemic manipulation of words and phrases derived from the root ħ-k-m plays a significant 
argumentative role, as explained later in section 7.4.2. 
23 The demarcation of the authorities in Saudi Arabia is indeed complicated. It is a monarchy in which the king, 
besides his monarchical role, is the head of the government. Even those in line to the throne hold governmental 
posts. Other members of the royal family hold positions in the government and other bureaucratic organisations. 
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ṭāghūt is discursively instrumentalised in delegitimising the Other-within: the rulers, soldiers 
and ulema. It is heavily-loaded ideologically and it is often translated in the literature as ‘tyrant’ 
or ‘false god’. Although it is discursively manipulated to mean the latter, I will retain the 
transliterated form as it is heavily instrumentalised with different derivations in the data: the 
plural form ṭawāghīt, the M/F adjective forms ṭāghūti/yah etc. In Islamic traditional literature, 
this term most commonly has the connotation of insolence towards and disrespect for God 
(Lewis 1991). It is used in the Quran of Pharaoh, who defied the word of God and claimed 
divinity. From there, the usage of this term has been applied to non-Muslim rulers and, 
historically and until very recently, to rulers whose legitimacy is not accepted. The usage of 
this term in the data is frequent and, in some cases, juxtaposed with Allah. 
(26) 
...the battle of al-suwaydī!24 Yes, it is a battle and let those be disgraced who do not understand, 
a fight wherein the two armies met: one fights for the sake of God, and the other for the sake of 
ṭāghūt... 
Issue 3, October 2003 
Such juxtaposition depicts the rulers as false gods defying Allah. It also portrays the conflict as 
a struggle between God and his believers on the one hand, and the ṭawāghīt and their people on 
the other. The ṭawāghīt, then, assume God’s right of sovereignty and divinity and extort the 
Muslims’ right to direct their worship – the rule in accordance with God’s laws in this case – 
to God alone (al-Sayyid and Balqriz 2013). In this sense, this term is a discursive tool integral 
to the argument of ħākimiyah (section 7.2.1.1) in which ṭawāghīt are constructed as false gods 
imposing their manmade laws instead of God’s laws. This extreme use of ṭāghūt as a central 
referential tool in AQAP discourse on the Saudi regime indicates that the notion of ħākimiyah 
plays a pivotal role in the ideology of AQAP. The most intriguing aspect of this term is its 
framing of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as that of a God-worshipper 
relationship that plays the double role of explicit takfir of the rulers and the ambivalent takfir 
of the ulema and the security forces. 
The third category regarding the Saudi regime/rulers is a group of references that discursively 
dissimilates them through explicitly or implicitly associating them with the external enemy. 
This category includes: ‘the traitors’, ‘the agents’, ‘the protectors of the Crusade’, ‘America’s 
Sheikhs’, ‘slaves of the Crusaders’ and so forth. The data are replete with referential items and 
predicational themes that associate the Other-within with the Other-outwith, using a master-
                                                 
24 Al-Suwaydī is a district in Riyadh, and this excerpt is from a statement released about a five-hour shoot-out on 
12 August 2003 that led to the death of one AQAP member and the arrest of five others. 
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slave metaphor, e.g. ‘their slaves’, ‘the Crusade’s slaves’, ‘the Jews’ slaves’ and ‘the slaves of 
America’. However, this category is by no means devoid of takfir as it is frequently explicated 
in Sawt al-jihad that helping the infidels and allying to them nullifies the faith of the committers 
of such crimes. It relates to a repertoire of juristic notions stressing that those allying to, or 
colliding with, an infidel enemy commit nullifiers of faith, nawwāqiḍ al-islām. A related set of 
references, in this respect, is two wordplays on the proper name Al Saud: ʾāl yahūd and ʾāl 
salūl,25 which literally mean ‘the House of Jews’ and ‘the House of salūl’, respectively. The 
former explicitly constructs Al Saud as Jewish, and the latter alludes to this by evoking bin 
salūl, a controversial figure of Jewish origin from the time of early Islam. 
(27) 
...may Allah disgrace the impure [rulers] of Arabia and humiliate ʾāl yahūd… 
Issue 3, October 2003 
 
(28) 
The ṭawāghīt of ʾāl salūl resorted to their fellow apostates’ methods in Algeria and Egypt by 
trying to tarnish the image of the mujahedeen… 
Issue 6, November 2003 
Adjectives derived from salūl are frequently used as attributive adjectives when referring to 
other related social actors, such as al-hukūmah al-salūliyah ‘the salūli government’, al-iʿalām 
al-salūl ‘the salūli media’, al-quwāt al-salūliyah ‘the salūli forces’, among others. 
Apart from referentiality, the predicates assigned to the rulers correlate with a list of negative 
attributions. By and large, these predicates fall under one of three categories: not implementing 
God’s laws, complicity with America or waging war against the mujahedeen. The following is 
a sample of the predicates ascribed to the Saudi regime: 
  
                                                 
25 Abdullah bin salūl is a renowned Muslim convert of Jewish origin in the time of early Islam. 
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 - as abandoning religion 
renegades on the enjoinments of God 
having averted religion 
the government of disbelief, injustice, and tyranny 
fighting them is first to fight infidels 
- as colluding with the external enemy 
allying to infidels 
governing according to laws other than Almighty God’s 
shutting up the reformers and preachers for good 
imprisoning whomever calls them to govern according to God’s laws 
America’s key ally in the war on terror 
implementing the plans of the ummah’s enemies 
aiding the war on Iraq 
providing the Americans with intelligence information about mujahedeen 
- waging war on jihad 
chasing, imprisoning, torturing and killing mujahedeen 
desperate to block the financial sources of the mujahedeen 
trying to distort the image of the mujahedeen in the eyes of donors 
jailing the champions and hailing the hypocrites of ummah 
waging a crusade war on jihad and Islam 
providing America with free oil supplies 
The three themes above concern the excommunication of the Saudi state and are elaborated and 
discussed in many theological debates included in the magazine as nullifiers of faith. Several 
texts are quoted from jihadist treatises that declare the infidelity of the Saudi state.26 Indeed, 
such generic takfīrī sentiments towards a state are incomprehensible as a state – in the modern 
sense – does not have faith. However, to approach an understanding of AQAP politics, two 
things must be understood. Frist, al-dawlh ‘the state’ and al-ħukūmah ‘the government’ – that 
are declared as kafir – are best understood as referring to the dynasty: the House of Saud. 
Second, the jihadist endeavour is for an Islamic state that undertakes the promotion of faith and 
maintains the application of Sharia law. Furthermore, in addressing a Muslim audience whose 
perception of political legitimacy is wholly based on religion, it functions as a crucial 
delegitimisation strategy to construct the Saudi regime not as lacking the necessary religious 
legitimacy but rather as having forfeited such legitimacy by no longer being Islamic. 
  
                                                 
26 One of the classical treatises that have denounced the Saudi State is the work of the Jordanian jihadist ideologue 
Muhammed Al-Maqdisi, it is entitled al-kawāshif al-jaliyah fī kufr al-dawlah al-suʿūdiyah, “The obvious Proofs 
of the Saudi State’s infidelity”, and was published in 1989; it has been circulated ever since in jihadist circles and 
on websites. 
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Overall, the definition of identity and the focus of loyalty in the AQAP narrative are solely 
based on an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is assumed to govern all aspects of life, 
including the political. In line with the broader jihadist movement, the delegitimisation of the 
Saudi political elite is based on ħākimiyah. The argument of ħākimiyah implies that had the 
Saudi state implemented God’s laws, it would be Islamic, and therefore legitimate. However, a 
perceived Caliphate shows up less in AQAP discourse, but this apocalyptic polity – though less 
discursively employed – is a fundamental notion in the jihadist doctrine that views the modern 
‘nation-state’ political form as an illegitimate colonial legacy. The following excerpt is an 
illustrative one for a jihadist doctrine that constructs waṭaniyah ‘nationalism’ as wathaniyah – 
note the wordplay – ‘idolatry’: 
(29) 
...those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the tawāghīt [false gods] on earth, of the Arab 
and non-Arab governments, those who disbelieve in the UN, Arab and regional tyrannical 
organisations ... those who disown the polytheistic doctrines, the paths of democracy, and the 
wathaniyah ‘idolatry’ of waṭaniyah ‘national’. 
Issue 8, December 2003 
 The soldiers 
The second category of social actors in the Other-within is the security forces, notably the 
Interior Ministry personnel, because they are involved in counter-terrorism operations.27 The 
security forces are heavily foregrounded in Sawt al-jihad due to the significant content of 
statements covering AQAP confrontations with them. The range of professionyms include 
words such as ‘soldiers’, ‘officers’ and ‘forces’ that are often correlated with organisational 
anthroponyms, such as ‘the Interior Ministry forces’, al-tawārī ‘the emergency forces’, al-
mabāħith ‘the intelligence services’28 and so forth. These references are the least common 
category, while references that present the security forces negatively are used in abundance. 
Overall, the security forces are discursively constructed as ‘belonging to’ or ‘possessed’. This 
is linguistically fulfilled via possessive constructions. There are different ways of expressing 
possession in Arabic. For a possessive relationship between two nouns, construct noun phrases 
are used. There is no overt possessive marker as in English (’s) in Arabic, instead order 
expresses possession. The first term is interpreted as belonging to the second. However, 
possessivisation overlaps with other discursive strategies. While the first term of a construct is 
almost always militarised, the second is constructed using ideological anthroponyms associated 
                                                 
27 As part of its hard policing, the Saudi government has developed a special security apparatus and established a 
trained security unit, quwāt al-ṭawāriʾ al-khāṣṣah, ‘the special emergency force’. 
28 The equivalent of the British MI5. 
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with the regime, e.g. ‘apostates’, ‘ṭawāghīt’, ‘Crusaders’, ‘America’ etc. Thus, in the 
construction junūd al-ṭawāghīt, the first term junūd belongs to the second al-ṭawāghīt, and the 
whole construct is translated in English as ‘the ṭawāghīt’s soldiers’. Most of the references (as 
illustrated in Table 11 in Appendix C) construct the forces as ‘soldiers’, ‘forces’, ‘army’ or 
‘slaves’ occupying the position of the possessed in a possessive structure, whereby the 
possessor is either ‘the regime’, ‘Al Saud’, ‘the ṭawāghīt’ or ‘America’. The Otherness of the 
soldiers is further reinforced by means of deictics (hum ‘they’, -u ‘they.NOM’ and -hum 
‘they.ACC’) that associate them with the apostate rulers or infidel enemy. 
Another theme closely related to possessivisation is the construction of the security forces as 
slaves and mercenaries. As we have seen above, the regime is constructed as a slave to the 
American master. In the same way, soldiers are portrayed as the slaves of slaves. Therefore, 
they are referred to as ʿabīd ʾāl salūd, ‘Al saluul’s soldiers’, and ʿabīd al-ṭaghūt ‘ṭaghūt’s 
slaves’. This example illustrates this point: 
(30) 
The slaves of the Crusaders’ slaves, the devil’s soldiers, Satan’s forces, the taghūts’ servants 
chased you; they didn’t like the Crusaders being harmed … The slaves of the slaves chased you 
with the actual support from the Crusaders, who participated with their slaves in their work ... O 
Abu Hajar, may Allah have mercy on you and those who were with you were not but men true 
to what they promised Allah... 
Issue 20, June 2004 
It follows then that the security forces are discursively dissimilated by associating them with 
the infidel enemy: ‘the slaves of the Crusaders’ slaves’. Slavery is used metaphorically to 
construct soldiers as mercenaries. The slavery metaphor and frequent references to it occur as 
nomination and predication. They are referred to as ʿabīd al-dirham, ‘the slaves of dirham 
[money]’, as opposed to mujahedeen, ‘God’s slaves’. An intriguing discursive technique is the 
juxtaposition of soldiers and mujahedeen that is overwhelmingly instrumentalised. The 
following table summarises the positive/negative dichotomy between soldiers and mujahedeen 
based on referential and predicational realisations: 
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Security forces Mujahedeen 
Nomination:  
- ṭāghūt’s Satan’s/devil’s soldiers 
 
- Allah’s soldiers/soldiers of the gracious 
- people of the false 
 
- people of the right 
- ṭāghūt’s/America’s/money slaves 
 
- God’s slaves 
- criminals/mercenaries - mujahedeen 
  
Predication:  
- fighting in the cause of ṭāghūt/Crusade 
 
- fighting in the cause of ṭāghūt  
- fighting for the sake of a salary 
  
- not fighting for worldly purposes 
- fighting to extinguish the light of Allah/to 
please America 
- fighting for Allah’s word to become 
Superior 
  
Table 5: Juxtaposition of mujahedeen and security forces 
Such juxtaposition of soldiers as fighters for worldly purposes and mujahedeen as those fighting 
for sublime religious purposes fulfils a dual mission: a negative presentation of soldiers to the 
audience, and the demoralisation of the soldiers themselves. In broad terms, possessivisation 
and the slave/mercenary construction mitigate against the takfir, ‘excommunication’, of the 
possessed/slaves/mercenaries: the soldiers. The soldiers are not constructed as apostates but 
rather as the possessions of apostates, i.e. ‘the apostates’ soldiers’ rather than ‘the apostate 
soldiers’. That is, they are not labelled as kāfir, but the attributes of kufr are ascribed to them. 
Understandably, AQAP avoids the explicit takfir of social actors other than rulers who 
implement manmade laws. This can be understood as an attempt by AQAP to rid itself of the 
collective takfir label, as it is strictly prohibited in the Salafi school of thought – to which AQAP 
belongs.  
The metaphor of slavery bears implicit aspects of takfir, particularly when combined with 
reference to the rulers as ṭawāghīt. The above God-ṭawāghīt juxtaposition involves on the one 
hand the rulers’ assumption of God’s right of sovereignty, as explained above, and on the other 
hand, it frames a ruler-ruled relationship that defies the individual Muslim relationship with 
God. That is, it refers to soldiers as ʿabīd ʾāl suʿūd/al-ṭaghūt, ‘Al Saud’s/ṭaghūt’s slaves’, 
fighting in the cause of the ṭaghūt, as opposed to mujahedeen, who are referred to as God’s 
worshippers/slaves fighting for His cause. The takfir of the security forces does not appear to 
be put forward in explicit terms but is, rather, left to the hearer to decode it from a relationship 
metaphorically constructed as one between a slave and a false god. The task of decoding 
operates on two aspects: (a) the juxtaposition of mujahedeen and soldiers in Sawt l-jihad, and 
(b) the restrictions placed on the use of the linguistic item ʿabīd in Arabic. In Arabic, ʿabd 
‘slave’ is generally used as a metaphor of man’s relation to God. Furthermore, the verb ʿabada’, 
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which translates into English as ‘worship’, is derived from the same trilateral root (ʿa-b-d). The 
metaphor of slavery is seldom, if ever, used for the relation of the ruled to the ruler. 
The ambivalent takfir of the security forces falls short of legitimising AQAP militants killing 
soldiers, as their blood cannot be forfeited unless they are denounced in explicit terms as kafir. 
A way to escape this dilemma is via a juristic rule known as dafʿ al-ṣāʾil, ‘repelling the 
attacker’.29 The word al-ṣāʾil, which roughly translates as ‘the attacker’, is a designated term 
referring to an attacker whether it be Muslim or non-Muslim. Sawt al-jihad statements on the 
confrontations between AQAP militants and the security forces refer to soldiers as al-ʿaduw al-
ṣāʿil. 
(31) 
...but we will not be up for grabs for the ṭawāghīt and their soldiers. We will defend ourselves, 
we will not hesitate to repel al-ṣāʿil ‘the attacker’ soldiers, and we shall show them what they 
hate. Allah is predominant over His affair, but most of the people do not know… 
Issue 3, October 2003 
Furthermore, several predications present soldiers as cowardly, turning their backs on battles 
with mujahedeen. A wide range of such hyperbolic statements on this theme is frequently used 
in Sawt al-jihad’s accounts of confrontations between AQAP militants and security forces. 
(32)  
…we took our positions to start shooting at them but soon afterwards they escaped and fled 
without firing a single bullet… 
 
Issue 4, October 2003 
(33) 
…then the bullets hailed from cowardly snipers fighting from behind walls… 
 
Issue 15, April 2004 
  
                                                 
29 In November 2003, Sawt al-jihad published two long articles, entitled “The Jurisprudence of Jihad: Repelling 
the Ṣāʾil: Confronting the Regime’s Soldiers”. AQAP ideologue Abdullah al-Rashid wrote both articles. 
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 The ulema 
The ulema are frequently represented in Sawt al-jihad. The mainstream ulema played a 
significant role in the official counter-terrorism campaign. Aside from hard policing, the Saudi 
handling relied on an efficient soft approach30 that included a media campaign in which the 
official religious sector and the mainstream ulema participated in denouncing AQAP members 
and their activities in Saudi Arabia. An important component was the broadcasting of televised 
interviews with three key AQAP militants31 who appeared on TV in November 2003 repenting 
their extremist views and explaining in religious terms how they had been mistaken in their 
support of AQAP members taking up arms. As a result, a considerable amount of the content 
of the discourse on jihad is counter-arguments for the campaign against AQAP. However, the 
range of referential types used to construct them is less diverse than for rulers and soldiers. The 
referential and predicational strategies used delegitimise the ulema in various ways. A negative 
presentation of the ulema is generalised on the whole, with almost no indivisualised references. 
The common denominator in referential and predicational strategies constructing the ulema is 
the attempt to rid them of any religious credibility in the minds of the population, and the 
Islamist community in particular. An essential reference involves associating the ulema with 
the rulers, e.g. ʿulamāʾ al-ṣalāṭīn, ‘the sultans’, ulema’, al-mashāʾikh al-rasmiyīn, ‘official 
Sheikhs’, and ʿulamāʾ al-ṭaghūt ‘ṭāghūt’s ulema’. Staying away from the rulers for reasons of 
piety and maintaining integrity and independence are virtues revered in the Salafist literature, 
even for those who are not revolutionary and anti-political authority. The very reference ‘the 
sultan’s ulema’ implies negative connotations of treason. Ṭāghūt’s ulema is more derogatory. 
Such references are accompanied by predicated negative attributes that reinforce the ulema 
being seduced by worldly pleasures and neglecting to make clear to people the obligation to 
embrace jihad against the Crusaders and their apostate agents. 
Another category of delegitimatory references makes use of attributive adjectives, e.g. al-
mukhathelūn ‘the discouragers’, al-murjifūn ‘who spread rumours’, al-munāfiqūn ‘the 
hypocrites’, al-mustaslimūn ‘surrenders’ etc. Interestingly, the falsehood of the ulema is 
expressed via the active participles of verbs in a specific morphological pattern that denotes 
pretention. Instances of this category include references such as al-mutafayhiq and al-
                                                 
30 The soft approach includes tightening the financial system and opening communication channels for potential 
deserters amongst AQAP militants. 
31 These were the clerical ideologues ʿali al-Khudair, Nasser al-Fahd and Ahmed al-Khāldi who were arrested on 
28 May 2003. 
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mutaʾaslimūn, which roughly translate into English as ‘pseudo-jurists’ and ‘pseudo-Islamists’, 
respectively. 
(34) 
...indulging in the mud of ṭawāghīt and their tale mercenaries and pseudo-jurists… 
Issue 15, April 2004 
Pronouns are used to associate the ulema with the rulers in references such as shuyūkhuhum, 
‘their Sheikhs’. The following is a sample of the predicates ascribed to the ulema corresponding 
to the referential strategies above: 
 - being negligent and accepting humiliation 
who find nothing wrong in their land being occupied by American female soldiers 
who don’t think of liberating the land of the Crusader invaders 
at the forefront of the negligent in the rights of our ummah 
instilling in them [the people OR their followers] humiliation and debasement 
irrigating them [their followers] with the water of servility 
deterring Muslims from jihad 
- serving the ruler 
enslaved by ṭawāghīt and their fate is linked with his 
providing gains for the Crusade 
serving the Crusade 
hypocrites 
brainwashing the people 
hired by the sultans 
handkerchiefs in the hands of the sultans 
- being false 
pretend ulema 
pretend religious 
seduced by worldly positions 
the so-called ulema  
In addition to the ulema, reference is made to the duʿāt al-ṣaħwah, ‘preachers of Sahwa’.32 
These preachers are known Islamist figures who appeared in the 1980/90s as a generation of 
enthusiastic preachers, some of whom were pro-jihad. By and large, they share delegitimatory 
discursive themes similar to those ascribed to ulema, but references to them are largely 
accompanied by a set of attributes highlighting their argument’s inconsistencies, e.g. ‘you were 
pro-jihad during the Afghan War and are against jihad now’.  
                                                 
32 The Sawha literally means the phenomenon of “Awakening [Islam]” (for a detailed account of this phenomenon, 
see Lacroix 2011). 
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5.3.3. The Other-outwith 
The Other-outwith comprises a group of non-Muslim countries hostile to the Islamic world, 
which Al Qaeda’s literature refers to as the infidel Crusader-Jewish alliance. The data clearly 
display two levels of discursively constructing the Other-outhwith. First, there is a set of 
references which are more or less floating signifiers that refer to a supposedly infidel Other. On 
this level, the differentiation is ideological and represents the Other by means of religionyms 
(e.g. ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’), negative ideologonyms (e.g. ‘Crusaders’, ‘infidels’ and 
‘polytheists’) references based on local orientation (e.g. ‘the West’ and ‘the Americans’) and 
a pre-modern ethnic reference (al-rūm ‘the Romans’). Sawt al-jihad, as early as the first issue, 
set forth its extremist ideological stance legitimising the indiscriminate killing of infidels. The 
following excerpt is taken from an article entitled ‘Creed first’, which was published in the first 
issue immediately following the op-ed. 
(35) 
…Verily they are polytheists, whose blood is that of a dog. 
God Almighty has said (Indeed, the worst of living creatures in the sight of Allah are those who 
have disbelieved, and they will not [ever] believe) and (Those are like livestock; rather, they are 
more astray) … verily the blood of the infidel is forfeited … and verily the muwaħūid [the 
monotheist] whose chest is filled with Godly-ordained enmity to infidels, who disbelieved in 
ṭāghūt and in whoever believes in ṭāghūt, whose alliance and enmity are in the cause of Allah, 
this muwaħūid should verily long for the infidel’s blood, and to cut him into pieces… 
My brother Mujahed ... Do you not want Paradise?! Do you not want to be safe from hellfire?! 
… Kill the polytheist … Kill those who have dog’s blood. Kill those by whom you are 
enjoined by God to kill… 
 
Issue 1, September 2003 
In this and similar references made throughout the magazine, a plethora of negative attributes 
are ascribed to the ideological Other-outwith to legitimise the indiscriminate killing of Western 
expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Several incidents occurred from 2003 to 2005, resulting in the 
wounding and killing of several Westerners in isolated events other than mass bombings.33 
Several topics in the discourse on disbelievers make the case that infidel blood is forfeit simply 
for being kafir or non-Muslim. This view justifies the indiscriminate killing of non-Muslims, 
combatants and non-combatants alike. The dehumanising ‘dogs’, ‘livestock’ in the excerpt 
above reinforce such propositions. 
Second, there are references denoting specific Western countries. Although the common 
Otherness in this camp is based on being non-Muslim or infidel, the struggle is simply focused 
                                                 
33 In these isolated incidents, nine Westerners were killed and five injured from 2003 to 2005. 
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on a universe of Crusade worshippers, abadat al saleeb. The pole of this universe, on which the 
magazine is fixated, is the USA. This is witnessed in the context of the standoff between 
America and Al Qaeda since the latter’s inception and more particularly in the context of the 
post-9/11 “War on Terror”. The case made against the USA throughout the magazine is very 
detailed and propagates the history of what AQAP regards as hostilities and conspiracies against 
the Islamic world. However, the list of old grievances does not justify AQAP’s jihadist 
campaign inside Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Sawt al-jihad adopts a hyperbolic narrative depicting 
the USA as occupying Saudi Arabia. This theme is constructed and reproduced throughout the 
magazine, consider this example that refers to the USA as ‘the occupying Crusader enemy’: 
(36)  
Of the greatest places where jihad is obligatory: bilād al-ħaramiayn [the land of the two Holy 
Mosques], wherein the occupying Crusader enemy, who steals its resources, determines its 
policies, and drives the Muslims from this land. Also therein is the apostate puppet government 
that implements the plans of colonisation, and allies to disbelievers, governing according to laws 
other than those of Almighty God. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
This narrative serves to justify the declared aim of AQAP, which is the expulsion of the 
Crusaders from Arabia. Nonetheless, AQAP’s ideological stance – in line with AQ’s stance – 
states that all Americans/Westerners are legitimate targets – civilian and military alike. 
As seen in Table 12 (Appendix C), a key referential tool used to represent America is the use 
of the Crusades as a religious icon symbolising the historical rivalry between the world of Islam 
and Christendom. This category combines several linguistic types incorporating the word al-
ṣalīb ‘Crusade’, or al-ṣalībiyy(a), that can be used as both an adjective and a noun derived from 
it.34 This category is conflated with various referential tools, e.g. al-ṣalībiyy(īn) ‘the Crusaders’, 
ʿubbād al-ṣalīb ‘worshippers of the Crusade’, al-ʿduw al-ṣalībiy ‘the Crusader enemy’, sadanat 
al-ṣalīb ‘servants of the Crusade’ etc. References to the Crusades are used throughout the 
magazine for a variety of actors/actions. This includes, among others, al-gharb al-ṣalībiy, ‘the 
Crusader West’ al-ħarb al- ṣalībiyya ‘the Crusade war’. Such references frame the relationship 
of the Islamic world with the West as one of hostility evoking the listener’s repertoire of old 
knowledge about the Crusades. AQAP’s worldview has its own perception of history that 
considers the American post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan to be the Tenth Crusade, as phrased 
explicitly in this excerpt:  
                                                 
34 One way of structuring the adjective from a lexical root in Arabic is through attaching the nisba, a ‘relative’ 
suffix, -iyy (M) or -iyya (F). 
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(37) 
…but the Tenth Crusade is now marching towards Afghanistan… 
 
Issue 4, October 2003 
Since the declared aim of AQAP is the expulsion of the Crusaders from Arabia, the 
confrontation is between Us (‘the worshippers of Allah’) and Them (‘the Worshippers of the 
Crusade’). As we have seen in the Other-within, some references and predicational themes 
associate the regime and the security forces with the Crusade. In this vein, the ṣalībiy 
attributions are primarily made to the Other-outwith and secondarily to the Other-within. 
References in terms of the Crusade are thus ideologically evaluative and are used in close 
proximity to predications reinforcing the Crusade narrative in the form of assumed shared 
knowledge. Moreover, the Crusade narrative involves two discursive strategies, religionisation 
and militarisation, and these are strongly related to historical analogical representations (as will 
be discussed in Chapter 7). The discursive construction of America dwells almost exclusively 
on invoking the historical narrative of the Crusades, along with a mutual association between 
America and the Saudi regime. 
It is emphasised by a Sawt al-jihad editorial that the number one enemy is the Crusaders 
occupying the Arabian Peninsula, bilād al-ħaramain, and that they will not target security 
forces provided the latter do not interfere to protect the Crusaders. This can be interpreted as a 
means of avoiding any blame for staining this hand with Muslim blood. Therefore, the range of 
attributions ascribed to America through predication are quantitatively abundant but limited in 
terms of their thematic content. As presented in Table 12 (Appendix C), the predications solely 
present America in religious and military terms as the “aggressive State of the Crusade”. The 
predications highlight the American invasion of Muslim lands. More importantly, hyperbolic 
statements are made about the American presence in Arabia, portraying it as an occupation of 
the heartland of Islam. 
(38) 
…here is jihad in your land, these are the Americans among you, building their churches in 
Mohammed’s land, look at them conquering your land with their troops and weapons… 
 
Issue 8, December 2003 
(39) 
…have you not seen this who curses your religion … who occupies Muslim lands and colonises 
Makkah and Madinah… 
 
Issue 10, January 2004 
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Such statements are made in abundance throughout the magazine. The mechanism of constant 
repetition in these statements aims to legitimise AQAP’s mission, given the several mass 
bombings that targeted compounds and facilities hosting American citizens. On the other hand, 
the enemy – America – is also presented as a losing enemy in the long run because it has been 
drawn into an ambush set by the mujahedeen. Several predications reinforce this narrative, 
featuring economic losses from the costly war launched in the Islamic world. Therefore, other 
predications assert that America’s defeat is a matter of time as it is trapped in the minefield of 
its war on Islam. 
5.4. Recap and conclusion 
This chapter has explored the topics of AQAP discourse on jihad and how jihad is constructed 
in its ideology. The analysis has shown that Sawt al-jihad stresses a messianic revivalist mission 
whereby jihad is, on the one hand, a goal in its own right – an incarnation of God’s oneness or 
the pure form of Islam and – and, on the other hand, a means for repelling a constructed U.S. 
invasion and fighting the illegitimate Saudi government. The chapter has explained how the 
AQAP narrative steers away from the classical Islamic conception of jihad as a collective duty 
and elevates its status to a personal duty equivalent to the articulation of faith. Therefore, the 
construction of jihad is interwoven with a plethora of juristic and theological topics, which are 
based on selective recontextualisation of sacred texts and prior juristic opinions. These topics 
promote polemics and ideas ranging from the legitimate killing of non-combatant infidels, the 
case of kufr or apostasy ‘disbelief’ of the Saudi government, to the polytheism in allying to 
disbelievers and implementing non-Sharia legislation, among others. 
Then, this chapter provided an account of how AQAP discourse textualises the social world. 
Sawt al-jihad conveys an extreme tripartite division of the world: believer Self, misbeliever 
Other-within and disbeliever Other-outwith. This extreme worldview is dictated by the urgent 
need to legitimise the novel jihad inside Saudi Arabia, which involves killing Muslims. Thus, 
the prototypical Self in the AQAP politics derive its merits from a commitment to jihad as a 
Godly-ordained duty. Sawt al-jihad, therefore, constucts the mujahed as the true Muslim, who 
is altruistic to the ummah and is willing to sacrifice his soul on this path. The notion of the 
ummah can be deemed to be the typical social structure in the AQAP’s body politic. The Other 
in Sawt al-jihad is divided into the Other-within and the Other-outwith. AQAP’s declared aim 
is fighting the invading American Crusaders and expelling them from Arabia. Three prominent 
camps of social actors are manifest in Sawt al-jihad: the political regime, the security forces 
and the ulema, ‘religious scholars’. All these groups of social actors are presented with similar 
 112 
negative attributions, though with varying religious/theological implications. The political 
regime/rulers are generically presented as either ‘false gods’, imposing their manmade laws 
instead of God’s laws, or with a wide range of attributions that involved declaring them as 
kuffār, ‘disbelievers/non-Muslim’. On the other hand, the security forces are constructed by 
means of linguistic realisations implying their implicit excommunication, while the ulema are 
generally associated with the government as ‘official sheikhs’ or ‘sultans’ ulema’. The Other-
Outwith is strictly defined in religious terms as a constructed Christian-Jewish alliance. In a 
narrative that goes hand in hand with the AQ’s anti-Americanism, the prominent actor in this 
universe of disbelief is the USA. Sawt al-jihad puts forth an extreme ideological stance 
legitimising the indiscriminate killing of disbelievers. 
Overall, such a representation of the social world is of a simplistic nature. It draws analogic 
historical representations with an imagined past in the jihadist narrative. Thus, all identities are 
reduced to traditional or pre-modern categories that, despite their simplistic nature, exert 
pervasive emotive and epistemological influence on the audience. Now, having reviewed the 
AQAP’s social world, the next chapter will explore the intertextual fabric of AQAP discourse. 
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Chapter 6 ANALYSIS OF INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS IN AQAP 
DISCOURSE 
6.1. Introduction 
Having reviewed the content of AQAP discourse topics along with the referential and 
predicational strategies that underpin them, this chapter considers the fabric of AQAP 
discourse. The previous chapter addressed what is said, while this one attempts to discuss the 
manner of articulation. Equipped with the analytic tool of intertextuality, alongside the 
concomitant tools of presupposition and de/re-contextualisation, I aim to explore the ways in 
which AQAP discourse appeals to, and overlaps with, prior (sacred) texts and the hearer’s 
repertoires of old knowledge. The goal of this chapter is twofold: (i) to develop a systematic 
analytic approach to intertextuality that is operationalisable in analysing (politico)-religious 
discourses – particularly perspectivised AQAP ideological discourses and (ii) to use this 
framework to analyse the structuring and restructuring of AQAP discourse. With respect to the 
former, I draw on Genette’s approach to intertextuality (1997) and Fairclough’s (1992) notions 
about modes of intertextuality and discourse representation. 
6.2. Appropriating an approach to AQAP intertextual connections 
This thesis proposes a fairly simple argument: the most important discursive vehicle for jihadist 
ideology is not the content of jihadist texts, but rather the underpinning intertextual relations 
between what is said and prior texts that carry symbplic and epistemilogical capital. AQAP’s 
discourse, and the various types of jihadist discourses, are, in essence, revivalist. They seek to 
resurrect a paradigmatic societal form: khilāfah ʾalā minhāj alnubuwah, a Caliphate according 
to the prophetic method. For such an ideological group, the authority lies somewhere in the 
river of Islamic tradition flowing from the constitutive texts of the Quran and the Sunnah 
through the amplifying corpora of religious and juristic texts, along with Islamic history. My 
argument, therefore, focuses on the way in which previous valued texts and their generic 
features are selected and put together in the discourse in question. The producers of AQAP 
discourse select elements from enclosed religious and ideological systems and arrange them in 
Sawt al-jihad. The aim of this task is to locate, describe and stabilise the significance of the 
intertextual relations between a specific text and others. For the respective sacred and religious 
texts involved, this study distances itself from becoming involved in any theological debate 
regarding the authenticity of relevant texts or the truthfulness of their interpretations. My role 
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is to explicate the intended meaning by the speaker and reveal relevant underlying texts. Such 
a peculiar relation between previous valued texts and new ones needs to be captured in the 
approach taken to intertextuality. 
Significant attention has been paid to the concept of intertextuality in sociocultural linguistics 
and discourse studies. Studies have examined the intertextual language in everyday use (e.g. 
Gordon 2003; Tannen 2006), in reported speech (e.g. Fairclough 1992; Matoesian 2000) and 
the intertextual connections involved in political discourse (e.g. Hodges 2008). Within CDA, 
the DHA gives primacy to intra- and intertextual relations and regards them as a constative 
element of context. It emphasises the role of intertextuality in transforming prior texts and 
restructuring new conventions to generate novel materials, but it does not provide a clear and 
systematic analytic framework. Fairclough (1992: 117–118) offers a rather detailed account of 
intertextuality that pays particular attention to reported speech. His approach accords with his 
focus on discourse and social change and only relies on intertextuality as a micro-analysis tool. 
He distinguishes three modes of manifest intertextual relations: (1) sequential intertextuality, 
where different texts or types alternate within a text; (2) embedded intertextuality, where one 
text or discourse type is clearly contained within the matrix of another; and (3) mixed 
intertextuality, where texts or discourse types are merged in a more complex and less easily 
separable manner. 
The data of Sawt al-jihad comprise an intertextual phenomenon in the first place and are 
saturated with dialogic references to prior texts. However, within CDA, intertextuality does not 
appear to have been sufficiently operationalised to do discourse analysis in a scope broader than 
text-to-text connections. Such limitedness strips the analysis of its ability to capture the 
omnipresent and dialogic nature of intertextuality beyond the word level in the data of Sawt al-
jihad. Consequently, I have attempted to proceed eclectically and move to formulate an analytic 
framework for intertextual relations, drawing for the most part on the structural approach 
presented by Genette (1997). Simultaneously, I adopt Fairclough’s (1992) notions regarding 
modes of intertextuality and discourse representation. 
  
 115 
6.2.1. Genette’s hypertextuality 
Genette (1997) provides a broader account of intertextuality that can be developed and 
operationalised in CDA. Rather than looking at micro-modes of intertextuality, as is the case in 
Fairclough’s account, Genette presents a compelling account that studies the totality of the 
textual transcendence of a literary text, i.e. “all that sets the text in relationship, whether obvious 
or concealed, with other texts” (1997: 1). His model of transtextuality1 is subdivided into five 
categories. First, he styles the mere co-presence of two or more texts in one text as 
intertextuality. For Genette, this category subsumes instances ranging from explicit quotations 
to less explicit allusions up to more concealed acts of plagiarism, allusion etc. He drives away 
from Kristeva’s semiotic processes of cultural and textual signification and offers a revised 
description of intertextuality that is concerned in a more restrictive sense with the relationship 
between specific textual elements. The second category is paratextuality, whereby the paratexts 
– texts accompanying a primary literary text, e.g. titles, subtitles, prefaces, postfaces etc. – 
provide the text with a variable setting and bind it within the totality of literary works.2 Paratexts 
are subdivided into two further categories: (a) peritexts (elements such as titles, chapter titles, 
prefaces, notes etc.) and (b) epitexts (features including interviews, announcements, reviews, 
private letters and other authorial and editorial discussions). The third category is that of 
metatextuality, where a text takes up a relation of commentary on another previous text, whether 
or not this is cited. Such a critical relationship of metatextuality is recursive, whereby we can 
identify meta-metatexts. Fourth, Genette introduces the category of archetextuality, which 
comprises the reader’s expectations pertaining to genre-specific matters. 
Of primary importance among all five categories of Genette’s transtextual relations is 
hypertextuality. Hypertextuality involves a relationship between a hypertext and an earlier 
hypotext, in which the hypotext is definitely located as a major source of signification for the 
hypertext, such as Homer’s Odyssey that can be said to be a major hypotext for other literary 
works, e.g. Joyce’s Ulysses (Allen 2001: 108). Conversely, the hypertext is grafted through 
transforming the generic and textual features of a hypotext or a corpus of hypotexts. Similarly, 
the hypertext is unable to exist without the hypotext, from which it originates through the 
process of transformation, though without necessarily citing it. Genette (1997: 5) emphasises 
                                                 
1 Confusingly, the term intertextuality is not the concept employed in the sense introduced by Kristeva nor that 
which is common in CDA but is reduced to the concrete co-presence of two texts, the first type in the transtextuality 
model. 
2 Genette (1997: 429) states that the prefix para- in paratext is used in the sense of operating with similar adjectives 
such as parafiscal and paramilitary. 
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that, for a hypertext, the hypotext “is more frequently considered a ‘properly literary’ work than 
is the metatext”. Figure 9 below illustrates the distinction Genette makes between intertextuality 
and hypertextuality. 
  
Figure 9: Intertextual vs hypertextual relations 
The main point here is to argue that the differential elevational values of texts should be worked 
into the formulation of intertextual links made in politico-religious discourses such as jihadist 
texts. The notion of hypotext is particularly relevant to jihadist data and similar discourses. I am 
primarily concerned with the significance of the prior text to the new intertext; and to avoid 
terminological confusion, I prefer the term hypotextuality to Genette’s hypertextuality. For 
Genette’s literary approach, the source of signification is literariness, but for my approach it is 
the authoritative, context-sensitive symbolic value of the hypotext which is featured in the 
intertext in question. The relation, then, between the hypotext and the intertext is a relation 
between an imitated text and an imitative one, with varying degrees of imitation or 
transformation. Of course, I am not assuming, when intertextually occurs (on the left in Figure 
9), that the prior text has no value. There must be a pragmatic value in representing a specific 
prior text among other possible prior texts, but the issue is that in the case of hypertextuality (as 
diagrammatically displayed on the right), the prior text adds significant value, authority and 
legitimacy to the intertext, due to the higher symbolic value assigned to the prior text. 
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6.2.2. Hypotextuality and the analysis of AQAP discourse 
Fairclough (2001: 71) argues convincingly that “[i]deology is most effective when its workings 
are least visible”. That remains undoubtedly true, but the effectiveness of jihadist discourse in 
recruiting new members cannot be perceived as hidden ideological workings. Indeed, it is too 
explicit, as already argued in Chapter 5. Effectiveness here can be ascribed to something else. 
Paraphrasing Fairclough, I would argue that ideology is most effective when it takes on the 
guise of religion, or in the words of Shayegan (1997: ix): the “ideologisation of tradition”. The 
ideologue in the Islamic world, as quite eloquently put by Shayegan (1997: 141), 
…has the advantage of possessing unshakable certainties forged out of incisive a priori 
notions … He has the faith of one who believes … He has the faith of one who believes 
he possesses the truth and is intolerant of anyone opposing him or disputing his 
monopoly of truth. 
He continues (142): 
The ideologue does not live in time but in space. He cannot feel comfortable until he has 
converted the movement of time into a frozen space where everything is in its correct 
place: where, say, the wicked are on the left, the good on the right, the discarded forms 
of the past behind, and in front a transparent future … marking out the roads to utopia. 
Shayegan’s characterisation of the ideologue seems appropriate for Sawt al-jihad ideologues. 
Their semantic macro-structures are presented as unshakeable certainties forged out of incisive 
a priori notions, protected on the grounds of: “God said it”. Therefore, for AQAP’s jihadist 
ideology, epistemology is intertextual and concerns a repertoire of old knowledge or, more 
precisely, a repertoire of old texts. Therefore, this study emphasises the systematic and 
relational nature of (jihadist) texts with earlier/historical discourses and assumes it is possible 
for the analyst to explicate and describe recurrent systematic relations. 
One might convincingly, though, suggest that the relationship between Sawt al-jihad’s texts 
and prior texts is a case of interdiscursivity. This remains true to a degree but what really matters 
is not the two overlapping discourses, but rather the overlap between the intertextual text and 
certain ‘hypotexts’, which supposedly possess a symbolic value, irrespective of the type of 
discourses to which they belong. The common denominator among the corpus of hypotexts is 
the fact that they belong to an epistemologically and emotionally archetypical Self. Thus, the 
hypotextual reference functions as a paradigmatic link, not only between two texts, but also 
between speaker and archetypical Self denoted in the hypotext. For instance, the hypotextual 
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connections drawn at the level of onymity and pseudonymity (in 6.3.2 below) do indeed form 
a relation between the current jihadist individual and a perceived archetypical Self from the 
past. 
   symbolic value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
time axis  
 
Figure 10: Hypotextual relations in Sawt al-jihad 
It is noteworthy that the structure of the hypotext follows the same hierarchical pattern 
explicated in 3.5.1. As Figure 10 illustrates, the corpus imbues the jihadist text with – in the 
words of Irvine (1989: 258) – a chain of authentication, ranging from Quranic verses and 
prophet’s sayings to texts attributed to salaf or jihadist figures. It is the Salafist mindset, in 
which the standard of truth lies in the practice of salaf, stretching from the time of the Prophet 
Mohammad up to the mujahedeen of modern times. In Bourdieu’s (1991) terms, each 
incorporated hypotext contains its own symbolic capital stemming from a belief in the 
legitimacy of its words, and of those who uttered them. The purpose of examining iterative 
hypotextual processes is to uncover how such a regime of truth reveals itself intertextually. 
While the jihadists’ use of language is implicated in a wider chain of both preceding and 
subsequent utterances, I am exclusively concerned with the former because the current study is 
focused on the way Sawt al-jihad cultivates prior linguistic resources. AQAP discourse 
inevitably anticipates potential responses from different social actors, but this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Hypotextuality, with the sum of all existing hypotexts, promotes the 
discourse in question by appealing to its infinite power, which is superior to that of everyday 
discourse. It is characteristic of AQAP intertextual references that they maintain a degree of 
a selected corpus of hypotexts QURAN
SUNNAH
TRADITION OF 
THE SALAF
JIHADIST
LITERATURE
intertext 
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juristic analogy, in the sense that the meaning brought forward by intertextuality centralises a 
representation, a story, a set of ideas without there being a need to state them explicitly. The 
hypotext is there, potentially present and bearing all of its meaning and symbolic as well as 
epistemic power, without necessarily uttering the analogous representation between the 
speakers of both text and hypotext. Thus, an exceptional richness and credibility are conferred 
upon Sawt al-jihad’s intertexts. 
AQAP’s voice in Sawt al-jihad is not uniquely homogeneous. Rather, it incorporates a mass of 
the already said/written/read into a discourse composed of texts drawn from innumerable 
stages in past histories. The intertextual profile of the jihadist discourse is too rich and 
historically loaded and reaches out beyond the immediate here-and-now encounter between the 
producers and consumers of discourse. For argumentative purposes (as will be explicated in the 
ensuing chapter), Sawt al-jihad is punctuated by references to significant epistemological texts 
and historical narratives. This involves a relatively constant flow of history into texts. 
Furthermore, hypotextuality plays a major role in rhetorical and emotional acts and can have 
an elocutionary effect on the audience by triggering certain behavioural patterns. 
In the case of religious revivalists and jihadists, the hypotext is the source of epistemological 
signification. That said, I attempt not to lose sight of the literariness of the corpora of hypotexts, 
for they do indeed bear elements of literary worth or eloquence. It has been established in 
Islamic tradition that the rhetorical superiority of Quran is inimitable. An entire branch of a 
theological discipline known as iʿjāz ‘inimitability’ is devoted solely to this purpose (Achrati 
2008). The fundamental premise for this discipline is that the Quran’s miraculous and inimitable 
nature springs from its challenge to pre-Islam Arabs, whose cultural community was best 
known for its cultivation of language and poetry. The densely structured chapters of the Quran 
reflect linguistic patterns known in Ancient Arabia, such as sajʿ, a prose style composed of 
remarkably concise sentences with changing expressive rhymes. The notion of inimitability is 
iterated in several Quranic verses (Graham and Kermani 2006; Neuwirth 2006).3 Furthermore, 
the corpus of Sunnah contains bespoke stylistic features, and it is widely established in Arab-
Islamic culture that quoting lines and fragments from the Quran and Sunnah or other traditional 
                                                 
3 An example of such verses is: Or do they say [about the Prophet], “He invented it?” Say, Then bring forth a surah 
like it and call upon [for assistance] whomever you can besides Allah, if you should be truthful (Quran, 10: 38). 
This and similar verses affirm the divine authorship of the Quran. Several modern Muslim authors have 
emphasised the literary supremacy of the Quranic text, such as Abu Zahra (1974), al-Rafi (1937) and Rida (1935), 
and for aesthetic reception of the Quran see Graham and Kermani (2006). 
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sources has oratory and rhetorical value. Moreover, it is a common practice, even in modern-
day religious discourse across different Islamic schools of thought. 
The appeal to religious authority is salient in AQAP discourse. Since religious symbolic power 
lies in a closed corpus of texts, it follows as a matter of necessity that the vehicle for the appeal 
to religious authority is an intertextual one. Therefore, hypotextuality –deliberate intertextual 
transpositions consisting of specific pre-existing hypotexts – is of direct concern to the analysis 
of AQAP discourse. As illustrated in Figure 11, I am inclined to recognise Genette’s five types 
of transtextual relations in a rather specific model within which hypotextuality – rather than 
hypertextuality – is the overarching mode manifesting in and overlapping with other types of 
intertextuality. For the purposes of my analysis, I define hypotexts as a corpus of texts, textual 
fragments or segments of sociolects that share formal, grammatical and lexical elements with 
the intertext. Their producers regard this corpus or its authors as a source of signification. 
Hypotexts can be transformed using processes such as amplification, repetition, excision, 
reduction etc.  
As shown in Figure 11, hypotextual transformation processes can mainfest at the levels of: 
- archetextuality, where hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole, e.g. in the 
choice of genre-specific features, register, stylistic elements etc.  
- paratextuality, where hypotexuality shows at the level of the paratext, e.g. titles, 
slogans, pull qoutes, (pseud)onymity etc.  
- meta-textuality, when selected hypotexts are being topicalised, and  
- micro-hypotextuality, whereby the intertextual relation is a text-to-text one, e.g. 
embedded hypotexts, allusions etc. 
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Figure 11: Model of hypotextuality in AQAP discourse 
Before proceeding to the analysis, I wish to highlight two notions in concomitance with 
hypo/inter-textuality, namely, recontextualisation and presupposition. Recontextualisation is 
the outcome of the process of transforming previous texts or just inserting them into a new 
intertext (Linell 1998). However, in the case of AQAP discourse, recontextualisation practices 
are not arbitrary, they more or less follow a practice of seeking authenticity by establishing 
links with sacred texts. This method follows the religious discourse tradition that has its own 
canons of intertextuality, principles of regarding which texts are most relevant to the 
interpretation of any text and, more importantly, principles of knowledge production norms that 
are mainly based on the concept of analogy. Indeed, citing sacred texts is, to varying degrees, 
a common intertextual pattern in the discourses of different Islamic schools of thought. 
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Conversely, presupposition is traditionally defined as “a piece of information or a proposition 
whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence” (Huang 2014: 85). Along with 
other accounts of presuppositions (e.g. Levinson 1983; Yule 1996), this definition provides a 
non-intertextual account of presupposition confined to the domain of the sentence.4 In contrast, 
Fairclough (1992: 120–121) provides a compelling intertextual view of presupposition, which 
assumes that “presupposed propositions are a way of incorporating the texts of others”. He 
argues convincingly that: 
…there are problems with this [intertextual] account: it would entail, for example, that 
the sentence ‘the Soviet threat is a myth’ is semantically contradictory, because the text 
producer would be simultaneously taking it for granted that there was a Soviet threat; 
and asserting that there was no such threat … [with the intertextual view] the expression 
‘the Soviet threat’ and the presupposition it cues come from another (‘alien’, as Bakhtin 
puts it) text which is here contested. 
He then concludes that: 
… [w]ithin an intertextual account of presupposition, the case where the presupposed 
proposition does constitute something taken for granted by the text producer can be 
interpreted in terms of intertextual relations with previous texts of the text producer. 
Polyzou (2015) makes an interesting point in this regard. She presents a compelling socio-
cognitive account of presupposition starting from the lexical level, then proceeding to the level 
of the clause, followed by the discourse level and then, finally, the interaction of pragmatic 
knowledge with real world knowledge. The latter gives room for both universal and culture-
specific assumptions shared by competent members of the epistemic community. This level of 
pragmatic presupposition bears links to intertextuality that are context-sensitive. I will return to 
this level of presupposition in Chapter 7. 
The remainder of this chapter illustrates how hypotextuality is substantiated in AQAP discourse 
at the four levels depicted in Figure 10. 
  
                                                 
4 Within the sentence-domain account, some conceive of presupposition as an attribute of the speaker (e.g. Yule 
1996), while others regard it as an attribute of the utterance (Frege 1982). However, both approaches neglect the 
intertextual aspect of presupposition. 
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6.3. Analysing Sawt al-jihad’s hypotextual profile 
The notion of hypotextuality must be examined in light of the symbolic power and 
epistemological weight of the cited hypotexts. The production and interpretation of jihadist 
texts are influenced by the speaker’s social value besides the linguistic features deployed in the 
text, such as grammar and lexis, semantic dispositions and the use of particular registers and 
genres to produce recognisable types of discourse that yield certain perspectives from their 
subjects. 
 
Figure 12: The hypotextual connections realised in the content of Sawt al-jihad 
I should point out an important fact before commencing on the substantiation of the categories 
displayed in this diagram. It is important to bear in mind that I am analysing examples translated 
from Arabic into English. The translation of texts involving hypotextual relations is never 
neutral because it erodes the significance of the transformation processes and conceals the ways 
in which previous formal structures are produced within the respective hypotexts. Nonetheless, 
I have done my best to give particular examples for each category. Whenever necessary, notes 
are added in the course of the analysis.  
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6.3.1. Architextual hypotextuality 
Architextual relationships, where hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole, e.g. in the 
choice of genre-specific features, registers, stylistic elements, are the most abstract and implicit 
of all the hypotextual categories. At this level, the process of assimilating texts and pre-texts 
through hypotextual references operate not only at the word level but also at a structural whole; 
in other words, how a text relates to the entire religious discourse/rhetoric as a semi-autonomous 
field. There is a matrix of formal, grammatical and lexical elements that help the reader 
recognise the semiotic unity of Sawt al-jihad’s texts as a unique architext. Indeed, we can speak 
of a jihadist idiolect, a transformed version of a religious sociolect associated with jihadist 
groups. At this macro-level, the relationship is not necessarily a text-to-text one. Rather, the 
relationship involves a whole tradition or sociolect. For the autographic texts of Sawt al-jihad, 
texts produce their significance out of hypotextual relationships with the religious sociolect as 
socially normative discourse. Discourse, in this regard, is the type of language used in religious 
sermons and rituals and is recognisable by the audience. It is the source from which texts and 
‘orders of discourse’ are borrowed.5 
One way of maintaining hypotextual relationships at the level of the architext in Sawt al-jihad 
is through enregisterment. In its broadest sense, register is “a variety of language defined 
according to its use in social situations” (Crystal 1990: 327). Enregisterment is a set of processes 
“through which a linguistic repertoire becomes differentiable within a language as a socially 
recognised register of forms” (Agha 2003: 231). The social position is cast in the linguistic 
elements typical of religious discourses, such as lexis, style and semantic dispositions 
recognisable to the listener. Hymes (1996: 33) states that “A repertoire comprises a set of ways 
of speaking. Ways of speaking, in turn, comprise speech styles, on the one hand, and contexts 
of discourse, on the other, together with relations of appropriateness obtaining styles and 
contexts.” Religionisation – as a discursive strategy – is not infused in AQAP discourse only 
via specific linguistic realisations (e.g. nomination or predication), it can also be identifiable in 
terms of architextual elements. Overall, Sawt al-jihad maintains a religious register, a variety 
of linguistic repertoires associated with religious situations is effectively infused in AQAP 
discourse through intertextual connections. Equipped with metapragmatic abilities, the 
consumers of AQAP discourse differentiate the religious register, among other registers, and 
assign pragmatic values to it. Enregisterment can be observed in the fact that AQAP discourse 
distances itself from the mainstream Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) by adhering to the more 
                                                 
5 Orders of discourse are the implicit conventions determining what counts as appropriate talk (Fairclough 1992). 
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classical variety associated with its valued hypotexts, i.e. the Quran, Sunnah and the language 
spoken by the Salaf. As the excerpts presented so far illustrate, the language of Sawt al-jihad 
draws hypotextual relations not with people’s everyday language but rather with Classical 
Arabic. To render the analysis tangible, I will look at two variant forms assigned to the religious 
register: (1) genre and (2) classical stylistic choices. 
Fairclough defines genre as ‘a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and 
partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity, such as informal chat, buying goods in a shop, 
a job interview, a television documentary, a poem, or a scientific article’ (1992: 126). Indeed, 
every issue maintains architextual relationships with religious discourse as a semi-autonomous 
field. Every issue bears the elements of a khuṭbah, a ‘religious sermon’. The structure of every 
issue of Sawt al-jihad begins with an op-ed, followed by various magazine sections, and ends 
with an epilogue and intertext with structuring of the khuṭbah. This corresponds to the khuṭbah’s 
opening, body text and closing, respectively. The correspondence is with both the structuring 
and the semantic content of these sections. The magazine texts, particularly autographic texts, 
share the defining generic features of religious sermons. The excerpt below is a translation of 
the op-ed of Sawt al-jihad’s fourth issue: 
(1) 
TITLE 
 
The op-ed: on the way ahead 
 
OPENING Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, the ally of the Righteous, and the helper of 
his followers, the mujahedeen [1]. His prayers and peace be upon the most honourable 
of the messengers, our Prophet Muhammad, and upon his family and companions [2]. 
BODY 
TEXT 
We are now in the last ten days [of Ramadhan] in which the Messenger of Allah, peace 
be upon him, used to strive harder than other days, reviving the night with prayers and 
awaking his family [to pray] [3]. 
… During these ten days, a group of blessed youths of Islam raided a complex of 
settlements of the Crusaders in the Arabian Peninsula. They brought to God a jihadist 
operation against his enemies, an operation delighting the believers and enraging the 
disbelievers and their allies ﴾and among you are avid listeners to them﴿ [4]. 
Jihad will continue until the Day of Judgment, as the master of mankind and the Imam 
of the mujahedeen – peace be upon him – told us. One of the greatest times of jihad in 
Islam is the month of Ramadan, which has seen a number of battles, the first of which 
was the great battle of Badr [5]. 
The mujahedeen fight the enemies of Allah everywhere, as Allah has commanded them 
[6]. They have gone forth to defend the sanctuaries of the Muslims. They do not target 
Muslims and do not intend to harm them [7]. How do the mujahedeen do so while they 
come out only in defence of the sanctity of Muslims and in obedience to Allah? [8] 
And he whoever knows that this is the purpose of jihad and its supreme goal will not 
listen to the calls of the hinderers and those hypocrites who say ‘come to us’, and those 
who do not go to battle, with the exception of a few [9]. 
Neither the mujahedeen nor the non-mujahedeen are entitled to make the fundamental 
tenets and rules of religion a matter for debate or negotiation. ﴾It is not for a believing 
man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, 
that they should [thereafter] have any choice about their affair.﴿ [10]. Those who 
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bow to and abide by the rule of Sharia, who submit their faces to Allah, rule by His law 
and lift man-made laws, and disown the enemies of Allah and do not ally to them, they 
are then our brothers and we are with them on the road [of jihad]. So, on what do we 
negotiate? [11] 
There is no negotiation between those who reject Allah’s law and choose the religion of 
America, or want to believe in some laws and disbelieve in others [12]. 
The dialogue between us and those occupying the lands of Muslims, killing their sons 
and keeping their women alive, is fighting in the path of Allah until God stops their 
military might and defeats them [13]. ﴾So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah; 
you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to 
join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who 
disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment﴿ 
[14]. 
We call on the ummah to target Americans everywhere, for this is the language of 
dialogue that the enemy understands ... and the mujahedeen with Allah’s will and strength 
will continue on this path ... and are unafraid to take the blame [15]. 
CLOSING We ask Allah to support the mujahedeen everywhere, and to hold the banner of religion 
high. O Allah, grant peace and blessings unto our Prophet Mohammed and upon his 
family and companions [16]. 
 Issue 3, October 2003 
The structure of this op-ed intertexts with the structure of a religious sermon that begins with 
an exordium reciting praise and gratitude to God, and invocating peace and blessings on the 
Prophet Mohammed. This is followed by a body of text commenting largely on the respective 
events and delivering a manifesto outlining AQAP’s overall policy. The op-ed ends by reciting 
blessings on the Prophet Mohammed and a selection of prayers for the good of the Islamic 
community and the mujahedeen. Indeed, although this short except illustrates several forms of 
hypotextuality, my focus is confined to its structure. At this level, the social identity of the 
speakers is constituted through the genre of what they say. Such a genre is associated with a 
socially ratified activity type, namely, the religious register. AQAP’s media practices – along 
with those of other jihadist groups – demonstrate that its speakers distance themselves from 
mainstream media and their daily language.6 For the jihadist groups, the use of the media is a 
matter of access to the public: a non-religious product used for the construction of religious 
discourses and identities.  
Regarding generic features, Sawt al-jihad is committed to maintaining hypotextual relations in 
the architextual fabric of the magazine with a religious register. This is uniquely achieved 
through khuṭbah, as a genre-specific performable sign belonging to the religious register. The 
use of khuṭbah features is a meaningful act and is semiotically linked with culturally-relevant 
ways of being religious. For instance, the opening of the op-ed even maintains matching the 
                                                 
6 Media, as portrayed in Sawt al-jihad, are starkly negative. This is observed in the negative collocates occurring 
with the word media, such as salūli – an adjective evoking the hypocrisy of Ibn Salul, as pointed out earlier in 
Chapter 5 – alongside other collocates such as fraud, lying etc. 
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style of praising with the body text. This is observed in the matching between the attribute of 
God as ‘helper of the mujahedeen’ to the news of ‘raiding Riyadh’s residential complex’, 
reported in the body of text. This too is an established practice in the delivery of religious 
sermons. The op-ed’s incorporation of the khuṭbah’s structural elements is entirely silent. 
Nonetheless, its generic quality of religiosity/religionisation is communicated to the listener. It 
is unarticulated but easily recognisable by a Muslim layperson, specifically, the intended Salafi 
audience. It follows, then, that the audience is involved in the business of determining the 
generic status of the text, which in turn influences the way they consume and understand the 
content of the message conveyed by the speaker. 
Enregisterment through genre choice can be said to be a form of contextualisation that builds 
further on notions of the reflexive nature of language usage, in the sense that utterances do not 
only say something in themselves, but they also say something about themselves. In the 
meaning-making process, the use of religious genre is a structuring device that draws on the 
role of religious discourse in particular social contexts. Religious khutbah implies not only 
particular text types, but also specific processes of consuming these texts. More importantly, it 
involves two designated subject types, where the speaker is an ‘imam’ and the addressees are 
‘layperson believers’. Therefore, the layperson recipient takes the propositions delivered in 
religious discourse as authoritative actions. In other words, if the speaker performs a religious 
speech act (preaching, making a fatwa, for example), then the speaker can be assumed to have 
the power/authority to do so; and consequently, his propositions rest on religious authority 
within the immediate cultural context. A significant element in this regard concerns the 
sensitivity of the audience to the repeated use of such architextual elements that intertext with 
the corpora of hypotexts. Evidently, their sensitivity underpins the formal concerns of the text 
producers who stick to the dogma of imitating the classical hypotextual model. The sermon’s 
properties strengthen the epistemological and rhetorical effectiveness of the political aims and 
propositions expressed in AQAP discourse. Such generic elements concern the ‘outward’ 
surface structures. Nonetheless, the audience’s perceptions help guide and determine to a 
considerable extent their expectations and reception of AQAP discourse. 
Genre is one aspect of architext. Style, though interconnected with genre, is another. Style is a 
complex interaction between the speaker’s choice of linguistic features and their social meaning 
(Charteris-Black 2014). The jihadist texts in question are characterised by the adoption of 
classical rhetoric and an oratory style that combines a multitude of classical linguistic choices. 
Of utmost importance in these choices are their social meaning and semiotic effect (ibid.). The 
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following excerpt is taken from an article entitled Encourage the believers, in Sawt al-jihad’s 
first issue:7 
(2) 
O you the Mujahedeen in the path of Allah [1] 
To you, O you who hold firm in Tora Bora, Gaza, Grozny and the land of the two holy mosques [2] 
To you, O you who made heavens home for your high souls [3] 
To you, O you the lights of dignity and the suns of championship [4] 
To you, O you the people of firm hold, I say [5] 
Rejoice, by one in whose hands is my life [6] 
Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties, [in exchange] for that 
they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise 
[binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is truer to his covenant than 
Allah? So rejoice in the transaction you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment [7] 
Yes, rejoice and don’t say that the martyr has died [8] 
Don’t say we lost the martyr [9] 
Since buried under the soil alone [10] 
I never died, for the angels are around me [11] 
With my Lord, resurrected as a new creation [12] 
O you, the lions, fight the leaders of disbelief. For indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; [fight 
them that] they might cease [13]. 
O people of the believers, be patient, fight with your Lord’s insight. When you meet the servants of the 
Cross, those are the ones who have exchanged guidance for error and forgiveness for punishment. How 
patient they are in pursuit of the Fire! [14] 
Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest [15] 
Disregard the rumours of rumour-spreaders, the discouragement of the secularists and the amusing 
stories of hypocrites [16] 
O slaves of Allah ... let the sword hit the necks of the enemies of God, and defend your ummah with 
your pure blood in the arena of jihad [17] 
Issue 1, September 2003 
This piece is replete with enregistering individual features associated with the classical style. 
For instance, the way the audience is addressed using the word ʾāyyuhā or yā āyyuhā, which 
approximately translates as ‘O you’, can be regarded as an institutionalised way of talking 
maintaining a stylistic hypotextuality with religious discursive formations. In fact, this style is 
commonly used in religious discourse and originates from Quranic texts. In this excerpt and 
elsewhere, this linguistic realisation is frequently used, particularly in stylistic schemes 
encouraging the audience to join jihad. In this excerpt, it is used at the beginning in an anaphora 
engaging the audience emotionally and cognitively. Furthermore, the texts of Sawt al-jihad 
make extensive use of classical figures of speech (both schemes and tropes)8 that are standard 
                                                 
7 The analysis of stylistic elements is an interesting and illuminating one with respect to enregisterment. However, 
translating these elements, no matter how good the translation is, entails the aporia losing the cultural values 
assigned to these elements in the target language, not to mention the impossibility of achieving equivalence when 
translating these texts.  
8 A scheme is a figure of speech involving grammatical choices in which there is some modification to the normal 
and expected sequence of words (e.g. anaphora, antithesis, epiphora etc.). Tropes, on the other hand, involve a 
choice of lexis whereby words are used with a sense that differs from their literal sense (allusions, hyperboles, 
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in religious discourse. This excerpt exhibits some examples of figurative schemes, such as the 
anaphora ʾilaykum yā man ‘To you, O you who’ in [2] through to [5], and repetition of the 
phrase ʾallāhu ʾakbar ‘Allah is the greatest’ in [15]. These are stylistic features associated with 
the discourse of the Salaf. Examples of tropes include metaphors (e.g. the light and sun 
metaphors in [4] that refer to the mujahedeen, and use of the sword metaphor in [17] for jihad), 
and periphrasis, such as the one in line [16], whereby more than necessary words are used to 
express the meaning of disregarding encouragers. Periphrases are common parlance in AQAP 
discourse, which is characterised by displaying rhetorical and oratorical skills. Another 
important trope is allusion, which involves the evocation of well-known textual or cultural 
references, such as the phrase ‘by one in Whose Hands my soul is’ that evokes the well-known 
way of swearing common in prophetic sayings: ‘by the one in whose hands Mohammed’s soul 
is’.9 The consistent adoption of these classical choices bears a hypotextual element at the macro-
structural level and refers to a shared identity, the glorious past, to which the ummah should 
return to regain glory and supremacy. The stylistic resemblance can be used to prove 
authenticity and reinforce the return to the Self because it has a metalinguistic tinge that can be 
easily detected by the audience. 
As opposed to literary works where authors suffer from “anxiety of influence [of previous 
texts]” (Bloom 1997), the authors of Sawt al-jihad texts enjoy the keenness of producing texts 
reminiscent of earlier hypotexts. The stylistic resemblance can be observed in the myriad of 
linguistic realisations expressing modality. By and large, AQAP’s jihadist content is expressed 
in a manifest way and is put forward as unmitigated and apodictic assertions. These assertions 
are made by deploying an array of semantic and formal devices. Examples of semantic devices 
include swearing phrases, such as tallāhi ‘[I swear] by Allah’, wallathi nafsī biyadihi ‘by Him 
in whose hand is my soul’ etc. Assertive grammatical elements associated with prior hypotexts 
are also used. An example of this is the assertive affixes attached to verbs. For instance, the 
word la-nuqatilu-nna, has two assertive affixes attached to the verb nuqātil ‘1st.PL-fight’: the 
prefix la- and the suffix –nna. Both affixes exert more assertion on the expressed proposition. 
Thus, the word la-nuqatilu-nna can be roughly translated as ‘verily, we are fighting’. 
To conclude, the architextual elements reviewed above enter AQAP narrative and effectively 
remind the audience of the value-laden hypotextual corpora to which they are related. When 
                                                 
irony, metaphors etc.). Schemes and tropes alike influence meaning and exert a degree of persuasive effect (see 
Charteris-Black 2014: 39-40). 
9 I will return to allusion in section 6.3.4.2. 
 130 
these architextual elements are reiterated across Sawt al-jihad, one effect is to solidify AQAP 
narrative as a macro-level discourse. The appeal to the historical Self is constituted through 
reinforcing religiosity in the text and maintaining hypotextual relations to institutionalised ways 
of religious talk (such as exordiums, rhetorical formulae, prayers etc.) that play a significant 
role in expressly regulating and reinforcing the messages delivered and exerting power upon 
them. The constant hypotextual element invoked, whether explicitly or implicitly, brings power 
and authority to the intertext. Such a sociolinguistic differentiation can be considered a type of 
sanctification obtained via language, drawing on the shared beliefs of the epistemic community. 
6.3.2. Paratextual hypotextuality 
The paratextual profile of Sawt al-jihad is not complicated. Two paratexual components are 
salient: titles and pull quotes. First, titles, which are a necessary part of AQAP rhetoric, 
summarise the gist of the jihadist ideology through key words that signify the tenets of jihadism. 
The magazine name is uniquely relevant in this regard. This can be observed in the subtitle 
accompanying the magazine’s title on the front page: Sawt al-jihad: tawħīdun wa jihād (‘the 
voice of jihad: unicity and jihad’). The subtitle refers to the discursive theme portraying jihad 
as equivalent to or an externalisation of faith or the oneness of God. The table below presents 
a list of the titles featured in the first three Sawt al-jihad issues: 
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Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
The op-ed The op-ed The op-ed 
Creed first Creed first Creed first: how the assiddiiq 
‘the truthful’ fought them 
Encourage the believers: said 
so while fire was burning him 
Encourage the believers: said 
so while fighting back his tears 
Encourage the believers: hasten 
to Paradise as wide as the 
heavens and earth 
The ulema said: Abu Umar 
Mohammed al-saif, may Allah 
protect him 
The monotheists freeing 
themselves from the pledges of 
the apostate ṭawāghīt 
Knights under the Prophet’s 
banner: al-Suwaydi battle, the 
facts as they are 
a message to the martyr of duty Knights under the Prophet’s 
banner: the caravan of female 
martyrs in Qandahar 
Removal of contemporary 
doubts about jihad: restrain 
your hands 
Our enemy within: Saudi 
Arabia as America sees it 
Tears of sorrow on the loss of a 
martyr 
Light on the path of jihad, by 
Sheikh Abu Qatadah, may 
Allah free him 
Said the Sheikh: Nasser al-
Fahad, may Allah free him 
Removal of contemporary 
doubts about jihad: the words 
of unification before the 
unification of words 
An interview with Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Rishud, may Allah 
protect him 
Pleasing the slaves with the 
virtues of jihad, Abdullah 
Azzam, may Allah have mercy 
on him 
Light on the path of jihad The jurisprudence of jihad: 
Shall there be a death ritual 
prayer for the martyr Ahmed 
al-Dakheel? 
Knights under the Prophet’s 
banner: Issam Algumri and 
Aljammaliyah do battle 
An interview with one of the 
wanted 19: The Mujahed Abu 
Hajar Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, 
may Allah protect him 
A statement from the 
mujahedeen to the Islamic 
ummah 
Removal of contemporary 
doubts about jihad: bombing is 
not a means of reform 
Said the Imams Our enemy within: the Saudi-
American exchange, plans for 
fighting jihad and the 
mujahedeen 
An interview with one of the 
wanted 19: Mujahed Abu Hajar 
Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, may 
Allah protect him 
Black magic and the 
Mujahedeen 
A message from Sheikh 
Mohammed to the mujahedeen 
of the Arabian Peninsula 
Black magic and the 
Mujahedeen 
The jurisprudence of jihad: 
does the martyr have to be 
washed? 
Said the people of the frontiers 
Is it permissible to say the 
Turki al-Dandani is a martyr? 
Said the people of the frontiers Compliance and obedience 
Our banner The mujahedeen’s statement 
about the Interior Ministry’s 
declaration  
But they plan, and Allah plans. 
And Allah is the best of 
planners: the story of Thafer al-
Ajmi escaping Medina Prison 
epilogue epilogue epilogue 
Table 6: List of the titles in the first three issues of Sawt al-jihad 
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The titles in the table above reach out to the audience not with pieces of news but with 
perspectives and creedal formulae. The first title immediately following the op-ed is constantly 
creed first. The theme of this column is the notion of a tripartite world divided along creedal 
lines: believers, misbelievers and disbelievers. The next title is encourage the believers, which 
is hypotextual with the Quranic verse: 
So fight, [O Muhammad], for the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except 
for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will 
restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve.10 
The original title Encourage the believers is supplemented by varying subtitles across the 
magazine. This hypotextual link functions as a slogan or sound bite that resonates with the 
listener. The recontextualisation of this phrase from a Quranic verse into new discursive 
encounters figures prominently on the paratextual site and engages the audience in an 
interpretation of this Quranic verse, and in the debate on whose reading will be accepted as 
valid and truthful. However, the relation between the prior (con)text and the new (con)text is 
presupposed as syllogistic. This conforms to qiyas ‘analogy’, the long-established root of 
Islamic law, which is used to determine the implications of God’s commands in particular 
instances. In other words, such a recontextualisation is effectively a fatwa. 
The titular profile makes hypotextual connections with well-known figures among the 
predecessors, e.g. a column dedicated to rebuffing arguments against AQAP. One of the key 
strategies to defeat AQAP was the religious establishment campaigning through the media. 
Therefore, this column’s main title is kashf al-shubuhāt, ‘the removal of doubts’, which 
intertexts with a creedal treatise for Muhammed bin Abdul-Wahhab, to which the religious 
establishment in Saudi Arabia is ascribed. On the other hand, a column dedicated to narrating 
biographies of the mujahedeen makes hypotextual connections with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
(2005) fursān taḥt rāyati al-nabiy ‘knights under the Prophet’s banner’. Jihadist leaders are 
revered hypotextually as the archetypical Muslims. 
The second paratextual element is a wide range of pull quotes featured throughout the 
magazine. These quotes are clearly highlighted on the cover of the magazine by using a large, 
eye-catching font size. One of the frequent quotes is a text attributed to the thirteenth/fourteenth 
Muslim theologian, Ibn Taymiya: 
                                                 
10 Quran, 4: 84. 
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The religion does not rise unless there is a book that guides and sword that aids but 
sufficient is your Lord as a guide and a helper. 
This frequent slogan is positioned next to the magazine’s name on the second page of every 
issue. The quotation carries hypotextual relations with two valued texts, the renowned figure of 
ibn Taymiya and a Quranic verse embedded in his quotation. Encapsulated in this slogan are 
the discursive strategies of religionisation (reference to the Quran) and militarisation (reference 
to the sword), which we have observed in the representation of jihad. 
There a number of Quranic verses which are on the surface of the magazine as pull quotes. Here 
are some examples:  
O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go 
forth in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth? Are you satisfied with the life 
of this world rather than the Hereafter? But what is the enjoyment of worldly life 
compared to the Hereafter except a [very] little.11 
 
O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support you and plant firmly your 
feet.12 
The words of Al Qaeda’s leaders are similarly reverred and foregounded on the cover of the 
magazine. Consider this excerpt: 
(3) 
While the sons of the Two Holy Lands have a belief in the necessity of jihad against disbelief 
everywhere, they are the most powerful and enthusiastic in their land where they were born to 
defend their greatest sanctities – the Kaaba, the qibla13 of all Muslims – and know that Muslims 
all over the world will help and support them in their great cause, the cause of all Muslims, 
namely, the liberation of their sanctities, and that is the duty of every Muslim in the world. 
Sheikh Osama bin Ladin, May Allah support him 
Issue 3, October 2003 
An intriguing element, notable alongside the titles and pull quotes, is the name of the author or 
speaker. Names occupy a significant portion of the paratextual site and play a meaningful role 
in the ideological workings of the Self. AQAP practice throughout the magazine is not aimed 
at acknowledging a particular author with a credit but rather at highlighting the archetypical 
jihadist character. The expression of jihadist ideas is deemed in the jihadist literature to  be a 
form of jihad, aljihād bilʿilm ‘jihad with knowledge’. The name of the author appears in one of 
two conditions: onymity and pseudonymity, not to mention some mixed cases. Onymity is no 
longer a statement of identity (the author’s name is X or Y), and pseudonymity is not just for 
                                                 
11 Quran, 9: 38. 
12 Quran, 47: 7. 
13 The direction Muslims face when they pray. 
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the sake of incognito, nor for the desire of giving oneself a pseudonym. Instead, the discursive 
practices of both onymity and pseudonymity are a way of constructing a character and putting 
this character in the service of the ideology. So, what is at stake is not the question of authorship 
– as commonly practised. Rather, the identity of the jihadist is constructed through 
paratextuality. 
Whether in the paratext or elsewhere, onymity and pseudonymity are a rich source of 
hypotextual relations. The revivalist ideology manifests in drawing hypotextual relations with 
early Muslims’ cultural code of personal names. The range of the mujahedeen’s given names 
revive old naming structures that consist of kunyah and a surname. First, the kunyah has three 
forms: (a) teknonymics, male names derived from the child’s name [father of X], (b) 
matronymics, female names derived from the child’s name [mother of X], and (c) patronymics, 
names derived from the father’s given name [son/daughter of X] (e.g.). The surname may 
include references to family information – family names are replaced with tribal names 
belonging to the era of early Muslims (e.g. al-Azdi, in the second example below) – or place of 
origin. Some examples are listed below: 
1. Abu Qātāda al-Filisṭīnī The father of Qatada, the Palestinian 
2. Abu Jandal al-Azdī The father of Jandal, the Azdi 
3. Abu Ali al-ħijāzī The father of Ali, the Hejazi 
4. Abu ħafṣ al-Misri The father of Hafs, the Egyptian 
5. Umm Azzam The mother of Azzam 
These are common naming structures among jihadist actors, particularly in the case of 
pseudonymity. Consequently, naming practices are a rich source where references to identity 
and the Self are made.14 This practice is closely linked to the charismatic projection of the 
mujahedeen throughout the magazine (see 7.4), whereby presentation strategies – through the 
constant drawing of hypotextual relations – reinforce the analogy between the mujahedeen and 
the archetypical Self: the salaf or ‘pious predecessors’. Such paratextual elements, which 
highlight the identity of the Self, function to control how the intended audience receives jihadist 
texts.  
The texts within the magazine are objects to be read; paratextual elements, such as titles and 
subtitles, pull quotes, slogans and jihadists’ names, are objects to be circulated and talked about 
                                                 
14 Linking the Self to the salaf is fulfilled through such naming practices and names are consolidated with other 
attributive adjectives, e.g. ahlu al-thughūr ‘people of the frontiers’ etc. 
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and, more importantly, to be purposefully made resonant by drawing relations with a broad 
range of hypotexts. 
6.3.3. Meta-textual hypotextuality 
This category of hypotextuality topicalises prior texts and, as the list of Sawt al-jihad titles 
above reveals, a considerable amount of space in the magazine is dedicated either to challenging 
the Other’s narratives or highlighting texts regarded as valued within the jihadist ideology. The 
meta-textual profile can be usefully examined in terms of two categories: dialogic 
metatextuality and hypotextual metatextuality. Most of dialogic metatextuality goes to the 
Other-within and, in particular, the religious establishment (the ulema ‘religious scholars’ and 
duʿāh ‘preachers’) and Interior Ministry statements. The magazine section entitled ‘The 
removal of doubts’ is dedicated primarily to resisting and rebutting the arguments proposed by 
the ulema and preachers’ anti-AQAP campaign. For instance, in the first issue, this section 
counters the argument: ‘bombing is not a means to reform’. With regard to the Interior Ministry, 
AQAP frequently issues statements challenging the official narrative. As for Western media, 
the magazine only values news about the Saudi government that portrays the fragility of the 
Saudi state. The section entitled ‘Our enemy within: Saudi Arabia as America sees it’ is 
dedicated to this purpose. 
With regard to hypotextual metatextuality, the magazine frequently uses prior texts, which are 
presented with the aim of legitimising the Self or delegitimising the Other. The objective is to 
recommend such readings to the magazine’s audience. Several jihadist treatises have been 
highlighted. These works argue in religious terms for the worldview adopted by AQAP vis-à-
vis jihad and other contentious issues. For instance, the first issue features a commentary on a 
book by the classical jihadist ideologue Abdullah Azzam, entitled ʿitħāf ʿal-ʾibād bifaḍāʿil al-
jihād ‘blessing the slaves with the virtues of jihad’. Both the title and the author of the book 
feature in the title of this section, with the prayer ‘may Allah have mercy on him’ following the 
author’s name. The way this text represents the book and its author is significant. The relation 
of the commentary does not involve embedding or merging of voices, as witnessed in micro-
hypotextuality. Rather, the book is revered as a valuable reference for the virtues of jihad. 
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(4) 
Title: Blessing the slaves with the virtues of jihad’, 
 by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam – may Allah have mercy on him. 
It is no coincidence that this book has this title, for the martyr Imam Abdullah Azzam was guided 
in choosing the titles for the books he wrote… 
The book that reviews indeed blesses the reader with the virtues of jihad. It includes speeches, 
raging hearts and passion. Once you finish the book, you will wish to be in the arena of jihad, 
fighting on the path of Allah, so you find great attainment. 
Sheikh Abdullah Azzam touched upon important aspects of jihad and commented on them in a 
way that is beneficial. Some of these aspects are: the continuity of emigration [from the sphere 
of disbelief to the sphere of Islam, women’s jihad, pledging allegiance in war, inter-Muslim 
fighting, types of jihad…] 
The virtues of jihad about which the sheikh talked cannot be limited to this book. His books, 
lectures and speeches are full of the virtues of fighting on the path of Allah, which can be 
attained by the mujahed in this world and in the hereafter… 
Issue 1, September 2003 
This excerpt refers to a classical jihadist book, written after the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. The 
aim of such metatextuality is to refer the readership to such radicalising works. Another 
example is a work entitled al-kawāshif al-jaliyah fī kufr al-dawlah al-suʿūdiyah “The obvious 
Proofs of the Saudi State’s infidelity”, by the jihadist ideologue Muhammed al-Maqdisi. 
Likewise, the book is reviewed and presented positively to the audience. 
6.3.4. Hypotextual micro-structures 
At this micro-level of hypotextuality, the relation is text-to-text. The workings of hypotextuality 
here are elaborate, and insertion of the hypotext takes many forms. Indeed, AQAP discourse is 
constituted through the novel configuration of these already-existing hypotexts, whereby the 
hypotextual relationship involves the investment of hypotexts’ symbolic value. This investment 
highlights the dimension of struggle over religious texts as a symbolic recourse at stake, in the 
words of Bourdieu. The jihadists’ worldview has its own system of dispositions, which 
introduces rules for how producers and consumers of discourse perceive the respective 
arguments. Therefore, the symbolic resource of religious texts is a source of symbolic power, 
‘power in discourse’ in particular. Bearing in mind the epistemological hierarchy of the Quran, 
the Sunnah and the traditions of the salaf in the knowledge system, to which AQAP jihadists 
adhere, the power of the cited words from these traditions is nothing more than the delegated 
power of the respective speaker. 
Based on the degree of marking the contained hypotext, I shall make a distinction between three 
forms of micro-hypotextuality: (1) explicitly marked hypotexts, (2) unmarked hypotexts and 
(3) hypotextual allusions. Below is an account of these three forms. All these variations of 
hypotextual connections involve two interconnected processes: (a) decontextualisation, 
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whereby (one or more fragments of) the hypotext is lifted from its original setting; and (b) 
recontextualisation, which involves the insertion of the hypotextual element(s) into the new 
setting(s). 
 Marked hypotexts 
Explicitly marked hypotextuality is the case when the hypotext is contained within the matrix 
of a jihadist text. Marked hypotexts that may show up as hypotexts are overtly marked as 
separate texts. This technique is used extensively where valued hypotexts are clearly contained 
within the matrix of the magazine, either as slogans, pull quotes, titles or magazine sections. 
This category of hypotextuality is closely linked to metatextuality, in other words, valued texts 
that are put forward as inspirational fragment texts representing the Self. No topicalisation is 
involved but texts and excerpts are explicitly foregrounded on the surface of the magazine. 
Featured texts of this sort are divided into four categories: Quranic texts, Hadiths, texts of the 
salaf and jihadist literature. However, explicitly marked hypotexts are also prevalently 
deployed within jihadist texts. In this excerpt – and in Sawt al-jihad as a whole – we find a 
mosaic of quotations drawn from innumerable previous contexts, including jihadist ones. 
Sentences (4), (10) and (14) in the op-ed above are typical examples of explicitly marked 
hypotexts. All these hypotexts are Quranic verses cued in the text and manifestly marked on 
the surface of the text using bold font and verse symbols ﴾ … ﴿.15 The magazine is replete with 
a broad range of explicitly marked Quranic verses and prophetic sayings. The following is an 
example of an explicitly marked embedded prophetic Hadith: 
(5) 
Do you feel solitude for the walkers are few? [1] Do you feel going slow for the road is so long? 
[2] Then remember his saying – peace be upon him: (By Him in Whose Hand Muhammad’s soul 
is, I love to fight in the way of Allah and get killed, to fight again and get killed and to fight again 
and get killed) [3]. O you, the mujahedeen on the path of Allah… 
Issue 6, November 2003 
This hypotextual Hadith in sentence [3] appeared in the op-ed of the sixth issue. It is also 
marked explicitly on the surface of the text using parentheses. These symbols are used 
conventionally to mark Quranic verses and Hadith. However, aside from punctual markers, 
hypotexts are marked using discourse representation or speech reportage. There are 
conventional methods of reporting Quran and Hadith quotations. The excerpt above represents 
an embedded hypotextual Hadith by means of the phrase ( لوقملسو هيلع الله ىلص ه ), which can be 
                                                 
15 Occasionally, the ampersand symbol is used to mark the end of a verse when more than one verse is involved. 
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roughly translated as ‘his saying peace be upon him’. However, discourse reorientation can play 
the ideological role of determining the functions of the represented hypotext. Below is the 
excerpt that first featured in section 5.3.1: 
(6) 
…Allah has ordained a great command on us; it is jihad for the sake of God, the Almighty has 
said [1]: ﴾Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you 
hate a thing and it is good for you, and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And 
Allah Knows, while you know not﴿ [2] … God has ordained jihad for reasons, all of which are 
available in our time. From repelling the aggression of the unbelievers to fighting the apostates, 
supporting the oppressed, and freeing prisoners, let alone offensive jihad against the infidels until 
they give the jizyah [poll tax] willingly while they are humbled [3]… 
Issue 1, September 2003 
The representation above concerns the ideational content of what is quoted. It frames the 
hypotext message by merging the voice of a sacred hypotext with that of an AQAP speaker. 
The message that is contained in the hypotext – ordaining jihad upon the believers – is 
contextualised in the immediate context of the AQAP mission. The pronoun us in the 
representing discourse in (1) externalises the pronoun you in the represented sacred text. 
Subsequently, the sacred text – with its epistemological and religious weight towards both the 
addresser and addressee – is translated into the speaker’s own language. The notion that the 
sacred text is a-historical is deeply rooted in religious discursive practices. Considering the 
other hypotextual characteristics of AQAP discourse that consolidate the religionisation of the 
jihadist narrative – jihadist deeds – these are justified in religious terms by portraying them as 
embodying the divine message of the sacred text. In other words, the magazine plays the role 
of interpreting the hypotext for its audience. 
The aim of marking the quoted sacred hypotexts is by no means a matter of establishing them 
as belonging to an outside voice. Quite the contrary, marking the embedded hypotexts serves 
to highlight their Divinity. The outcome of this process is a linguistic form that establishes an 
authoritor-authoritee relationship between text producer and consumer, whereby the jihadist 
interpretation of the sacred text is the true one. The meaning of the hypotext, therefore, cannot 
be determined without referring to how it functions and is recontextualised in the new intertext. 
The jihadist identification with hypotexts and the abolition of their socio-historical context are 
trends that characterise the radical rhetoric. Currently, this trend is experienced in the discourse 
of a wide range of violent extremist groups, known as Salafist jihadism. Such a phenomenon 
taps into the old dichotomy of literalist vs intentionalist interpretations of religious texts, and 
the question of the a-historicity of a religious text. 
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 Unmarked hypotexts 
The second type of hypotextual micro-structures is unmarked embedded hypotexts. In this type, 
there is no explicit boundary between the intertext and the contained hypotext. Devices marking 
hypotexts – such as Quranic markers, quotation marks and reporting clauses – disappear. The 
exact words of the hypotext or sequences of hypotexts are used. Occasionally, tense and deictics 
of the hypotext are shifted to incorporate the voice and perspective of the new intertext. 
Consider the fragment below, which appeared in September 2003 in an AQAP statement 
pertaining to a previous report produced by the Saudi Interior Ministry: 
(7) 
The Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula – in the bounty of Allah – are preparing all that they 
could, and summoning whatever they are able of power, in addition to the fighting experiences 
they have gained in various fields of jihad [1]. They did not prepare all that, nor did they carry 
the banner of jihad, but for the word of God to be the highest, so that there shall be no more 
fitnah [tribulation] and worship shall be for Allah [2]. They have vowed to fight America 
everywhere, especially in the land of the two holy mosques, taken by the Crusaders as a base to 
launch the Crusade wars … and Afghanistan and Iraq have been invaded from its different bases 
[3]. 
Issue 2, September 2003 
The italicised bold portions of the passage above are fragments of Quranic verses blended into 
the text. The voices of the hypotext and the intertext are not demarcated. However, such pieces 
are used to represent the speaker’s discourse and are easily recognised and understood by the 
intended audience, which thus finds it easy to go along with their meanings. The degree of 
boundary maintenance (Fairclough 1992: 119) between the hypotext and the intertext is a 
matter of deliberate and conscious choice. The two hypotextual fragments in [1] are 
incorporated from the following Quranic verse: 
And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war, by which 
you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides whom you do not know, 
[but] whom Allah knows. (Q, 8: 60) 
 
Recontextualisation here involves reshaping the hypotext to some degree. As sentence [1] 
illustrates, the aspect of the hypotextual verb ‘prepare’ in the Quranic verse has been 
transformed into the present ‘are preparing’. Meanwhile, the second person you is transformed 
into the third person plural them, which is co-referential to the subject of the sentence, the 
Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula. The level of blending of the voices involved in this 
micro-structure is remarkably more than that in the explicitly marked ones. The key hypotextual 
phrase acts as an anchor to the context of jihadism that helps maintain a linkage between the 
old context of the Quranic verse and the subsequent recontextualisation, in which the phrase is 
 140 
incorporated as a positive attribution predicated to the mujahedeen. This manoeuvre is widely 
used in Sawt al-jihad and has close ties with the authoritative appeal to sacred texts. This 
accords with a long-established epistemological pattern, whereby sacred texts are eternal and 
open to a-historical readings. Similarly, sentence [2] draws hypotextual relations with two other 
Quranic verses. The two clauses ‘the word of God to be the highest’16 and ‘there shall be no 
more fitnah [tribulation] and worship shall be for Allah’17 are two hypotextual clauses 
grammatically subordinated to a main clause, of the speaker’s words, in a relationship marked 
by the conjunction for. The aim is to use the authority of the hypotext to support the speaker’s 
position. 
Embedding Quranic verses and other types of hypotexts in AQAP texts works to re-inscribe 
them into the subsequent AQAP context. The constant incorporation of hypotextual series – 
marked or otherwise – and the fidelity to maintaining a manner of convergence to the hypotext 
and its established meanings work to bolster the speaker’s merits and truthfulness. 
 Allusions to hypotexts 
The third type is allusions. AQAP discourse is replete with words (or phrases) that evoke 
assumed/shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, e.g. historical texts, stories and 
personalities. These allusions acquire their meanings from the shared collective memories of 
an epistemic community. In its entirety, the collective memory – imaginary or real – represents 
a type of hypotextual domain that can be mined as a source of meanings, and stories for making 
sense of the present-day setting. Such cross-domain mappings are integral to every hypotextual 
reference. However, in the case of allusions, mapping processes draw freely on other semiotic 
elements. Elements can be events (e.g. nominating the attack on one of the residential 
complexes in Eastern Riyadh in 2009 as Badr al-Riyad, referring to the battle of Badr18 in early 
Islam). Nevertheless, allusions are inevitably accompanied by two processes that work to 
strengthen the plausibility of the analogy: erasure and focalisation (Hodges 2011). Erasure 
involves excluding facts inconsistent with the narrative, while focalisation highlights the 
similarities between the two domains of the analogy that the speaker wishes to make 
                                                 
16 ‘And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds (is this not seeds?). You said seed in 
the text of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you 
do not know [but] whom Allah knows.’ Quran, 8: 60. 
17 ‘Fight them until there is no [more] fitnah ‘tribulation’ and [until] worship is [acknowledged to be] for Allah. 
But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors.’ Quran, 2: 193. 
18 This was the first battle fought by Prophet Mohammed and his followers against the Polytheists of Makkah. It 
was in 17 Ramadhan 2 AH – Islamic calendar. It was for the timing – 17 Ramadhan 1424 AH – that the operation 
in Riyadh was named Badr al-Riyadh. Again, hypotextual connections are maintained on the operational level. 
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conspicuous. For instance, alluding to the battle of badr and the operation of badr alriyad 
focuses on similarities, such as the timing (both events occurred during Ramadan) and the small 
numbers of fighters on the Muslim side. On the other hand, facts pertaining to Muslim casualties 
are overlooked. In fact, allusions of this sort are strategically used to fulfil several functions: an 
association with the exemplary time of the Prophet. Above all, they serve as easily repeatable, 
catchy phrases or slogans that are reiterated across AQAP texts to consolidate the overall 
narrative. 
Semiotic elements can be ready-made labels for social actors. This category is a rich source for 
the division of social actors in the jihadist worldview, and it can be best observed in the different 
labels used to construct a tripartite image of the world. The Self camp is designated as Muslims, 
believers, mujahedeen etc. Labels such as apostates, hypocrites and discouragers, among 
others, are recalled nominating the Other-within. For the Other-outwith, a myriad of labels is 
used, including infidels, Crusaders, the Romans etc. The religionised narrative evokes the vast 
histories of meanings inscribed in these labels. As a whole, the intra-textual combination of 
these labels, which have hypotextual references to the past, provides a coherent narrative of the 
current world by drawing analogies to past worlds. This narrative and the histories inscribed 
therein belong to an historical series and, therefore, engage the listener in the interpretation of 
intertextual context. For every text, the listener is engaged in deciding to which series a text 
belongs and, subsequently, what can be presupposed as common ground for the participants.  
Allusions cut across other forms of textuality, such as paratextuality and metatextuality. In these 
allusions, an analogy is always made between the collective memories of “the time of the 
Prophet” and “the present context”. These are strengthened by drawing comparisons between 
the two contexts. These similarities are accentuated through the process of repetition. Each 
reiteration of the hypotextual phrases reinforces AQAP’s association with a larger narrative of 
a commitment to Divine will. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an 
exhaustive account of either the allusions occurring in Sawt al-jihad, or the hypotexts standing 
behind them. Therefore, I will just give one more example, whereby allusion involves a rather 
complex transformation. Consider the reference to AQAP mujahedeen as strangers in the 
following excerpt: 
(8) 
At a time when the demoralisers are many, hypocrisy and hypocrites have peered, the 
mujahedeen have become strangers amongst their relatives, loved ones, and friends. They rarely 
find aides for the good, and supporters on its road. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
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This emotional excerpt alludes to a prediction of the Prophet that is widely circulated in the 
Salafi tradition. It is the apocalyptic view that, at the end of time, few believers will uphold 
their religion, also known as strangers, similar to early Muslims. In other words, deeming the 
mujahedeen as strangers hypotextually relates to the Prophet’s statement that: “Islam initiated 
as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange, so good tidings 
for the stranger.”19 This type of allusive nomination encapsulates a complex story and, more 
importantly, efficiently entails the argument of commitment. The essential meaning here is that 
the estranged mujahedeen are those who are committed to the principles of Islam based on the 
accepted epistemological hierarchy outlined in 3.5. The allusions deployed throughout the 
magazine utilise ready-made cultural frameworks in the hypotextual context as generic 
precedents. 
Allusions are employed abundantly in predication, too. The attributes are selected strategically 
to ensure the Muslim audience picks up on two concepts. For instance, when speaking of the 
alliance between Saudi Arabia and non-Muslim countires, the word tatawalla ‘take as an ally’ 
is predicated to the Other-within. Here, there is a hypotextual allusion to well-known concept 
of ‘allying the infidels’, that is closely linked to the enthymeme of alliance and disavowal in 
7.3.3 below. Allying the infidel is regarded as a nullifier of belief, i.e. a pretext to 
excommunicate rulers. Indeed, issues of Sawt al-jihad extensively elaborate on this and other 
nullifiers in a series of episodes entitled nawāqiḍu al-islam,‘nullifiers of Islam’. The choice of 
this classical word rather than that associated with common parlance, namely, taħālaf, which 
has the same meaning, hpotextually alludes to a Quranic verse.20 This indicates that linguistic 
choice goes beyond the political to the ideological, presupposing thereby the conclusion 
included in the verse: “And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of 
them.”  
The hypotextual tendencies noted above can be interpreted as one realisation of a wider 
tendency of AQAP speakers to market their worldviews in ways that link consistently to the 
sacred texts and history. The hypotextual series connect – either through presupposed or 
entailed indexicality – with a particular context and other valued contexts. Such linkage with 
sacred and valued texts bears both an epistemological and a rhetorical significance. These 
hypotextual tendencies sustain for the AQAP narrative what can be called a regime of truth, in 
                                                 
19 Muslim, 270. 
20 “O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one 
another. And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not 
the wrongdoing people”, Quran, 2: 51. 
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Foucault’s terms (Hodges 2011). Every discourse producer – particularly a perspectivised 
discourse of the AQAP sort – speaks from within a certain regime of truth (Blommaert 2005). 
The system of truth in the AQAP case is religious in nature and revolves around a corpus of 
sacred texts and a collection of sayings that belong to a religious imaginary about the past. In 
doing so, the cited hypotexts must give up their transitivity: they no longer speak, they are 
spoken; they no longer denote, they connote; they no longer mean something on their own, they 
acquire the status of material. The role of such hypotextuality introduces a novel way of reading 
or consuming the jihadist discourse, whereby every hypotextual reference is an invitation to a 
continued process of reading the hypotext, integrating the hypotext and the intertext in a unified 
syntagmatic structure. 
6.4. Recap and conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the different intertextual formations exhibited in Sawt al-jihad. The 
intertextual formations seem to play a significant role in delivering a coherent narrative drawing 
on religion as historical analogies. In effect, they seem to position the recipients as social 
subjects and instil a degree of credibility and truthfulness of the AQAP message within them. 
The social world constructed in this narrative is the outcome of the discursive process “world-
making” (Bourdieu 1989: 22). I have argued in this chapter that intertextuality is an identity kit, 
creating and promoting views of the Self and the Other, and assigning every social actor an 
identity, by drawing analogical representations between an assumed past and the current 
political reality. The jihadists’ system of intertextuality system revolves around the possession 
of religious truth through investment in prior sacred and valued texts’ symbolic capital. 
I have developed an approach to intertextuality, drawing on Genette (1997), which concerns 
deliberate intertextual transpositions being drawn with hypotexts – pre-existing texts located as 
major sources of epistemological and symbolic value. I have termed this intertextual 
phenomenon hypotextuality. In section 6.2, my approach to hypotextuality is detailed, 
differentiating various levels of hypotextual transformations: archetextuality, where 
hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole; paratextuality, where hypotexuality shows 
up at the level of the paratext; meta-textuality, when selcted hypotexts are being topicalised; 
and micro-hypotextuality, whereby the intertextual relation is a text-to-text one, e.g. embedded 
hypotexts, allusions etc. Section 6.3 has provided an account of Sawt al-jihad’s intertextual 
profile in light of the proposed framework. 
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Chapter 7 ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTATION STRATEGIES IN 
AQAP DISCOURSE 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the third research question: what are the argumentation strategies 
and the macro-/micro-legitimatory topoi utilised in AQAP discourse to (de)legitimise the Self 
and the Other? I answer this question through the methodology of topoi analysis, which has 
already been described in previous chapters. First, in 7.2, I will provide a brief overview of 
enthymemes evidenced in Sawt al-jihad, classified into their respective topoi. Subsequent 
sections, 7.3–7.6, explore the argumentative nature of Sawt al-jihad by locating legitimatory 
topoi and the ways they are rhetorically demonstrated. 
7.2. The dynamics of topoi and enthymemes 
Argumentation is an essential hallmark of any specific perspectivised discourse. The research 
data are overwhelmingly imbued with an enormous set of topoi that cannot all be sufficiently 
analysed within the limitations of this chapter. Rather, this chapter explores Sawt al-jihad’s 
argumentation profile through: (i) exploring the topoi or places that are the sources of 
arguments, and (ii) sketching the macro-arguments or enthymemes stemming from these 
sources. For reasons of space, the analysis is restricted to the arguments pertaining to jihad, the 
Self and the Other. It leaves aside the enormous arguments and counter-arguments on other 
issues like juristic and theological polemics, the representation of the media, among others. The 
data reveal that the macro-structure of Sawt al-jihad promotes a set of argumentative themes 
for the legitimation of the Self and the AQAP jihadist mission as well as the delegitimisation 
of Other social actors. The salient macro-argumentative enthymemes are presented in Figure 
13, which roughly presents them alongside their respective scale. These enthymemes are 
arguments emerging from AQAP discourse and each enthymeme is constructed as an ‘if …, 
then’ argument that guarantees the transition from premise to conclusion.  
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As noted earlier in 4.3.3, topoi are sources, from which propositions or arguments that have 
logico-discursive universal patterns, are derived. Based on this approach to topoi, the 
legitimatory enthymemes shown above can be classified into four macro topoi: topos of 
authority, commitment, consequence and defence, as illustrated in the diagram below: 
 
Figure 14: The set of topoi and their enthymemes in Sawt al-jihad 
The analysis presented in the two previous chapters has shown that AQAP language, in the 
pursuit of its political goals, is religious in substance. The religious identity forms the core of 
AQAP jihadist politics, whereby non-compromising views of the past and the Self legitimise 
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reviving a polity defined and legitimised in religious terms. As a religious group, AQAP 
constitutes its speech repertoire based solely on historical analogical reasoning, whereby the 
topos of religious authority is the key topos. The historical analogical reasoning underpinning 
AQAP discourse stems from the fact that a Muslim’s life – including their politics – must be 
modelled after that of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers. As pointed out earlier, 
salafiyah ‘Salafism’ is a puritanical religious mindset centring on the view that the era of the 
Prophet, saħāba ‘the first generation’, and tābiʾīn ‘their followers’ is purer than later eras, 
including the present. This view of history underpins the notion of revivalism or a return to a 
pure past.  
Therefore, there is meaning in this choice of topoi displayed in Figure 14. The selection of these 
topoi reflects how the producers of Sawt al-jihad’s texts tailor their arguments according to the 
assumed audience: a Salafist audience. As the diagram highlights, the key topos under which 
the macro doctrinal enthymemes fall is that of religious authority. The deliberate choice of an 
appeal to religious authority as the central topos in AQAP discourse impacts on the audience’s 
reception of the expressed arguments. The topos of religious authority and its macro-
enthymemes, along with other rhetorical demonstrations of this topos, are not just mental topoi 
– ‘places’ that the speakers go to. Rather, they are locations to which the audience is led in order 
to achieve complete reasoning. That is, based on the visual metaphor of topoi as sources of 
arguments, the recipient will be circumscribed in a reasoning space, where s/he is trapped with 
these enthymemes: whose rules shall be implemented? Is jihad divinely ordained? Should the 
Muslims ally to each other and disavow the disbelievers? etc. This reasoning narrows the 
recipient’s focus on seeking the sanctioning of jihadist deeds through their literal interpretations 
of specific texts. Moreover, it takes into consideration the accepted epistemological hierarchy 
and comprises recontextulaised texts from the Quran, Sunnah and opinions of respected figures 
from across the full spectrum of the Islamic tradition. This topos aims to test the lay believer’s 
commitment, wherein joining jihad becomes either an act of obedience or disobedience to 
Allah. A wide range of arguments also constructs jihad as obligatory. 
It is worth mentioning that these topoi are charged with a wide range of emotional appeals that 
may matter more than the argumentative rational content, as suggested by prominent scholars 
(e.g. Lynch 2006; Hafez 2007b; Hafez 2007a; Sageman 2011). The emotional presentation of 
these topoi and corresponding enthymemes is achieved using a host of stylistic schemes, e.g. 
anaphora, repetition, rhetorical questions etc. However, the stylistic representations of topoi are 
an interesting topic that may be addressed elsewhere. Before, proceeding to the analysis of topoi 
and enthymemes, I should highlight an important issue. The premises underlying both 
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enthymemes and the underlying topoi are not always manifest. Indeed, they are more often 
latent or presupposed either as shared knowledge or meanings invoked by intertextual 
connections. 
7.3. Topos of religous authority 
Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP discourse, for both macro ideological ideas 
and specific nuances concerning minor religious or jihad-related juristic issues. In this regard, 
Sawt al-jihad draws on a received belief in the realm of the Salafist epistemic community that 
revelation is the source of truth. Consequently, role of ʿaql ‘intellect’ is subservient to waħy 
‘revelation’ and subsequent traditions, (see examples 1–2, below): 
(1) 
At this time comes Sawt al-jihad to be of help to the mujahed, lighting his way and guiding him 
to the path, its inexhaustible fount is the texts of the two revelations, Quran and Sunnah, and 
the biographies of the Prophet’s companions, their followers and those who follow them until 
the Day of Judgment. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
(2) 
One of the characteristics of religious duties is the fact that the person submits to Allah and 
performs them, and does not subject them to reason nor the experiences of others, but performs 
as ordained by Allah and seeks reward from Him. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
As the bold portion in example (1) shows, AQAP’s editorials explicitly state these 
epistemological principles. Regardless of the question of whose words the Sunnah is, this 
excerpt makes no distinction between the Quran and the Sunnah, and thereby they are 
strategically given the same status regarding authority. Furthermore, it is notable that the 
religious authority is more than that of revelation. The excerpt also establishes the authority of 
the practice of the Prophet’s companions and the succeeding generations, respectively. This 
received opinion among scholars of Sunni Islam is based on a renowned Hadith, stating that 
“[t]he best of my followers are those living in my generation (i.e. my contemporaries) and then 
those who will follow the latter”.1 The aim of these pronouncements, made as early as the first 
issue of Sawt al-jihad, is to object to any potential anti-textualistic argumentation. This 
objection has important implications. Chief among them is to undermine non-literal 
interpretations of Quran and Sunnah that would be at odds with AQAP’s coherent narrative, 
which is based on a-historic, revolutionised readings of specific sacred texts, as will be shown 
                                                 
1 Bukhari, 2. 
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in the enthymemes below. Thus, any deviation from this normative system is explicitly 
condemned in Sawt al-jihad’s editorials: 
(3) 
Their pursuit reminds us of what the outlier rationalist group (Muhammad Abdu and Jamal al-
Afghani and who is their ilk) did with British colonial rule in Egypt, where they deterred the 
ummah from fighting with their rationalistic sophistries, and their submissive opinions of co-
existence, that abolish tenets of religion such as ‘alliance [to the believers] and disavowal [of the 
non-believers]2 and jihad on God’s path. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
 
(4) 
Jihad in the path of the Almighty Allah is an obligation imposed by Allah on his worshippers; it 
is not a human ideology, approach or opinion that can be tested or experimented. A Muslim has 
no choice but to accept or reject it. Moreover, jihad should not be based on rationally 
considering its pros and cons, the pros and cons are considered in light of what religion says 
and the worshipping aspect of jihad ought not to be overlooked. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
Technically, examples 1–4 set forth the normative epistemological system that governs the 
jihadist worldview vis-à-vis truth, history and the common good. This system makes a clear 
distinction between two approaches to the divine texts within the epistemic community of Sunni 
Islam. A distinction is made between scriptural interpretations of sacred texts and more 
rationalistic intentional interpretations, alfiqh almaqāṣidī. Reducing Islam to religious scripts, 
and presupposing its universal message regardless of time and place, the commitment to a literal 
interpretation then becomes the ultimate means of expressing authenticity. Thus, it follows that 
al-ʿaqlāniyah ‘rationalism’ is constructed discursively as a rival to supposedly authentic literal 
interpretations. The rationalist Other is then presented negatively as outliers who mean mischief 
to ummah by adopting so-called sophistries that call for submission to the enemy by abolishing 
jihad.3 Therefore, the consistent appeal to religious authority throughout the magazine by the 
recontextualisation of sacred texts affords the jihadist worldview significant epistemological 
credibility. There are socio-cognitive dimensions of the production and interpretation of the 
sacred texts that operate according to specific ontological and epistemological norms within the 
community of believers. 
                                                 
2 I will return to ‘alliance and disavowal’ in section 7.3.1.3. 
3 Sawt al-jihad makes frequent references or allusions to history. In Example 5, while the two prominent Islamic 
scholars Mohammed Abdu and his mentor Jamal al-Afghani are both deemed Islamic reformists in the early post-
colonial period – particularly the late 19th century – in mainstream modern thought, they are presented as examples 
of heretic rationalists. Rationalism in this context is nothing but a modern hermeneutic interpretation of religious 
texts as both scholars remained loyal to their call for a return to the original teachings of Islam and application of 
the Islamic system. 
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Thus, these excerpts explicate a reasoning system based on historical analogical 
representations, according to which the AQAP mindset works. Thus, reasoning can be: 
a.  scriptural, in which contemporary political realities are mapped against the background 
of certain sacred texts; 
b. historical, in which analogical conceptions are drawn between contemporary political 
realities and a sacred history as constructed in the AQAP narrative; or 
c. a combination of the two. 
Scriptural representations manifest themselves as Quranic verses, Hadith narrations or the 
sayings of respectable historical figures deemed salaf ‘pious predecessors’. AQAP borrows 
heavily, albeit selectively, from these categories and imposes past notions on the present 
political realities. Historical representations include a wide range of historical accounts that 
comprise what can be said to be the jihadists’ version of sacred history. Given the jihadist’s 
revivalist approach that seeks to revive a lost past, it is indeed not only the case that specific 
incidents from history are evoked, but also that the wider historical narratives are mapped onto 
the present. AQAP – among other jihadist groups – reimagines and reconstructs a history of the 
ummah, or a ‘religious imaginary’ in the words of Arkoun (2006). Examples of analogical 
historical representations that abound in AQAP discourse would include: mapping the narrative 
of the Prophet’s struggle in the Battle of Badr onto the present AQAP’s members’ offensive in 
Riyadh; mapping the eleventh-/twelfth-century Crusaders onto contemporary America and its 
coalition etc. Thus, centuries of Islamic interpretations and counter-representations are 
overlooked and a rather strict, uncompromising textual reading is put forward as unmitigated 
articles of faith. 
The appeal to religous authority is in a sense a topos that can be formalised as follows (Reisigl 
2014: 76): 
Conclusion Rule: If authority X says that A is true/that A has to be done, A is 
true/that A has to be done. 
A: X says that A is true/that A has to be done. 
C: Thus, A is true/A has to be done. 
The topos of religous authority underpins AQAP’s ideological starting points. These starting 
points comprise the macro-enthymemes displayed in Figure 14: namely, the enthymemes of 
ħākimiyah, divinely ordained jihad, and alliance and disavowal. These three enthymemes are 
manifestations of the process of revolutionising specific sacred texts. In a sense, each 
enthymeme is propped up by a formal argument: ‘God said it.’ Thus, it engages in employing 
religious ‘meaning in the service of power’, in a perceived social world in which the difference 
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marker is religion (Hjelm 2014: 866). From a critical perspective, these enthymemes are a 
struggle for argumentation and hegemony. Ħākimiyah, divine ordainment, and alliance and 
disavowal are creedal enthymemes, fetched from tradition, but strategically recontextualised to 
serve the jihadist cause. These three enthymemes have nothing to do with the Other-outwith. 
Rather, despite the declared enemy in AQAP’s campaign being the Other-outwith, all these 
macro-enthymemes are concerned with delegitimising the Other-within, and legitimising the 
Self. 
7.3.1. Enthymeme of ħākimiyah 
The concept of ħākimiyah is the most prominent revolutionised concept that can be regarded as 
the spearhead enthymeme in AQAP discourse for delegitimising the Other-within. The term 
ħākimiyah means that ultimate sovereignty and authority belong to God. That is, all walks of 
life, and foremost the political, must be governed by Sharia law for society to be Islamic. The 
term ħākimiyah is derived from instances of the verb yaħkum, and its verbal noun ħukm, in the 
sacred texts. An example is this Quranic verse, which is circulated widely in Sawt al-jihad: 
(And whoever does not – yaħkum – ‘judge’ by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who 
are the disbelievers).4 I should note though the fact that the Arabic verb yaħkum, contained in 
the Quranic verse, is actually polysemic. In other words, it has multiple senses, such as ‘rule’, 
‘govern’, ‘judge’ and ‘adjudicate conflicts’, inter alia (Mujamma 2004). The polysemy of 
yaħkum involves both a political and a judiciary sense, i.e. the judiciary sense of adjudicating 
according to Sharia law and the exercise of politics according to God’s law. Although all 
Islamic exegetic treatises unanimously interpret this verse according to the judiciary context 
(Tarabishi 2008a; 2008b), Sawt al-jihad goes along with the mainstream jihadist literature and 
ideologises the Quranic verse and charges it with a political sense. 
With regard to the political aspect, the formative texts of Islam do not dictate a particular from 
of governance. It is noteworthy that Quran and Sunnah traditions narrate with elaboration the 
basic principles and characteristics setting the governance standards for the rulers and the ruled 
(Choudari and Ahmed 2013). These principles include ʿadl ‘justice’, accountability, honesty, 
equality and freedom. The Islamic theorisation of politics appeared later. Based on readings of 
the political practices of the Prophet and the historical experience of the Prophet’s early Caliphs, 
political theories were formulated later, beginning with Mawardi’s (d. 1058) theories and later 
those of Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328). The early theories perceived ummah as a basic collective 
                                                 
4 Quran, 5: 44. 
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religio-political unit, and the Sharia as the basis for the legal system. Due to the political decline 
of the Islamic Caliphate at the time eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, the notion of the 
Caliphate is not as central as that of ummah and Sharia. Consequently, it is fair to say that the 
concept of ħākimiyah is a recent one (al-Sayyid 2015; Tarabishi 2008a; 2008b). The notional 
concept of ħākimiyah crystallised in the context of anti-colonial liberation movements (Rahman 
and Ali 2012). Although the concept is invoked broadly in the discourse of Islamists, the term 
is ambiguous and remains far from achieving consensus, even among Islamists. Al-Sayyid 
(2015) argues that ħākimiyah characterises any rival political order, be it democracy or any 
other political form, as un-Islamic and tantamount to apostasy.  
In the post-Ottoman era, there have been two dominant forms of political Islam: the calls for 
restoration of the Caliphate as a symbol for one ummah and the calls for applying Sharia as a 
moral and legal system. As far as Sawt al-jihad goes, the AQAP approach combines both forms, 
combining an argumentative theme that can be labelled the enthymeme of ħākimiyah. This 
enthymeme is central to both legitimising the Self and delegitimising the Other. The 
nominalisation of this concept through the constant rhetorical recycling of ħākimiyah 
throughout Sawt al-jihad goes along with the use of the enthymeme of ħākimiyah by other 
jihadist groups. This enthymeme schematises the Quranic verse cited above – along with other 
sacred texts of similar themes – so that when speaking of the legitimacy of a certain ruler or 
government, this enthymeme then creates the following syllogism: 
 (I) God says that His laws must be implemented. 
 (II) Ruler X does not implement God’s laws. 
 
 Ruler X is a disbeliever and therefore illegitimate. 
The major premise I is admitted as an acceptable proposition or a shared belief with the assumed 
audience. More importantly, this premise is an applicable rule drawing on the aforementioned 
Quranic verse. The ideologisation of religious tradition occurs at the level of such discursive 
schematisation of a well-known Quranic verse, giving way to an extremist argumentation tool 
that is at odds with the mainstream and classical canon of religious scholars. Consider these 
excerpts: 
(5) 
The disbelief of these ṭawāghīt [the Saudi rulers] sanctified the juristic principles of the people 
of Sunnah [the Sunni community of believers], stipulating the excommunication of apostates 
who rule/judge by laws other than what Allah has revealed, change his religion, make what 
is ħalāl [permissible] into what is ħarām [forbidden], and what is ħarām [forbidden] into 
what is ħalāl [permissible]… 
Issue 3, October 2003 
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(6) 
Also, therein is the apostate puppet government that … governs according to laws other than 
those of Almighty God, and jails those who call them to implement Allah’s Sharia [the 
mujahedeen and the jihadist ideologues]… 
Issue 1, September 2003 
This enthymeme of ħākimiyah has become a ready-made argument for the legitimisation of the 
mujahedeen and the delegitimisation of their rivals, political rulers. It has been established in 
the discourse of Al Qaeda leaders that democracies, constitutional governments and 
insufficiently Islamic monarchies are viewed as equally illegitimate forms of governance for 
Muslim communities because these forms favour human rulers and legal systems over the “the 
law of God”, Sharia (Blanchard 2007).5 In this regard, the application of Sharia law is not only 
a legal system, but also an all-encompassing paradigmatic political system – the Islamic state – 
that governs all aspects of social and economic life, as opposed to al-aħkām al-waḍʿiyah 
‘positivistic, man-made laws’ and al-dīmuqrāṭiyah al-kāfirah ‘infidel democracy’. As far as 
Sawt al-jihad goes, ħākimiyah is used strategically to mean both implementing a Sharia-based 
judiciary and governing/regulating society from the top in accordance with God’s law, Sharia. 
However, Sawt al-jihad avoids the Saudi monarchy being illegitimate per se because if 
ħākimiyah refers to governance, the Saudi dynasty is no different from any earlier ruling 
dynasty in Islamic history. Moreover, in this instance, both the canon of tradition and the 
authority of exemplary salaf are counterproductive, for it is an established rule in Salafism that 
dissidence to the ruler is strictly forbidden.6 
Instead, Sawt al-jihad opts for delegitimising it on account of the institution’s failure to commit 
to Sharia and other reasons that I will offer below. However, little is said throughout the 
magazine about the second premise of the enthymeme, i.e. that ‘the Saudi government/rulers 
do not implement Sharia ‘God’s law’. Indeed, the judiciary system in Saudi Arabia is based on 
the provisions of Islamic law. An instantiation of this premise only appears in an interview with 
                                                 
5 Sharia or (God’s law) is rather a problematic term that deserves further explication in its own right. I cannot do 
justice to it in this space but I will present Hallaq’s (2013) viewpoint that I see as relevant here. Hallaq distinguishes 
between two forms of Sharia: Sharia prior to the emergence of the modern state and Sharia after. To him, the 
former was then the supreme moral and legal force, which was the accepted system of norms for regulating both 
society and government across the dynastic powers that ruled the world of Islam. This form was paradigmatic but, 
conversely, with the appearance of the modern state it was reduced to providing no more than the raw material for 
legislation of the personal status. 
6 The received opinion in the Salafi political literature, particularly atharī Salafism ‘traditional Salafism’, is against 
political dissent. This view is inspired by many narrations that correlate political dissent with fitnah, ‘internal 
strife’. One of these narrations is this Hadith: ‘When you are holding to one single man as your leader, you should 
kill who seeks to undermine your solidarity or disrupt your unity’ (Muslim: 1852). 
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a jihadist, whose nom de guerre is Abdul-Rahman al-Athari, in his answer to a question about 
the most prominent aspects of faith shortcomings on the side of the Saudi government: 
(7) 
The adjudication according to laws other than those of the Almighty God (Have you not seen 
those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O Muhammad], and what was 
revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to ṭāghūt, while they were commanded to 
reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray).7 An example of this in our reality is the 
adjudication according to [the Saudi] labour law and the arbitration in the [Saudi] Chambers 
of commerce, and other [legal] systems that violate the law of God. 
Issue 5, November 2003 
This excerpt reveals the extreme vision adopted by AQAP ideologues. This view that condemns 
the provisions of Saudi labour and commercial laws is propped up by an extreme conception of 
ħākimiyah, in the sense that divine sovereignty and God’s law are so comprehensive that they 
preclude all human laws and authority. This idea is in parallel with the established concept of 
ħākimiyah and known in other radical groups since the 1970s. The fundamental aim is to 
delegitimise the Saudi state and declare its rulers as kuffār, disbelievers. Otherwise, waging a 
jihadist campaign would not adhere to the principles of legitimate jihad.  
The enthymeme of ħākimiyah refers to the corresponding claim that Muslim leaders submit to 
the West, do not adhere to the Sharia and engage in international institutions that are not based 
on God’s law. This has close ties to the jihadist’s anti-nation-state and anti-democracy 
sentiments. The nation-state is constructed as being in defiance to the assumed supreme Islamic 
polity and democracy – as the rule of the demos – in defiance of God’s sovereignty and 
authority. With regard to the former, jihadists are not alone in despising the nation-state system 
as pan-Arabists hold a similar view of the modern state as a colonial legacy. While pan-Arabists 
called for the unity of Arabs, the jihadists’ armed struggle is basically for restoring a single 
Islamic polity: one state under one ruler as a symbol of Muslim unity and identity. 
(8) 
…those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the ṭawāghīt on earth, of the Arab and non-Arab 
governments, those who disbelieve in the UN, Arab and regional tyrannical organisations, those 
who disown the polytheistic doctrines, the paths of democracy, and the wathaniyah ‘idolatry’ 
of waṭaniyah ‘national’. 
Issue 8, December 2003 
The call for applying Sharia in the jihadist sense is different from that of the mainstream 
Islamists. For the latter, implementing the Sharia more or less means to have Sharia-based 
judiciary systems in which their set of laws is compatible with the traditional Sharia system. 
                                                 
7 Quran, 4:60. 
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They embrace this view within their respective nation-state systems. For the jihadists, Sharia 
is, conversely, more than a set of codified laws, i.e. Sharia here is used in the political sense as 
the ultimate framework for political legitimacy. Particularly in countries like Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria, mainstream Islamists’ call for implementing Sharia is a reaction to the 
replacement of the traditional Sharia with modernised laws emanating solely from the secular 
nationalist political authority (Fukuyama 2011). As rightfully argued by (Feldman 2012: 111–
117), these demands for a return to Sharia reflect a grave dissatisfaction with lawless 
authoritarianism, in which powerful executives are neither limited by modern courts and 
legislatures nor by a class of ulema.  
7.3.2. Enthymeme of obligatory/eternal jihad 
The thrust of the magazine’s discourse on jihad comes from a religious authority that is brought 
to confirm the theological authenticity of the jihadist ideology in general and in particular 
AQAP’s mission for jihad in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. As observed previously in 5.2.2, 
Sawt al-jihad elevates the status of jihad and constructs it as a divinely ordained ‘ritual’, or ‘an 
act of worship’, in its own right. Throughout the magazine, this enthymeme overlaps with a 
wide range of juristic topics and polemics concerning the legitimacy of jihad itself. A recurrent 
theme about divine ordainment concerns the debate over whether jihad is farḍ kifāyah ‘a 
collective duty’ or farḍ ʾayn ‘personal/permanent duty’. AQAP’s stance is in favour of the 
latter, breaking away from classical and mainstream ulema ‘religious scholars’. The underlying 
topos for this stance is the topos of divine authority. After all, jihad is a religious notion, the 
legitimisation of which must be observed according to juristic norms. Sawt al-jihad depicts 
jihad as a permanent obligatory duty for Muslims individually, similar to the five pillars of 
Islam: prayer, fasting etc. The performer of the farḍ ʾ ayn jihad is rewarded, but unlike collective 
jihad, failing to perform it leads to punishment.  
Such a view is constantly repeated throughout Sawt al-jihad. Consider this excerpt quoting 
Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz8, a pseudonym for a well-known jihadist ideologue: 
  
                                                 
8 His real name is Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (aka Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz or Dr. Fadl). He has written central texts 
on the theological and practical meaning of jihad. Some of his writings (e.g. alʾumdah fī iʾdād alʾuddah ‘The 
essentials for making ready for jihad’) were used as manuals in training camps in the 1980s, and later on his pro-
jihad opinions proved influential in wider jihadist offline and online publications. 
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(9) 
Sheikh Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz, may God preserve him, said: 
The fact that the jihad of these ṭawāghīt is a permanent duty is the knowledge that must be 
spread throughout the Muslim world. Every Muslim should know that he is personally 
commanded by his God to fight these ṭawāghīt… 
Issue 2, September 2003 
Apart from the debate over whether jihad is a collective vs a personal duty, there are a number 
of arguments that are distinctive to the ideology of modern jihadism, i.e. jihad as a permanent 
revolution. Closely linked to the notion of ħākimiyah, AQAP intriguingly charges the old 
concept of jihad with new revolutionised meanings – simply jihad as the embodiment or 
externalisation of faith or God’s oneness. 
(10) 
…we must make it clear to people that jihad is nothing but an embodiment of the Oneness of 
God and an implementation of the testimony that there is no God but Allah and that 
Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and we connect people to this matter to know the 
importance of jihad. 
Issue 2, September 2003 
The data reveal greater emphasis on the enthymeme of the eternality of jihad, whether as an 
abstract religious concept or as contextualised action against the internal and the external 
enemies in the AQAP campaign. Similarly, this enthymeme is based on the schematisation of 
specific texts that denote the eternality of jihad. Consider this excerpt: 
(11) 
This worship is going on to the Day of Resurrection; the Prophet peace be upon him said: “This 
religion will continue to exist, and a group of people from the Muslims will continue to fight 
for its protection until the Hour [End of the world] is established.” 
Issue 2, September 2003 
The discursive themes constructing jihad as ‘perpetual’, ‘global’ and ‘boundless’ war against 
disbelief and ṭāghūt are abundant in Sawt al-jihad. The aim is to establish jihad as the identity 
marker dividing the community into ʿal-mujāmilūn ‘the mujahedeen’ and ʿal-qāʾidūn ‘those 
holding back’. Thus, the construction of jihad as commanded by God and therefore legitimate 
serves two goals. First, it secures the religious credibility of their tripartite framework for social 
identity. By projecting jihad as the truth and the right path to follow, the jihadist Self is projected 
as committed to truth, while those Muslims abandoning jihad are delegitimised and constructed 
as the Other-within. Second, this enthymeme is a significant mobilising factor. The bulk of 
arguments under this enthymeme aim to establish jihad as a personal duty for every Muslim 
capable of going to war and then count on the lay believer’s religiosity in deciding to join the 
jihad. 
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7.3.3. Enthymeme of alliance and disavowal 
The third enthymeme falling under the topos of authority is ʿalwalāʿu wa ʿalbarāʿ ‘alliance and 
disavowal’.9 This enthymeme is dedicated to the binary division of the world into a community 
of believers and communities of non-believers. ʿAlwalāʿu means the manifestation of loyalty 
and alliance to the former, while on the other hand ʿalbarāʿ means disavowing the latter (al-
Qahtani 1992). It should be noted that this creedal enthymeme is not a principal core belief in 
Islam; rather, it was developed as a theological concept later. It is attributed to Ibn Tamiya (d. 
1328), a religious scholar whose teachings are influential in the Salafi school of thought. The 
concept emerged after the Mongol invasion of the Islamic world that reduced the Islamic state 
to smaller sectarian constituencies (al-Sayyid 2015). 
Similar to the first two enthymemes, this enthymeme schematises sacred texts calling for the 
solidarity of believers and the disavowal of disbelievers. Consider this example: 
(12) 
God praised the Mujahedeen in His threat to the apostates, He said: (O you who have 
believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion – Allah will bring forth [in place 
of them] a people He will love and who will love Him [who are] humble towards the 
believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not 
fear the blame of a critic.) Allah praised the people whom He will bring forth by jihad 
and alliance and disavowal for being not to fear the blame of blamers for they knew 
the true path and took it under the guidance of God… 
 
Issue 2, September 2003 
Therefore, this enthymeme highlights the Saudi-American alliance as a sign of illegitimacy that 
is always listed as a macro-argument against the state, as we have seen in an earlier example 
that calls for jihad inside Saudi Arabia, because “therein is the apostate state that … allies to 
disbelievers”. Under this enthymeme, a wide range of propositions are propagated. For 
example, the USA is constructed as a state warring against Islam and Muslims. Therefore, the 
mere agreements and treaties with the USA are portrayed as a breach of the principle of ‘alliance 
and disavowal’, deemed as ʾaṣlun min ʾuṣūl ʾaddīn ‘one of the tenets of Islam’. Consider these 
two examples: 
 
                                                 
9 Some sources (e.g. Harris 2010; Ulph 2006) translate ʿalwalāʿu wal barāʿ as ‘alliance or support to the believers 
and enmity to the nonbelievers’. A rather precise literal translation is ‘alliance and disavowal’, though such 
doctrinal concepts have been revolutionised in the discursive practices of the jihadists to mean ‘alliance and 
enmity’. 
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(13) 
Also, therein is the apostate puppet government that … allies to disbelievers. 
Issue 1, September 2003 
(14) 
…it is a warring state [USA] assaulting Muslims and partaking and aiding against them across 
the world, and this necessitates that it in principle has no binding agreements [with Muslims] 
because they were signed by ṭawāghīt and apostates… 
 
Issue 2, September 2003 
Some argue that this enthymeme articulates the jihadists’ core belief pertaining to the regulation 
of foreign affairs in the perceived Islamic state. In other words, “where prioritisation is given 
to the Islamic or pro-Muslim credentials of the external state, over or against other 
considerations (moral or financial obligation, economic interest, international treaties etc.)” 
(Ulph 2006: 11). Indeed, the elevation of the status of the doctrine of ‘alliance and disavowal’ 
is first and foremost geared towards the Other-within not outwith. That is, it is a legitimatory 
enthymeme aimed at pronouncing takfir ‘excommunication’ of the Other-within, rival political 
rulers. It serves to construct the Saudi state’s conclusion of agreements and alliances with the 
USA as a nullifier of faith. Strenuous in its denunciation of national identities, Sawt al-jihad 
portrays this act from the side of the Saudi government as a betrayal of ummah, the Muslim 
community. More importantly, based on the principles of alliance and disavowal, all acts of 
Saudi coordination with the USA are constructed as qualifying the Saudi state for being 
excommunicated. Subsequently, resisting and overthrowing the Saudi state is religiously 
sanctified based on the principle of ʿalwalāʿu wa ʿalbarāʿ. 
7.4. Topos of defence 
Closely related to and overlapping with the topos of ħākimiyah is the topos of defence. It is a 
short-cut strategy for legitimising the Self against the perceived American occupation of Saudi 
Arabia – in the context of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at the hands of infidel 
forces – and against the perceived Other-within’s aggressions towards the mujahedeen. 
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7.4.1. Enthymeme of defying the occupiers 
‘we are legitimate because we are defending Muslim lands’ 
This enthymeme recycles a persistent theme in the jihadist movement’s revolutionary rhetoric 
on Muslims suffering at the hands of non-Muslim aggressors that has ever since the 1960s been 
repeated and recontextualised in a wide range of domains and genres, both within jihadist 
literature and within wider pan-Islamist rhetoric. In accordance with AQ’s post-1990 anti-
American rhetoric, this enthymeme focuses on the USA as the key actor in the universe of the 
infidel Other and reinforces AQAP’s declared aim: the expulsion of the occupying American 
forces from the Arabian Peninsula. The overlap with the topos of ħākimiyah occurs at the level 
of constructing the expulsion mission as a fulfilment of the frequently repeated Hadith ‘Expel 
the polytheists from Arabia.’10 Nonetheless, the appeal in this enthymeme to divine authority 
plays a rather secondary role, i.e. it does not mount to the revolutionary schematisation of the 
sacred texts as evidenced in the enthymemes falling under the topos of divine authority. 
Nevertheless, the dominant theme is the Muslims’ universal right to defend their lands and 
liberate them from the occupying Americans, i.e. ‘we are right because we are defending the 
Muslim lands’. 
For Sawt al-jihad, there is a crystal-clear tendency in this enthymeme to correlate the perceived 
American occupation of Saudi Arabia with the Other’s perceived Muslim suffering at the hands 
of Americans. In this regard, AQAP draws on Bin Laden’s sentiments against the Saudi 
government’s invitation of foreign troops after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. He portrayed this 
as an affront to the sanctity of the Holy Land of Islam. The same rhetoric emerges as early as 
the op-ed of the first issue, as seen previously: 
(15) 
One of the greatest places where jihad is obligatory: bilād al-ħaramayn [the land of the 
two Holy Mosques], wherein the occupying Crusader enemy, who steals its resources, 
determines its policies… 
Issue 4, October 2003 
                                                 
10 Sunan Abi Dawud 3029. 
Another relevant Hadith in this vein is the less repeated Hadith: ‘Let there not be two religions in Arabia.’ The 
incorporation of this Hadith is based on the hyperbolic portrayal of the American military presence as another 
religion in the Arabian Peninsula. 
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This same rhetoric is employed as a legitimatory argument for sanctifying and legitimising 
AQAP’s operations inside Saudi Arabia. Consider this excerpt from the fourth issue’s op-ed, 
commenting on the operation that was executed on the al-Muhayya compound in Riyadh:11 
(16) 
…a group of blessed youths of Islam raided a complex of settlements of the Crusaders 
in the Arabian Peninsula. They brought God a jihadist operation against his enemies, an 
operation delighting the believers and enraging the disbelievers and their allies … They 
have gone forth to defend the sanctuaries of the Muslims. They do not target Muslims 
and do not intend to harm them… 
Issue 4, October 2003 
AQAP’s focus on the narrative of expelling the American troops on Arabian soil fits well onto 
the AQ’s internationalist agenda of striking the non-Muslim aggressor forces in all Muslim 
lands. And, more importantly, this rhetoric of resistance appears historically to gain audience 
acceptance and, therefore, is heavily invested in the Sawt al-jihad’s narrative. To put the local 
jihad in the context of pan-Islamist global jihad, the magazine characterises the presence of the 
U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia not only as an ‘invading army’ but also as ‘another religion in 
Arabia’. This hyperbole helps promote the commitment to defensive jihad and to justify the 
jihadist operations against American targets insider Saudi Arabia, combatants and non-
combatants alike. 
A micro-topos related to this enthymeme is the more/less topos used frequently to legitimise 
AQAP’s controversial mission in Saudi Arabia. If jihad is legitimate against the Americans in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, why is it then illegitimate against the bases from which the operations 
against Afghanistan and Iraq are launched? Consider this example: 
(17) 
It is strange that many young of the youth of jihad go to other fields of jihad and leave this great 
field [jihad inside Saudi Arabia]. 
Issue 2, September 2003 
 
Such propositions are directed towards laypeople who consider themselves pious but are not 
convinced of the legitimacy of jihad inside Saudi Arabia. 
  
                                                 
11 This explosion targeted a residential complex in al-Muhayya district in Riyadh and left 17 people dead and 120 
injured. This operation was counter-productive as far as public opinion was concerned for it turned out that most 
of the casualties were Arab and Muslim expatriates, contrary to AQAP’s declared aim. 
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7.4.2. Enthymeme of resisting the regime/security forces 
‘we are legitimate because we defend ourselves/mujahedeen’ 
Sawt al-jihad equally uses the topos of defence to legitimise the involvement of Muslim blood. 
The AQAP campaign has always been presented as a mission for the expulsion of American 
troops from Arabia, not intending to spill Muslim blood, as revealed in example (16). Again, 
although the security forces are implicitly excommunicated and pronounced kāfir, AQAP 
editorials seem to be fearful of outraging the public by the direct targeting of Saudi soldiers. It 
justifies the casualties among them as a matter of resistance, i.e. ‘we have the right to defend 
ourselves/the mujahedeen’. 
(18) 
We will defend ourselves, we will not hesitate to repel al-ṣāʿil ‘the attacker’ soldiers, and we 
shall show them what they hate.  
Issue 3, October 2003 
This enthymeme focuses on the right to defend the Self but is by no means devoid of allusions 
to authority. The concept of al-ṣāʿil ‘a juristic term denoting the attacker be it Muslim or 
otherwise’ is the key element from the topos of authority that overlaps with this enthymeme. 
However, the enthymeme of resisting the security forces was dramatically recycled towards the 
end of 2004, when AQAP targeted two security headquarters and checkpoints (see Appendix 
A). Later issues tended to employ this enthymeme and link it with the (re)production of the 
mujahedeen’s victimhood through the incessant narration of stories about their imprisonment 
and alleged torture. Victimhood is reinforced with stories about the harsh lives of mujahedeen 
caused by being in the run, chased by security forces. The victimisation of the mujahedeen aims 
to gain more sympathisers and ultimately legitimise the operations against security forces as 
merely retaliation against mujahedeen sufferings at the hands of the security forces. 
Contrary to the assertions made on the legitimacy of targeting foreign troops and the 
excommunication of political leaders, Sawt al-jihad editorials mainly use the enthymeme of 
repelling the security forces, given their strategy of avoiding an explicit pronouncement of 
Saudi soldiers being kuffār. However, the killing of Muslim security forces has proved to be a 
setback for the AQAP. The fact that some AQAP operations resulted in deaths among Muslim 
and Arab residents and passers-by was an embarrassing issue weaponised in the official anti-
AQAP media campaign. Therefore, this issue received a considerable number of polemic 
replies, primarily based on accusations of fabrication on the side of the government.  
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7.5. Topos of commitment 
Like the topos of authority, the topos of commitment is concerned with the legitimisation of the 
Self and the deligitimisation of the internal Other, not the external. The topos of commitment 
claims that Muslims should be committed to a set of ideological positions. The list of 
propositions goes on and touches upon a wide range of themes constructed as identity markers. 
Chief among these issues are the commitment to jihad, the commitment to defending Muslims, 
the commitment to promoting virtues and preventing vice, and so forth. Based on the 
commitment to these propositions, two camps of social actors arise. There are those with 
consistent commitment and others with inconsistent or no commitment. Sawt al-jihad data show 
that this topos is such an extraordinarily powerful tactic used in AQAP discourse, not because 
of factual commitment or non-commitment, but also because of the AQAP narrative and the 
emotional appeals infused in it. Therefore, two camps or enthymemes are instantiated in Sawt 
al-jihad in accordance with AQAP’s persistent theme of the Self and the Other-within: (1) the 
jihadist as the epitome of Muslim, and (2) non-committed others. 
Before proceeding to the two enthymemes falling under this topos, I should shed light on a 
point that applies equally to both enthymemes. Indeed, an important means for presupposing 
the topos of commitment is the tendency to infuse the narrative with hypotextual references, 
whether in the projection of the mujahedeen or the construction of the internal Other, as will be 
explained in the following section. Furthermore, regarding the audience targeted, this line of 
argumentation addresses lay Muslims or the population of Saudi Arabia rather than the ulema 
or the political elite. It is, as it were, a comparison drawn between two camps, and it is the task 
of the audience to choose from these binaries: the mujahedeen or ʾal-qāʿidūn ‘holding back’, 
the honest ulema or the dishonest ulema, God’s soldiers or the ṭāghūt’s soldiers. 
7.5.1. Mujahedeen as the epitome of Muslims 
‘we are legitimate because we are committed and consistent’ 
Sawt al-jihad data have shown a constant tendency to iconicise the mujahed as a person who 
is, against all the odds, steadfast and committed to the path of Islam. The propositions 
demonstrating this tendency can be said to form one enthymeme: the enthymeme of epitome. 
This enthymeme maintains a positive self-presentation of the jihadist as alfirqah al-nājiyah/al-
manṣūrah ‘the chosen/supported community’, committing themselves to what Sawt al-jihad 
constructs as the core principles of Islam. A key principle in this vein is jihad, the status of 
which has been elevated to be an embodiment of faith and monotheism in actual politics. 
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(19) 
And then we have walked this way based on this vision [the vision that jihad is divinely 
ordained], and knew the truth and committed ourselves to it, and we ask God to be steadfast to 
the truth. Jihad is religious and the ummah has been promised that jihad will continue, he said 
peace be upon him. “This religion will continue to exist, and a group of people from the Muslims 
will continue to fight for its protection until the Hour is established.” We hope that we are part 
of this supported community, which upholds the command of God and jihad in the path 
and fights His enemies.  
Issue 3, October 2003 
The enthymemes of commitment are substantiated in the wide range of nominational and 
predicational realisations referring to the mujahedeen. For instance, as previously noted in 
5.3.1, the key reference to the mujahedeen as ghurabāʾ ‘strangers’, which draws a historical 
analogy between the few mujahedeen and the few early Muslims, is charged with the 
legitimatory topos of commitment. Since AQAP is principally participating in a war based on 
making claims to truth, references to social actors within the Self camp reflect a presupposed 
topos of commitment. For instance, Osama Bin Laden is referred to as ‘the imam of the 
mujahedeen’, a reference used to denote the Prophet.  
In line with previous and subsequent jihadist groups, AQAP’s performance pertaining to this 
enthymeme works significantly to iconicise the character of the mujahed. Therefore, this 
enthymeme is a mix of cognition and emotion that offers inspiration and motivation for would-
be jihadists. The iconicisation of the mujahed character is an old practice in the literature of 
jihadist ideologues. This dates back to the writings of Abdullah Azzam, namely his book Signs 
of the Merciful in the Afghan Jihad. Iconicisation concerns incarnating ideas in personalities 
and this strategy plays a significant radicalising role, as noted by Gerges (2017: 33): 
In my conversations with former jihadis, one of the critical lessons I have learned is 
that personalities, not ideas or organisations, are the drivers behind the movement. 
It is a personality-driven animal that devours idealistic and alienated young 
Muslims. 
Thanks to technological advances, the ascendance of ISIS and other jihadist groups gave rise 
to several publications that included multimodal projection of the charismatic jihadist. 
However, the charismatic projection of the mujahed in Sawt al-jihad was merely textual. All 
29 issues include sections iconicising and memorialising significant jihadist figures, dead and 
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alive, within and beyond AQAP. A key theme iconicising the jihadist personality is 
steadfastness, i.e. commitment.12  
7.5.2. Enthymeme of inconsistency 
‘they are illegitimate because they are inconsistent/not committed’ 
As opposed to the commitment and consistency of the Self, Sawt al-jihad strongly propagates 
a set of arguments about the inconsistency of the Saudi government and the ulema and preachers 
concerning jihad. On the one hand, the inconsistency of the political regime is a temporal one. 
A considerable number of propositions make references to the contradiction in supporting the 
mujahedeen by the government in the 1980s Afghan war and fighting the mujahedeen later on. 
This enthymeme is extensively recycled to delegitimise the Saudi state and construct it as a 
renegade. Conversely, the ulema and the preachers played a significant role in campaigning 
against AQAP as early as the campaign started, and to them alone, six episodes entitled ‘Years 
of Deception: Studying the Reality of Sahwa Preachers’ were dedicated from the fifth to the 
tenth issues. Their inconsistency is both temporal and spatial. The former is no different to the 
inconsistency of the Saudi government. The latter signals a contradiction regarding resistance 
to the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as legitimate jihad while targeting Americans 
inside Saudi Arabia as illegitimate. It also makes references to the contradiction in the ulema’s 
and preachers’ support for previous jihads and the objection to the current AQAP campaign.  
(20) 
These ulema were the references of the people … Many of this ulema were sending the youth to 
the battlefields and were mobilising them with their writings, cassettes and their ideas that were 
based on a rejection of the ruling according to laws other than God’s and on waging jihad against 
the ṭawāghīt… 
 
Issue 2, September 2003 
More often, this enthymeme speaks of the generic ulema and preachers and occasionally 
specifies certain individuals. 
                                                 
12 In a recent study, Lahoud (2017: 54–60) found that the common themes of anāshīd ‘Capella songs’, posted 
online on the jihadi website shabakat al-mujahedeen al-iliktūniyah ‘the mujahedeen’s electronic network’, go for 
topics involving the topos of commitment, such as steadfastness, martyrdom, eulogising jihadists etc.  
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7.6. Topos of consequence 
7.6.1. Enthymeme of jihad usefulness  
This enthymeme legitimises jihad by propagating a constructed set of useful consequences. 
This is a complex enthymeme, as salvation is twofold: salvation now and salvation then. 
Regarding the former, jihad is salvation for the whole community, the ummah. It concerns 
legitimisation of jihad as ‘a means of establishing the Islamic state’. Salvation now concerns 
rescuing the powerless Muslim believers invaded by non-Muslim forces, and ruled by 
treacherous apostates. It is interesting to note that the salvation narrative has nothing to do with 
worldly needs. While this view is in line with sublime and puritanical intentions, with which 
the jihadist character is correlated, it also entails a dilemma: what Gerges (2017: 279) styles a 
‘vacuum of ideas’. AQAP offers extreme religious interpretations and aspirations for an 
imagined populous – the ummah – but for real people in the real world, it offers an oblique and 
apocalyptic future. This future has no positive vision of governance and does not address the 
basic needs of the people. Their Islamic utopia is obscure, and defined, if any, in oratory terms 
as a place where there are no borders, and in which Muslims behave as they should do. 
Conversely, salvation then focuses on the useful consequences ascribed to the mujahed in the 
afterlife. For AQAP to survive, it must appeal to fresh recruits. So, this enthymeme is geared 
towards the pool of potential recruits, particularly young males, and appeals to the salvation of 
the recruit as an individual. Salvation then, in the next world, seems to be a key mobilising 
factor in Sawt al-jihad. It draws on a set of rewards accorded to martyrdom. The data abundantly 
draw on a doctrine of narrations in a tradition that lists the posthumous rewards for the martyr 
in the cause of God. Martyrdom, therefore, lies at the core of emotionally radicalising themes 
in the discourse of AQAP and other jihadist groups. This thematic category is not devoid of 
intertextually embedding or alluding to sacred texts encouraging the believers to join jihad or 
promising them rewards in the hereafter. 
(21) 
…but the worship that qualifies you to receive God’s pardon and the forgiveness of sins is 
verily jihad in the path of God. The amplified texts of the Quran and Sunnah confirm God’s 
pardon and forgiveness for those perfuming jihad. The Almighty said: O you who have believed, 
shall I guide you to a transaction that will save you from a painful punishment. [It is that] you 
believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and your 
lives. That is best for you, if you should know.13 
Issue 21, February 2004 
                                                 
13 Quran, 61: 10–11. 
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Martyrdom is constructed as ʾizz alduniā wa saʾādat alʿākhira ‘glory in this life and happiness 
in the hereafter’14 and thus represents both the zenith of the jihadist trajectory and an expression 
for altruistically sacrificing a worldly lifetime for an eternal afterlife. Thus, salvation addresses 
the individual and functions on two levels: the salvation won from the sins of quitting jihad and 
the salvation achieved by reaping the rewards promised for the mujahedeen. The theme of 
martyrdom is deployed throughout the magazine as the ultimate goal sought by mujahedeen: 
(22) 
May Allah have mercy on you, may Allah have mercy on you, Yousif, you sought martyrdom 
in Afghanistan, and you sought it in Somalia, and here it is coming to you in the land of the 
Arabia Peninsula… 
Issue 2, September 2003 
I ask God to grant me martyrdom in His path.  
Issue 2, September 2003 
Martyrdom is presupposed for the group’s dead members in a discursive strategy used 
frequently throughout the magazine, in particular within genres focused on the Self-fashioning 
of fellow dead mujahedeen as martyrs. Consider this excerpt from a text lamenting an AQAP 
leader: 
(23) 
The martyr Turki al-Dandani was killed in al-Jawf at the hands of ṭawāghīt’s soldiers, may Allah 
have mercy and him and accept him among martyrs… 
Issue 2, September 2003 
This type of contractual preaching of jihad, in which recruits are urged to sacrifice their lives 
for the sake of reaping martyrdom rewards, appeals to young recruits who provide a constant 
supply of people willing to commit suicide. The intensified focus on martyrdom and its 
perceived posthumous rewards aims to secure fresh recruits, particularly with a willingness for 
self-sacrifice. 
7.6.2. Enthymeme of threat 
Another macro-argumentation strategy for waging jihad inside Saudi Arabia is based on future 
threats. The enthymeme of threat comprises a set of argumentative themes about the invasion 
of the Arabian Peninsula by non-Muslim forces. Furthermore, Sawt al-jihad dwells more on 
ideological threats, whereby un-Islamic doctrines are forced on the Muslim population of Saudi 
Arabia. To tap into the local population, AQAP discourse partly relates to some local regulatory 
decisions and links them to this enthymeme. For example, some propositions construct a 
                                                 
14 Issue 4, an interview with the wanted sheikh Abdullah al-Rishudi. 
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hypothetical threat with regard to some regulatory changes in Saudi Arabia pertaining to 
education at the time of publishing Sawt al-jihad: notably, changes in some religious curricula 
and the decision to unite the administrative bodies of boys’ and girls’ education.  
(24) 
Consider the dangers surrounding the ummah. The unjust American war on Muslims in Iraq, 
Palestine and Afghanistan, and the aftermath of the Iraq war, a change in the map of the region 
and changes in society and education, and the imposition of infidel democracy on the region 
Issue 2, September 2003 
7.7. Recap and conclusion 
This chapter has analysed (de)legitimatory topoi and their respective enthymemes evidenced in 
Sawt al-jihad. I set out with a brief overview of Sawt al-jihad’s enthymemes and classified 
them into their respective topoi. Many enthymemes have been weaponised to promote the 
AQAP worldview. They fall under four legitimatory topoi: authority, commitment, defence and 
consequence. All these topoi and their respective enthymemes are ideologically-driven. That is, 
the macro-arguments define the AQAP struggle through the framework of identity politics 
rather than modern-day social demands. The key overarching topos is that of authority, which 
underpins AQAP’s reasoning system. Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP 
discourse, and the topos of authority overlaps with all other topoi. The topos of authority is a 
complex one that can be both scriptural, propped up concerning sacred texts, or historical, 
drawing analogical conceptions between contemporary political realities and a sacred history. 
It subsumes the key belief enthymemes of ħākimiyah, divine ordainment, and alliance and 
disavowal. All these enthymemes are modern ideas fetched from tradition and are 
revolutionarily schematised to serve the jihadist cause. They are all concerned with 
delegitimising the Other-within. The other topoi are consistent with classical arguments for 
jihad. The topos of defence has been employed as a short-cut strategy for legitimising AQAP’s 
jihadist cause inside Saudi Arabia. It legitimises the Self against the perceived American 
occupation of Saudi Arabia – in the context of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at 
the hand of infidel forces – and against the perceived Other-within’s aggression against the 
mujahedeen. Similarly, the topos of consequence and topos of commitment recycle classical 
jihadist notions arguing for and mobilising people to AQAP’s jihad. 
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Chapter 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1. Overview 
The first section of this concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings and an overall 
critique. The chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the present study and presenting 
suggestions for future research. 
8.2. Summary and discussion 
Under CDA as a theoretical and methodological package, the present study has investigated the 
discursive micro-politics of AQAP between 2003 and 2005. It has looked at data from the texts 
of the e-magazine Sawt al-jihad, which can be regarded as front stage political practices. By 
drawing on Bourdieu’s ‘capital theory’, Islamic religious epistemology and the literature on 
intertextuality, this thesis has attempted to explore Sawt al-jihad’s texts and make sense of the 
sociopolitical, cultural and epistemological contextual elements involved. The study has 
focused on exploring how the Self and Other are constructed, prominent intertextual 
connections and their values and, finally, the legitimisation of the jihadist worldview. Text has 
been regarded as a resource wherein the collective background culture, symbols narrative and 
myths that resonate with the audience are looked into. The findings are summarised as follows: 
8.2.1. Representational analysis 
As AQAP’s media outlet in the 2003 campaign, Sawt al-jihad stressed a messianic revivalist 
mission whereby jihad is, on the one hand, a goal in its own right – as an incarnation of God’s 
oneness or the pure form of Islam and – and conversely, a means for repelling a constructed 
U.S. invasion and fighting an illegitimate Saudi government. The AQAP narrative broke away 
from the classical Islamic conception of jihad as a collective duty and elevated its status to be 
a personal duty equivalent to an articulation of faith. Sawt al-jihad propagated an extreme 
tripartite division of the world, dictated by an urgent need for the legitimacy of the novel jihad 
inside Saudi Arabia, which involves killing Muslims. The sort of jihad promoted throughout 
the data of Sawt al-jihad is exclusively a military one. Therefore, the construction of jihad is 
interwoven with a plethora of juristic and theological topics, which are based on a selective 
revolutionisation of sacred texts and prior juristic opinions. These topics promote polemics and 
ideas ranging from the legitimate killing of non-combatant infidels, the case of kufr or apostasy 
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‘disbelief’ of the Saudi government, the polytheism in allying to disbelievers and implementing 
non-Sharia legislation, among others (as noted earlier in Figure 7). 
Thus, the prototypical Self in AQAP’s body politic derives its merits from the commitment to 
jihad as a Godly-ordained duty. Sawt al-jihad, therefore, mythologises the mujahed as the true 
Muslim, who is altruistic to the ummah and willing to sacrifice his soul on this path. The notion 
of the ummah can be deemed to be the typical social structure in AQAP’s body politic, into 
which the discourse topics and discursive strategies of the jihadist cause and discourse are 
woven. However, the ideological trappings of the topics on and representations of the ummah 
are quite complex. AQAP propagates a pan-Islamist ideology that transcends nationality, 
ethnicity and borders and puts the local jihad inside Saudi Arabia within Al Qaeda’s global 
jihad. AQAP’s narrative – and that of other groups of its ilk – trades on the sufferings of 
Muslims and presents the mujahedeen as a saviour to the community of Muslims. For good or 
for ill, the notion of the ummah remains part and parcel of the discourse of mainstream 
Islamism, and consequently part of the cognition of lay Muslims. People’s knowledge and 
thoughts regarding ummah are derived in large measure from religious discourse, be it 
traditional or contemporary. In the discourse on ummah, AQAP discourse cuts across tradition 
and other (politico)-religious discourses, whereby notions of the Self are associated with the 
whole community of believers. 
The Other in AQAP’s narrative is split into the Other-within and the Other-outwith. AQAP’s 
declared aim is fighting the invading American Crusaders and expelling them from Arabia. 
Regarding scale and diversity, the delegitimatory discursive strategies for the Other-within are 
far greater than those on the Other-outwith. This indicates that the discursive practices in Sawt 
al-jihad are more or less locally oriented and focused on delegitimising the Saudi regime. 
Nonetheless, Sawt al-jihad continues to declare that it is anti-American and aims to expel the 
foreign non-Muslim troops from Arabia. This might be because recruits desire to fight the 
Americans rather than the regime and the security forces. It may also be due to the contentious 
legitimacy of waging jihad against fellow Muslims. The list of grievances attributed to the 
regime is not socio-economic but instead religious, in which the alliance with the USA and non-
Muslims states is a key delegitimising argument. 
The findings of the representational analysis endorse al-Sayyid’s (2015) diagnosis of the 
jihadist phenomenon as a sect driven by panic as regards the Islamic identity, fuelled by social 
imaginaries of the past and apocalyptic prophecies about the future. At the core of Sawt al-
jihad’s identity politics, takfir seems to be the key weapon in AQAP’s War of Truth. AQAP 
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has used this weapon carefully, for it is a serious undertaking with lethal consequences. The 
explicit takfir was clearly levelled against rulers and governments for violating the principles 
of ħākimiyah and alliance and disavowal. Although the ulema and the security forces were 
constructed with a wide range of delegitimising and even derogatory terms, specific explicit 
takfir of them was by and large avoided. However, the way they were nominated and predicated 
involves an implicit takfir. Takfir seems to have been a key weapon in the struggle for the hearts 
of believers, so as to distinguish the level of commitment to AQAP’s radical’s cause and to 
delineate the lines of identities between the us-group and the them-group. Nonetheless, it caused 
two major setbacks for AQAP. First, it has an inherently fragmenting influence on the 
community whom the jihadists are attempting to win over. Second, the fragmenting takfiri 
ideology has exposed AQAP to criticism from among Sunni scholars and cost the group its 
reputation among the population of Saudi Arabia. 
The overall representational profile of AQAP seems to be consistent with AQ central’s 
calculated variations in both tone and content. AQAP rhetoric has remained committed to AQ’s 
focus on the American presence in Saudi Arabia. AQAP appeals to various target audiences, 
but this strategic manoeuvre concerning the declared aim directly addresses the population of 
Saudi Arabia, the pool of potential recruits whose support was the lifeline for the then AQAP’s 
awkwardly-run offensive. This presence in the birthplace of Islam is constructed as the cause 
triggering the AQAP offensive. Although this can be seen as a calculated rhetorical tool, which 
intermingles pseudo-nationalist with pan-Islamist ideological content, this macro-legitimatory 
argument seems not to tap into the social base inside Saudi Arabia. The AQ’s treatment of the 
U.S. military presence was understandable during the 1990s, but the same treatment after the 
withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003 is questionable.1 Indeed, it is 
even inconsistent with Bin Laden’s September 1996 declaration of jihad against the United 
States when he stated that “[t]he solution to this crisis is the withdrawal of American troops ... 
their military presence is an insult to the Saudi people” (FBIS 2004: 13). From my viewpoint, 
the anti-American sentiment is a rhetorical tool concealing AQ(AP)’s anti-Saudi regime policy. 
This is evidenced in both the operational and discursive practices. Operationally, AQAP’s 
offensive waged a violent campaign against U.S. and non-U.S. targets in numerous attacks 
inside Saudi Arabia. Small- and large-scale attacks were executed against military and civilian, 
U.S. and Saudi personnel. Conversely, AQAP discursive practices have remained consistent 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Defence Secretary announced on 29/04/2003 that its 5,000 troops in Saudi Arabia would be pulled out 
in summer that year leaving 400 troops to train Saudi soldiers, see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/30/usa.iraq. 
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with the pan-Islamist narrative: ʿahl ʿal-jazīrah ‘people of Arabia’ should view themselves as 
part of a larger single nation and unite in an obligatory defensive jihad to resist U.S. aggression. 
8.2.2. Intertextual analysis 
The tripartite division of the social world is a substantiation of the power of “world-making” 
(Bourdieu 1989: 22). Indeed, this power of world-making is in its turn the outcome of conflicts 
between different symbolic powers, each of which aims to impose its vision of which divisions 
are legitimate and which are not. AQAP’s world-making is fulfilled through a system of 
intertextuality that draws analogical representations between an assumed past and the current 
political reality and, in turn, assigns every social actor an identity based on these analogies. This 
system revolves around the possession of religious truth through investment in prior sacred and 
valued texts’ symbolic capital. I have termed this practice hypotextuality, whereby deliberate 
intertextual transpositions are drawn with hypotexts – pre-existing texts located as major 
sources of epistemological and symbolic value. Thus, it is worth noting that the notion of 
intertextuality has a lot to offer as an analytic tool to the analysis of politico-religious 
discourses. Intertextuality should not then be reduced to form (Titscher et al. 2000), nor should 
it serve as a contextual notion (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). Rather, intertextuality serves as an 
identity kit (Gee 1990), where it is necessary to look beyond the boundaries of jihadist texts and 
explore from where specific utterances emerge and what histories and values adhere to them, 
as discussed at length in Chapter 6.  
I have demonstrated how hypotextuality served as AQAP’s identity kit and examined 
hypotextual connections at the levels of architextuality, paratextuality, meta-textuality and 
micro-hypotextuality. In (politico-)religious discourses, the ‘sacred texts’ and the ‘already 
uttered’ texts of respectable figures frequently enter into new discussions – primarily in the 
contest over how best to represent the ‘already uttered’ sacred and symbolic texts. Thus, prior 
texts are recontextualised in new discursive encounters with varying degrees of fidelity. The 
process of recontextualisation is, indeed, “a political act” that links to larger sociopolitical 
concerns. Therefore, the significance of the hypotextual practices in AQAP’s discourse lies in 
its power to impose upon the listener’s mind a specific vision of social division, a sense of 
history and a diagnosis of the existing world order. Religion is the exclusive means for relating 
socially-defined realities with the ultimate reality (Berger 1969: 41). Historically, the primary 
sources of religion have been the most widespread and effective instrument of legitimisation in 
the exercise of politics in the Islamic world.  Therefore, the religious symbolic capital is a credit 
or power granted to specific social actors possessing the status of being in a position to impose 
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recognition, whose utterances are brought together to form a mosaic of quotations and 
intertextual relations. Similarly, hypotextual connections with secondary valued texts of 
respected figures feature prominently in AQAP’s discourse and, in effect, engage these 
discourses in the long-contested struggle over the interpretation of sacred texts. It is a fight over 
whose contextualisation – or reading – of the religious corpus will be the valid one. Such a 
viewpoint reinforces the old critiques about the a-historicity of sacred texts – primary and 
secondary alike – in the sense that what is at stake is not literal scripture but rather its sublime 
value and intention. 
8.2.3. Argumentative analysis 
Many enthymemes have been weaponised to promote AQAP’s worldview. They fall under four 
legitimatory topoi: authority, commitment, defence and consequence. All these topoi and their 
respective enthymemes are ideologically-driven. That is, macro-arguments define AQAP’s 
struggle through a framework of identity politics rather than modern-day social demands. The 
key overarching topos is that of authority, which underpins AQAP’s reasoning system. 
Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP discourse, and the topos of authority 
overlaps with all other topoi. The topos of authority is a complex one that can be both scriptural, 
propped up concerning sacred texts, or historical, drawing analogical conceptions between 
contemporary political realities and a sacred history. It subsumes the key belief enthymemes of 
ħākimiyah, divine ordainment, and alliance and disavowal. All these enthymemes are modern 
ideas fetched from tradition and are revolutionarily schematised to serve the jihadist cause. 
They are all concerned with delegitimising the Other-within. 
The other topoi are consistent with classical arguments for jihad. The topos of defence has been 
employed as a short-cut strategy for legitimising AQAP’s jihadist cause inside Saudi Arabia. It 
legitimises the Self against the perceived American occupation of Saudi Arabia – in the context 
of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at the hand of infidel forces – and against the 
perceived Other-within’s aggression against the mujahedeen. Similarly, the topos of 
consequence and topos of commitment recycle classical jihadist notions arguing for and 
mobilising people to AQAP’s jihad. 
As noted in the representational analysis, the analysis of (de)legitimatory topoi has found that 
the Other-outwith is not the sole or the primary actor to be delegitimised in AQAP’s discourse 
world. Rather, the Other-within is the primary target of delegitimisation. That is not to say that 
AQAP does not target the USA/West nor that the USA/West is not repugnant. The issue is that 
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defying the USA/West is just one argument against the Other-within within a larger view of the 
world. The question is not that of Dar al-Islam ‘the sphere of Islam’ vs Dar al-Kufr ‘the sphere 
of disbelief’. Rather, AQAP’s goal is to create a chasm between the apostate/hypocrite state 
and Muslim society. 
Topoi analysis provides an approach to argumentation that appears to be compatible with the 
task of locating the arguments in a given discourse. Topoi – as formal devices – seem to be an 
effective search formula for both developing and locating arguments. Drawing on Slomkowski 
(1997), I have employed an understanding of the topos as an argumentation scheme that can be 
said to underlie enthymemes. Enthymemes are, therefore, culture-specific, context-dependent 
instances or rhetorical demonstrations of their respective topoi. The incorporation of a 
topos/enthymeme distinction solves the persistent debate over whether topoi are form-related 
or content-related conclusion rules. For the distinction of culture-specific “topoi” – i.e. 
enthymemes, references are made to the Aristotlean distinction between general and specific 
topoi. 
8.3. Evaluation of the theoretical/methodological approach 
The analysis of nturally occurring language used by jihadists seems to have been a research 
programme, with potential insights for the research problems in questions, and for CDA 
theories and methods. This approach has allowed me to examine the discursive practices of 
AQAP and to demonstrate how jihad, the Self and the Other are constructed and 
(de)legitimised. In this study, I have sought to develop an intertextual approach to explore the 
manner in which jihadist transpositions are made from specific hypotexts. Indeed, there is still 
a potential opportunity to pursue in-depth studies as to how religious authority is exploited by 
AQAP and its ilk, by conducting studies, in Arabic, investigating jihadist discourse and other 
(politico)-religious discourses. However, while I have attempted to answer a few questions 
about the jihadist phenomenon, many questions remain unanswered and CDA has a lot to offer 
in this regard. 
This study has its own limitations in scope, largely because of space and time restrictions.  First, 
the analysis of the jihadist discourse leads to opening a wide range of context-specific notions 
and historical accounts, to which I could not do justice within the space of an IPhD thesis. 
Second, the translation of texts involving hypotextual relations is never neutral. Translation 
erodes the significance of the transformation process and conceals the way in which previous 
formal structures are produced within respective hypotexts. A proper intertextual analysis can 
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only be conducted in Arabic studies whereby different intertextual connections at all levels of 
analysis can be fully attended to.  
8.4. Overall conclusion 
While the principal goal of mainstream Islamist groups has been a theocratic agenda – 
establishing an Islamic Caliphate – in the first half of the twentieth century, it turned into a 
nomocratic one in the second half of the century, calling for the rule of Sharia (al-Sayyid 2015). 
This thesis has found that the discursive practices of AQAP employ both goals, but with more 
frequent instrumentalisation of the latter. Before the 2003 campaign, Al Qaeda central was 
cautious with respect to the notion of an Islamic state, and so was AQAP. References to the 
Caliphate exist in the AQAP narrative, not as a macro-legitimatory argument but rather as a 
long-run consequence. The focus on the rule of Sharia that is constructed to forbid alliances 
with disbelievers is a strategy calculated to delegitimise the Saudi regime. This is understood 
against the background that it is a received opinion that the existing Saudi state is Islamic, or at 
least by the guidelines of the classical Salafist School. The supreme Islamic polity – the 
Caliphate - seems not to have tapped into the social base. Therefore, AQAP has focused on the 
instrumentalisation of the ħākimiyah, in the sense of the implementation of God’s law. 
The delegitimisation of the Saudi government seems to be motivated by an extremist Islamist 
ideology rather than by socio-revolutionary activism. AQAP members continue to have the 
same 1990s hostile and retaliatory sentiments against the Saudi regime, particularly the 
grievances known in the statements of veteran mujahedeen who were detained during the 1990s, 
who see the change in the official Saudi policy regarding the participation of mujahedeen in 
foreign areas of conflict. Therefore, the discord is fundamentally ideological, not social. 
Similarly, I argue that a defining feature of AQAP jihadist ideology is the rejection of the 
existing world order and the pursuit of a polity purely defined in religious terms. Their struggle 
stems from the huge dissonance between this order and their religiously-motivated aspirations, 
be they political, moral or cultural. The discursive contents and forms sit uncomfortably in a 
modern world that has been created by the Other. This modern world comes in-between a 
lamented mighty past and an apocalyptic promised future that is believed will bring back 
dignity, might and grace to what jihadists perceive as God’s chosen sect. The jihadists’ 
perceived aspirations can only be externalised in, and only in, an Islamic state, though the 
Caliphate seems to have been employed to the minimum in AQAP discourse. 
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For the moment, AQAP – as an organisation – has been dead for a decade in Saudi Arabia. But 
in this decade, jihadist groups and emirates have emerged and ascended across the region. The 
seeds of jihadism, as this thesis has argued, are politico-religious. The religious affords 
ideological nourishment in the form of macro-legitimatory arguments, for a perceived exercise 
of politics, whose polity and focus of loyalty are defined in religious terms. These macro-
legitimatory arguments are predominantly notions fetched from sacred texts or religious 
traditions, discursively ideologised to serve the jihadist worldview. Regardless of the veracity 
of jihadist propositions, jihadist discourse delivers a coherent narrative. No one strategy is likely 
to be decisive in countering Al Qaeda and its jihadist agenda and worldview. A complex 
mixture of instruments is needed for this encounter – military, intelligence, financial and even 
social. However, a long-term war of ideas must be in place. As the data have revealed, there is 
a pressing amalgam of ideological issues that need to be addressed. Chief among these issues 
are Islamic political theory, the tension between Sharia law and innovative modern-day 
legislation and the problematic notion of ‘alliance with Muslims and the enmity with non-
Muslims’. This war of ideas should extend to the extremist and revolutionary ideologisation of 
tradition and sacred texts. Examples of such ideologisation of tradition have been identified in 
the contextualisation of sacred texts specific to the jihadist narrative (as explained in depth in 
Chapter 6) and the schematisation of some Quranic verses (e.g. topoi of ħākimiyah and ‘alliance 
and disavowal’, in Chapter 7).  
It is easy for the jihadist movement to replace combatants, but it is harder to replace its key 
notions and arguments. Therefore, based on the analyses carried out in this thesis, I argue that 
more enlightening and critical work is needed to revise a wide range of grand narratives, such 
as the notions of ‘Islamic Caliphate’ and ‘Sharia’. Throughout Islamic history, there has always 
been a gap between the de facto exercise of power and the theoretical formulations of the jurists. 
The analysis of AQAP discourse has revealed that this gap is concealed and there is, rather, a 
narrative – or to use Arkoun’s (2006) term, a ‘religious imaginary’ – in other words, based on 
a-historical visions of the past. For instance, regarding Sharia, AQAP discourse speaks of an 
idealistic paradigmatic form for applying revealed holy law and ignores the fact that Sharia has 
never been an overriding reality and Islamic law has always been supplemented by local 
customary laws, given the enormous cultural and geographical differences between Muslim 
societies. 
Furthermore, I would like to highlight a problem inherent in the topos of religious authority. As 
observed in Chapters 6 and 7, the producers of Sawt al-jihad’s texts desire to identify with the 
earliest Muslims – the Prophet, his companions and their successors, whose example is still 
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alive in the hearts of people living in Islamic culture – manifest in the hypotextual connection. 
There is a commonly accepted principle underlying this system of reasoning: that sacred texts 
are a-historical and universal. However, this principle is problematic for two reasons. First, it 
is easy to assemble convergent texts to support a violent narrative. It is true that this principle 
equally allows counterarguments to the violent theory, but this creates a level of reasoning 
where bad ideas can battle it out with good ideas on an equal footing. That is, the cultivation of 
prior hypotexts can be used strategically for credibility-building purposes for good and bad 
ideas. Second, the a-historical view disregards the huge differences between pre-modern and 
modern world orders. 
8.5. Recommendations for future research 
Hypotextuality has more to offer in terms of highlighting the appeal to authority at the stylistic 
level. The approach I have developed to hypotextuality, along with polyphony and double 
voicing, has a lot to offer such studies. More case studies are needed to explore the 
epistemological and argumentative force of historical analogic reasoning. Moreover, this, in 
turn, takes us to an old question asked anew: truth politics and the basis of ‘God said it.’ From 
my perspective, this type of reasoning is too powerful if we regard sacred texts as a-historical. 
Having observed the debate between mainstream ulema and jihadist ideologues, for every 
argument put forward by one side, another counter-argument is proposed. A potential study in 
this regard is a comparative study evaluating the employment of the topos of authority by 
proponents and opponents of jihadism, to assess whether or not such a dialogue has circular 
reasoning.  
Other potential research on jihadism could investigate the stylistic presentation of 
argumentation. AQAP is replete with metaphors associated with the Quran, the prophetic 
tradition and codes of heroism and chivalry corresponding to the time of early Muslims (e.g. 
path concept, slavery etc.) which, in turn, can have decisive entailments regarding the 
performance of authenticity. We have seen in 5 that metaphor can be used for masking takfir 
‘declaring a Muslim to be out of creed’. I argue that an interesting ingredient in jihadist texts is 
metaphorical mappings, and I would recommend examining the jihadists’ use of them. 
Therefore, critical metaphor analysis and topoi analysis can both be devised to deal with jihadist 
rhetoric. The iconicisation of the jihadist personality is yet another line of enquiry that is worth 
pursuing. This study has shown that the jihadist discourse often uses the charismatic projection 
of mujahedeen as a means of mobilising supporters and enhancing Self-credibility and 
legitimacy. A host of symbols and imageries are used to project the jihadists – leaders and 
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grassroots – as the inspirational archetypical Self actors. Gerges (2017: 33) rightfully argues 
that the prime driver in radicalising jihadists is personality, not ideas. The cultivation of the 
jihadist personality in Sawt al-jihad indicates that AQAP’s ideologues and propagators are 
aware of the fact that potential recruits, particularly alienated young Muslims, are personality-
driven. Therefore, it is wise to pursue how jihadist ideas are anchored discursively in real 
jihadist performers. 
Another important line of research concerns the consumption of jihadist discourses. The current 
study has explored the space between the text producer and the text. However, the question of 
how jihadist texts are consumed is a potential field of inquiry, where the findings of discourse 
analysis can relate to culture and communication studies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Transliterating symbols 
 Transliterating 
symbol 
Arabic letter Phonetic description 
C
o
n
so
n
a
n
ts
 
ʾa ء glottal stop 
b ب bilabial voiced stop 
t ت voiceless alveolar stop 
th ث voiceless dental fricative 
j ج voiceless alveolar affricate 
ħ ح voiceless pharyngeal fricative 
kh خ voiceless velar fricative 
d د voiced alveolar stop 
dh ذ voiced dental fricative 
r ر alveolar trill 
z ز voiced alveolar fricative 
s س voiceless alveolar fricative 
sh ش voiceless post-alveolar fricative 
ṣ ص velarised voiceless alveolar fricative 
ḍ ض velarised voiced alveolar stop 
ṭ ط velarised voiceless alveolar stop 
ḍḥ ظ velarised voiced dental fricative 
ʿa ع voiced pharyngeal fricative 
gh غ voiced uvular fricative 
f ف voiceless labiodental fricative 
q ق voiceless uvular stop  
k ك voiceless velar stop 
l ل alveolar lateral 
m م bilabial nasal 
n ن alveolar nasal 
h ـه voiceless glottal fricative 
w و voiced labial-velar approximant 
y ي palatal fricative 
V
o
w
el
s 
a   َ  short a  
u   َ  short u 
i   َ  short i 
ā اـ long a  
ū وـ long u 
ī يـ long i 
Table 7. The full tramscription of the Arabic phonemic inventory 
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Appendix B: The chronology of the milestones in AQAP’s 2003 campaign 
18 March 2003   A bomb going off prematurely in a Riyadh-based bomb factory 
25 March 2003   Killing a policeman and wounding another in Skaka 
12 April 2003   Killing a police chief in his car in Jawf  
1 May 2003   An American shot dead in a marine base in Jubail 
6 May 2003   A battle in Riyadh, then authorities issued 19 militants wanted 
12 May 2003   A 3-car-bomd targeting Western expatriate compound, 35 killed 
September 2003   The first issue of AQAP’s Sawt al-jihad published 
8 November 2003   Suicide bomb on Muhayya compound, 17 killed, 120 wounded 
4 December 2003   A Major General security officer attacked and wounded 
6 December 2003   Authorities issued a wanted list of 19 militants  
15 March 2004   AQAP’s Khaled alHajj and 2 militants killed by police 
21 April 2004   Car bomb on security building in Riyadh, 6 killed, 145 wounded  
29 May 2004   Militants shooting at several places in Khobar, many wounded 
6 June 2004   BBC correspondent wounded and cameraman killed in Riyadh 
8 June 2004   US citizen Robert Jacobs killed in Riyadh 
12 June 2004   US citizen Kenneth Scroggs killed in Riyadh 
12 June 2004   US citizen Paul Johnson kidnapped from Riyadh and killed later 
18 June 2004   AQAP’s leader al-Mugrin and 3 militants killed in a police raid 
23 June 2004   One-month amnesty for surrenders declared by authorities 
20 July 2004   Killing 2, wounding and arresting 3 militants in a police raid 
3 August 2004   Shooting dead an Irish citizen in a militants gun firing in Riyadh 
11 September 2004   Car explosion near Samba Bank in Jeddah, the attacker wounded 
November 2004   Sawt al-jihad temporarily discontinued, reappearing later 
6 December 2004   Storming the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, 4 attackers were killed  
29 December 2004   Suicide car bomb attacks on the interior Ministry and National 
Guard training facility, 10 militants killed and 1 bystander dead 
3-5 April 2005   A 3-day gun battle leaving 14 militants dead and several 
wounded in Al-Rass 
19 June 2005   Police interrogator shot dead by militants at his house 
19 June 2005   Authorities issued a wanted list of 36 militants  
24 February 2006   A failed attack with 2 explosives cars on Abgaig oil facility 
2 December 2006   Authorities announce the arrest of 136 militants in several cities  
7 December 2006   Militants shooting dead 2 security guards near a prison in Jeddah 
26 February 2006   4 French tourists killed in an archaeological site north of Medina 
27 April 2007   Authorities announced the arrest of 172 suspected militants  
9 august 2007   Authorities announced the arrest of 135 suspected militants  
28 November 2007   Authorities announced the arrest of 208 suspected militants  
3 march 2008   Authorities announced the arrest of 56 suspected militants  
25 June 2008   Authorities announced the arrest of 701 suspected militants  
19 January 2009   Saudi AQAP and Yemeni AQAP merged (Danadani) 
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Appendix C: Nominational and predicational realisations 
Table 8: The construction of jihad 
NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
 
JIHAD: 
jihād ‘jihad’ 
qitāl fighting 
ribāṭ ‘firm hold’ 
nafīr ‘going forth’ 
shaʾīrah ‘ritual’ 
faḍīlah ‘virtue’ 
jihādunā ‘our jihad’ 
jihād ikhwāninā ‘our brothers’ jihad’ 
jihād al-muslim(īn) ‘Muslim(‘s) jihad’ 
jihād al-muʿmin(īn) ‘believer(‘s) jihad’ 
jihād al-mujāhid(īn) ‘Mujahed(‘s) jihad’ 
jihād al-ummah ‘ummah’s jihad’ 
al-fareedhah algha’ibah ‘the absent duty’ 
al-jihād al-askari ‘the military jihad’ 
al-jihād al-wājib (al-mutaʿayin) ‘the obligatory jihad’ 
farīḍat al-jihād ‘the duty of jihad’ 
sha’eerat al-jihad ‘the ritual of jihad’ 
al-jihādu fī sabīl allah ‘jihad in the path of God’ 
al-qitāl fī sabīl allah ‘fighting in the path of God’ 
al-ʾithkhānu fī al-ʿaduw ‘inflicting a massacre in the 
enemy’ 
jihād al-kuffār/al-kāfirīn/al-mushrikīn/al-murtaddīn/al-
ʾamrīkān/al-ṭughāh/aʿadāʾi allah ‘jihad against the infidels 
(polytheists) (apostates) (Americans) (ṭawāghīt) (God’s 
enemies)’ 
 
- military 
is fighting 
is the military struggle 
fighting the apostates is defensive jihad 
all about defensive jihad nowadays 
- as tawħīd externalised 
the externalisation of twheed to God 
embodiment of tawħīd 
the head of the matter in Islam 
a worship akin to prayer and fasting 
not deserted but by hypocrites 
increases imaan ‘belief’ and pushing away disbelief and hypocrisy 
the sincerity of intentions to God 
is an act of worship 
one of the Islamic laws 
a struggle between what is true and what is false 
of the most loved acts of worship to God 
the sign of the ummah’s return to Islam 
a creed issue decided by the religious texts 
an ordained act of worship, whether won or lost 
the ultimate purpose for people 
the banner of which is lifted by the winning sect 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
al-daʿawah ila allah ‘the call to Allah’ 
 
among the reasons for uprightness 
- perpetual 
impossible to eliminate 
universal fate 
a continuous fierce war against the Crusade and its followers 
global and boundless 
valid at all times in all places 
not just a single battle 
continuing until the day of judgement 
- a test for the believers 
a great test [for the believers] 
may not immediately lead to triumph 
based on withstanding hardships 
its dereliction is disobedience to Allah 
abandoning it is one of the greatest sins 
abandoning it leads to the descent of Allah’s punishment on the ummah 
lifting its banner is a God-given bounty 
- a means to an end 
a means of establishing the Caliphate on earth 
a means of implementing God’s laws 
a means of calling to Allah 
the road to victory, pride, and dignity 
a noble means 
its aim is the demise of the affliction that befell Muslims 
one of the financial resources of the state of Islam 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
- Obligatory and legitimate 
is one of the rituals of Islam 
mandatory when the enemy enters a Muslim land 
mentioned and legitimated by many Quranic and Sunnah texts 
permanent duty on ummah 
a statement made by the Prophet Mohammed  
an obligatory duty that doesn’t require parents’ permission 
a duty ordained on the believers 
permeant ordinance 
there are numerous reasons for it in the Arabian Peninsula 
referred to in the [Quran and Sunnah] texts as necessary in the struggle 
against infidels 
- salvation then 
for which the reward is the forgiveness of all sins 
has great rewards 
leading to paradise in the next world 
profitable even if mujahedeen are killed 
the ultimate purpose of which is God’s rewards 
- a means for defiance 
the effective power to thwart the plots of infidels and hypocrites 
the language of force that works with enemies 
a means of taking revenge on behalf of Muslims 
a blow to Western colonisation and the world order 
a means of destructing infidels and the victory of believers 
a means of repelling aggression 
defiance to the enemy 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
- effective 
having discomposed the internal and the external enemy 
dramatically influential 
liberated some of the Arabian’s Peninsula’s people from slavery 
could have established states 
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Table 9: The construction of the ummah 
NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
ummah: 
 
al-ummah ‘the Islamic community’ 
al-muslimūn ‘the Muslims’ 
al-mustaḍʿafūn ‘the oppressed’ 
ahl al-islām ‘people of Islam’ 
ahl al-sunnah ‘people of Sunnah’ 
ummat al-islām ‘the community of Islam’ 
 
the most humiliated nation 
in need for the substantiation of tawħīd  
chosen by God to be the best nation among all humanity 
humiliated by the Crusaders, the Jews and the apostates 
living the life of religious dereliction and the indulgence in sins 
having no other solution but the return to the Book and Sunnah 
humiliated by Allah due to abandoning jihad 
turned away from jihad 
will be guided if practised jihad 
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Table 10: The construction of the Self 
NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
THE MUJAHEDEEN: 
 
naħn ‘we’ 
-nā ‘our/us’ 
mujāhid(īn) ‘Mujahed(een)’ 
murāabiṭ(īn) ‘firm holder(s)’ 
al-muwaħid(īn) ‘maonotheost(s)’ 
abṭāl ‘champions’ 
al-ghurabāʾ ‘the strangers’ 
al-shahīd ‘the martyr(s)’ 
al-ṣāabir(īn) ‘the patient’ 
al-akhyār ‘the pious’ 
al-ṭalīʿah ‘the vanguard’ 
sarāyā al-mujāhīd(īn) ‘troops of mujahedeen’ 
katāʾib al-ħaq ‘the brigades of the right’ 
katāʾib al-mujāhidīn ‘brigades of mujahedeen’ 
khalāyā al-mujāhidīn ‘cells of muhjahedeen’ 
shabāb al-jihād ‘youth of jihad’ 
ahl al-jihād ‘people of jihad’ 
ahl al-ribāṭ ‘people of ribat’ 
maṣābīħ al-ʿ izzah ‘the lights if dignity’ 
ahl al-sunnah ‘people of Sunnah’ 
abnāʾ al-jazīrah ‘sons of the peninsula’ 
ahl al-thughūr ‘people of the frontiers’ 
ikhwānuk(um) ‘your [PL/SING.] brothers’ 
ikhwānunā ‘our brothers’ 
abnāʾukum ‘your sons’ 
ikhwānī ‘my brothers’ 
ʿibād allah ‘God’s slaves/worshippers’ 
 
rightful and committed to a Divine mission 
the true 
having a mission and a message 
defending the sacred lands of Muslims 
fighting for Allah’s word to become Superior 
dedicated to God’s enjoinments 
having a just cause 
hailed and lauded by God 
fighting God’s enemies as enjoined by God 
permitted by God to kill infidels 
people of truth and patience 
supporting and protecting God’s religion 
their jihad is legitimate 
seeking refuge in strong support [God presupposed] 
making their lives in the path of God 
not a mafia gang killing each other for dollars 
guided by the light of the Quran and Sunnah 
disbelieved in ṭāgihūt and whoever worships them 
following the Prophet’s Sunnah 
grateful to Allah for the bounty of jihad 
avoiding the seduction of abandoning jihad 
altruistic and having noble pan-Islamist goals: 
seeking to free Muslim prisoners 
wishing to promote virtue and prevent vice 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
awliyāʾ allah ‘Allah’s allies’ 
 jund allah ‘God’s soldiers’ 
altā’ifah al-mujāhidah ‘the striving sect’ 
al-shabāb al-mujāhid ‘the striving youth’ 
al-mujāhidūn al-muʾminūn ‘the striving believers’ 
al-shabāb al-ṣāliħīn ‘the pious youth’ 
al-ħarakah al-jihādiyah ‘the jihadist movement’ 
mujāhidū arḍ al-jazīrah ‘the mujahedeen of the Peninsula’ 
fursān taħta rāyat al-nabiy ‘knights under the Prophet’s 
banner’ 
fiʾatun tuqātilu fī sabīl allah ‘an army fighting in the cause 
of Allah’ 
in constant striving and sacrifices all over the world 
not fighting for worldly purposes 
flocking to Arabia to liberate it from Crusaders and their agents 
selling this world in the name of obeying God’s commands and 
supporting the vulnerable 
the ummah rises with them 
men who sacrificed their lives for their religion 
reforming what people have spoiled 
known for their good will and intentions 
[referring to the mujahedeen] the supply for the coming Islamic Caliphate 
brave and successful: 
brave heroes 
the men of ummah 
the knights of ummah 
managing to kill Americans 
managing to kill dozens of the National Guard troops 
storming the Crusaders’ settlements (with reference to expatriate 
compounds in Riyadh) 
seeing jihad as fighting 
killing infidel hostages 
repelling government forces and incurring losses 
pounding the Crusaders’ strongholds 
not naïve that they expose themselves to the regime 
lighting fires beneath the Crusaders 
lifting the banners, chanting allahu akbar ‘Allah is great’ 
feared by ṭawāghīt 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
able to escape confrontations with minimal losses 
triumphing intellectually 
whose operations are increasing 
not stupid 
organised and having goals: 
having clear goals and adopting distinct methods 
seeking to evict the Crusaders from Arabia 
determined to establish the Islamic State 
not waging jihad without a purpose 
having a central leadership 
waging a war of attrition with the Crusade’s states 
managed to neutralise America 
fighting under the banner of the global front of fighting the Crusaders and 
the Jews 
hoping for establishing the Islamic state 
coming to kill Christians in Arabia 
as victims: 
being misshaped by ulema and the media 
tortured in prison 
being abducted by infidels 
seldom finding aids for the good, and supporters on its road 
resistant and uncompromising: 
refusing a life of humiliation 
disregarding the rumours and the discouraging campaigns by the media 
and evil ulema 
standing for the truth and being unafraid to take the blame 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
determined to keep on their way despite their experiences 
the first threat to the Jews and the Christians 
having high morale 
a thorn in the enemy’s side  
disbelieve in the Arab and non-Arab governments 
distancing themselves from international and regional associations 
disavow the polytheistic doctrines 
disavow the democratic approaches 
repudiate the pagan nationalism 
could have resisted despite the obstacles 
not harmed by those who disbelieve or stand against them 
expecting one of the two best things: victory or martyrdom 
men who vowed not enjoy life before liberation Muhammed’s land from 
the Crusaders 
whose hearts are filled with enmity to infidels 
taking allies and enemies for the cause of God 
triumphing over discouragers by joining the jihad 
vowing to defeat the fight who fights Allah 
will not abandon jihad regardless of how bad the conditions become 
continuing to fight America and all invaders 
aiming to convert people to Islam 
upset America and its allies 
will disregard the rumours’ claims that jihad deforms the image of Islam 
will dismiss the claims that beheading Americans is cruel and brutal 
the true sect: 
putting faith in God’s hands 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
fasting during the day and praying at night 
upholders and protectors of religion 
the victorious sect of Islam 
men who are true to what they promised Allah 
among them honest ulema 
strangers among families, relatives and loved ones 
the best of people 
lifting the banner of jihad in the path of Allah 
worshipping the God of jihad, rather than the leaders of jihad 
asking Allah to keep us form on the jihad and the straight path 
the army, to which the grace of Allah is promised  
seeking martyrdom and winning in the next world 
martyrs in death 
seeking martyrdom in the path of Allah 
triumphing even if get killed 
believing the promise of Allah 
will marry fair wives in the Paradise 
trade with Allah 
martyrs will achieve eternal life in the Paradise 
granted forgiveness by Allah’s upon their death 
pay their lives as dowries for fair wives in the Paradise 
fearing punishment in the next world 
caring of Muslims 
avoiding Muslim blood 
caring of their injured fellows 
not initiating fighting with the regime’s soldiers 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
don’t target Muslims 
not seeking to take arms against Muslims 
 
with referring to the honest people who support mujahedeen: 
their actions confirm their words 
they courageously provided moral and material support to mujahedeen 
provide weapons and shelter to the mujahedeen 
they defended the jihadist approach despite the ṭawāghīt’s threats 
 
REFERENCE TO OSAMA BIN LADEN: 
 
Osāmah, Osāmah bin Lādin 
abū abdullah ‘father of Abdullah’ 
al-shaykh ‘the chief’ 
al-qāʾid ‘the leader’ 
al-mujāhid ‘the Mujahed’ 
al-ʾimām ‘the (religous) leader’ 
shaykhunā ‘our chief’ 
imāmunā ‘our leader’ 
(imām) (shaikh) (qāʾid) alhujahedeen ‘(chief) (leader) of the 
mujahedeen’ 
Al-shaykh al-mujāhid ‘the Mujahed chief’ 
al-ʿabd al-ṣāliħ ‘the pious slave [of God]’ 
qāʾid fusṭāṭi al-ʾīman ‘the leader of the believers’ assembly’ 
 
 
honest person 
speaking on behalf the mujahedeen who fight the West 
under his leadership, the Muslims have succeeded 
offering a truce to the Europeans 
seeking to liberate the Arab and Islamic world from American influence 
renovator of the time and compeller of Americans 
gave a Saudi colour to the 9/11 attacks 
speaking in the name of the ummah’s nobles 
sobbing when he remembers Iraq 
able to fight the world’s apostates and infidels 
rendered the ummah great projects 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
REFERENCE TO AQAP FOUNDER YUSUF AL-
UYAYRI: 
 
Yusuf Al-Uyayri 
al-shaykh ‘the chief’ 
al-qāʾid ‘the leader’ 
al-mujāhid ‘the Mujahed’ 
al-shahīd ‘the martyr’ 
al-ʾimām ‘the leader’ 
akhūnā ‘our brother’ 
al-baṭal ‘the hero’ 
 
 
 
imam ‘leader’ 
long-sighted 
strategic thinking 
a martyr 
honest person 
highness in the time of disgrace 
a prudent mind 
an outweighing opinion 
one of the trainers in the Faruq camp during the Afghan jihad 
sought martyrdom in the battles of Somalia against the American forces 
sought martyrdom in Afghanistan 
bravely obtained martyrdom in the Arabian Peninsula 
went on a hunger strike to be transferred into solitary confinement to 
devote his time to Allah 
aided the jihad in Chechnya by writing religious studies for the voice of 
Caucasus website 
having a jihadist career full of sacrifice and hard work 
following Prophet Mohammed’s approach 
being the bodyguard of Sheikh Osama bin Laden 
having shown his genius to Sheikh Osama bin Laden 
contributing to the fundraising for Kosovo 
imprisoned and severely tortured in Dammam 
has relations with the leader Khattab 
blessed with an incredible military intellect 
met with some Taliban ministers who came to perform hajj 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
hurt by how the ulema’s let down 
whose virtue is recognised by the ulema 
whose writings increased the number of ulema supporting 9/11 
patient on calamities 
soft-hearted on mujahedeen and easily shedding tears when reminded of 
the sacrifices of the mujahedeen 
modest 
a martyr in the cause of his religion 
fought until being killed on the soil of the Arabian Peninsula 
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Table 11: The construction of the Other-within 
NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
A SET OF FREQUENTLY-USED EMPTY SIGNIFIERS 
REFERRING TO THE OTHER WITHIN: 
 
(hum, -u ‘they’, -hum ‘them’, antum ‘you.PL.NOM’, -tum 
‘‘you.PL.ACC’ al-mushrikīn ‘polytheists’, al-ṭawāghīt ‘, ʿabadat 
al-ṭawāghīt ‘ṭawāghīt’s worshippers’, al-murtaddīn ‘apostates’, ʿ 
aduwunā min al-dākhil ‘the enemy within’, al-ʾanthimah al-
ṭawāghītiyah ‘the ṭāghūti regimes’, salāṭīn ‘sultans’, ahl al-bāṭil 
‘people of the false = those who followed what is false’, jund al-
shayṭān ‘devil’s soldiers’) 
 
 
REFERENCE TO THE HOUSE OF SAUD, THE SAUDI 
GOVERNMENT: 
 
antum ‘you.PL.NOM’ 
-tum ‘‘you.PL.ACC’ 
hum ‘they’ 
-u ‘they.NOM’ 
-hum ‘them.ACC’ 
ʾāl suʿ ūd ‘the house of Saud’ 
ʾāl salūl ‘the house of Saluul’ 
ʾāl yahūd ‘the House of Jews’ 
al-ṭawāghīt  
ṭawāghīt al-jazīrah ‘the ṭawāghīt of the Peninsula’ 
ṭawāghīt ʾāl salūl ‘the house of Saluul’s ṭawāghīt’ 
ṭawāghīt suʿ ūd ‘the house of Saud’s ṭawāghīt’ 
ṭawāghīt al-ħaramayn ‘the tyants of the Holy land’ 
ṭawāghīt al-riddah ‘the ṭawāghīt of apostacy’ 
al-nāʿib ‘the agent’ 
 
ṭawāghīt  
apostates 
renegades 
renegades on the enjoinments of God 
having averted religion 
the government of disbelief, injustice, and tyranny 
fighting them is first to fight infidels 
implement the plans of colonisation 
allying to infidels 
governing according to laws other than those of the Almighty God 
shutting up the reformers and the preachers for the good 
imprisoning whoever calls them to govern according to God’s laws 
America’s key ally in the War on Terror 
supporting the global war on terrorism with the available resources 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
al-khawanah ‘the traitors’ 
al-ʿaduw ‘the enemy’ 
aʿadāʾuna ‘our enemies’, 
ʿbīd ʾāl yahūd ‘the Jews’ slaves’ 
ʿbīd ʿamrīka ‘America’s slaves’ 
ʿbīduhum ‘their slaves’ 
athnābuhum ‘their tails’ 
hulafāʾuhum ‘their allies’ 
humāt al-ṣalīb ‘the protectors of the Crusade’, 
aʿadāʾ allah ‘God’s enemies’ 
al-ħukūmah al-ʿamīla ‘the agent government’, 
 al-ħukūmah al-ṣalībiyah ‘the Crusader government’, 
al-ħukūmah al-murtaddah ‘the apostate government’, ʿ aduwunā 
min al-dākhil ‘the enemy within’, 
al-ħukkām al-khawanah ‘‘ 
shuyūkh ʿamrīka ‘America’s Sheikhs’ 
ʿukhrā tuqātilu fī sabīl al-ṭaghūt ‘another [army] fighting in the 
cause of ṭaghūt’ 
 
 
aiding the war in Iraq 
providing the Americans with intelligence information about mujahedeen 
chasing, imprisoning, torturing and killing the mujahedeen 
providing space for polytheists, rafidhah [Shiite] and secularists 
entering into a treaty and alliance with the Crusaders who fight Islam and 
the Muslims 
desperate to drain financial sources 
trying to distort the image of mujahedeen in the eyes of donors 
the most agent state to America 
protecting the American interests 
jailing the champions and hailing the hypocrites of ummah 
not qualified to establish the religion and defend Muslims 
implementing the plans of the ummah’s enemies 
resorting to ṭāghūti laws, such as the Labour Law, commercial courts, 
Customs Law, etc. 
claiming to have eliminated jihad 
implements America’s instructions 
declaring war on jihad 
waging a frenzied attack on jihad 
waging a crusade against jihad and Islam 
providing America with free oil supplies 
gave aid to the Iraq War 
don’t allow prejudice to America 
its presence depends on the existence of America 
having deservedly proven that it is the most agent state to America 
loyal to protecting America’s interests 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
REFERENCE TO ULEMA: 
 
hum ‘they’ 
-u ‘they.NOM’ 
-hum ‘they.ACC’ 
ʾal-ʿulamāʾ ‘the ulema’ 
al-murjifūn ‘the who spread rumours’ 
al-mukhathelūn ‘the discouragers’ 
al-munāfiqūn ‘the hypocrites’ 
al-mustaslimūn ‘surrenders’ 
ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ ‘the evil ulema’ 
ʿulamāʾ al-ṣalāṭīn ‘the sultans’ ulema’ 
shuyūkhuhum ‘their Sheikhs’ 
ʿulamāʾ al-ṭaghūt ‘ṭāghūt’s ulema’ 
al-mashāʾikh al-rasmiyīn ‘official Sheikhs’ 
 
 
who find nothing wrong in their land being occupied by the American 
female soldiers 
who don’t consider liberating the land of the Crusader invaders 
instilling in them [the people OR their followers] humiliation and 
debasement 
irrigating them [their followers] with the water of servility 
enslaved by a ṭāghīt and their fate is linked with his 
at the forefront of the negligence regarding the rights of our ummah 
pretending to be religious 
renegades 
deterring Muslims from jihad 
serving the Crusade 
providing gains for the Crusade 
pretended ulema 
seduced by worldly positions 
hypocrites 
brainwashing the people 
hired by the sultans 
handkerchiefs in the hands of the sultans 
the so-called ulema 
trying to deceive people by claiming that the mujahedeen are targeting 
Muslims 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
SOLDIERS AND SECURITY FORCES: 
 
hum ‘they’, -u ‘they.NOM’, -hum ‘they.ACC’ 
al-junūd ‘the soldiers’ 
al-quwāt ‘the forces’ 
almuħaqqiqūn ‘the interrogators’ 
al-ḍābiṭ, al-ḍubbāṭ ‘the officer(s)’ 
wazārat al-dākhiliyah ‘the Interior Ministry’ 
wazārat al-dākhiliyah al-ṣalībiyah ‘the Crusader Interior Ministry’ 
ʿskar al-kufr ‘the soldiers of disbelief’ 
ʿskar al-ṭawāghīt 
junūd al-ṭawāghīt ‘ṭawāghīt’s soldiers’ 
junūd al-nāʾib ‘the agent’s soldiers’ 
junūd ʾāl suʿūd ‘Al Saud’s soldiers’ 
junūd firʿawn ‘Pharaoh’s soldiers’ 
junūd ʾiblīs ‘devil’s soldiers’ 
junūd al-ħukūmah (al-salūliyah) ‘the (salūli) government soldiers’ 
junūd al-nithām ‘the regime’s socldiers’ 
quwāt al-ṭawāriʾ ‘the emergency force’. 
quwāt al-nithām ‘the regime’s forces’ 
quwāt al-nithām ‘the security forces’ 
quwāt al-murtaddīn ‘the apostates’ forces’ 
quwāt ʾamrīka ‘America’ forces’ 
al- quwāt al-salūliyah ‘the salūli forces’ 
kilāb al-mabāħith ‘dogs of secret police’ 
al-ʿabīd ‘the slaves’ 
ʿabīd al-ʿbīd ‘the slaves of the slaves’ 
ʿabīd ʾāl salūd ‘Al saluul’s soldiers’ 
ʿabīd al-ṭaghūt ‘ṭawāghīt’s slaves’ 
ʿabīd ʾamrīka ‘America’s slaves’ 
ʿbīd al-dirham ‘the slaves of dirham [money]’ 
 
are traitors: 
cowardly  
traitors 
fighting for the sake of salary 
fighting in the cause of ṭāghūt 
fighting in the cause of the Crusade 
aides of the Crusaders 
sacrifice their souls for the sake of the Crusade’s worshippers 
go to Hellfire if killed in the ranks of ṭāghūt 
the protectors of the Crusade 
fighting under the devil’s banner 
fighting the mujahedeen 
working to extinguish Allah’s light 
pay their religion in exchange for a salary 
unable to eliminate the mujahedeen 
push themselves in a losing battle with the mujahedeen 
sell themselves for worldly advantage 
protecting polytheism 
accept being at the forefront of the Crusader soldiers 
accept being at the hands of the ṭawāghīt 
protecting the Crusaders 
engaged in constant war with the mujahedeen 
America’s slaves  
turning their backs [in flight] 
leave their vehicles and weaponry 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
Al-murtazaqah ‘the mercenaries’ fight from behind walls 
killed in their dozens 
frightened and panicked 
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Table 12: The construction of the Other-outwith 
NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
 
A SET OF FREQUENTLY-USED EMPTY 
SIGNIFIERS REFERRING TO THE OTHER-
OUTWITH: 
(hum ‘they’, -u ‘they.NOM’, -hum ‘they.ACC’, al-rūm ‘the 
Romans’, al-kuffār, al-kāfirīn ‘infidels’, al-ṣalībiyīn 
‘Crusaders’, al-naṣārā, al-masīħiyīn ‘Christians’, al-yahūd 
‘the Jews’, al-gharb ‘the West’) 
 
 
 
AMERICA, THE AMERICANS: 
 
hum ‘they’, 
-u ‘they.NOM’, 
-hum ‘they.ACC’ 
al-kuffār, al-kāfirīn ‘infidels’, 
al-ṣalībiyīn ‘Crisaders’, 
al-naṣārā, al-masīħiyīn ‘Christians’, 
al-ʾamrīkiyīn ‘the Americans’, 
al-aʾadāʿ ‘the enemeies’, 
al-mulħidūn, ‘athiests’, 
asyāduhum ‘their [Al Saud] masters’, 
ahl al-kufr ‘people of disbelief’ 
ʿubbād, ʿabadat al-ṣalīb ‘the Crusade’s worshippers’, 
sadanat al-ṣalīb ‘the Crusade’s servants’, 
al-ʿaduw al-ṣalībī ‘the Crusader enemy’, 
al-mujannadāt al-ʾamrīkaiyāt ‘the American female 
soldiers’, 
al-duwal al- ṣalībīyah ‘the Crusader states’ 
ʾulāʾika allathīna kafarū ‘those who disbelieved’, 
 
 
the masters 
their [the apostate regimes] masters 
stealing its resources [the Arabia] 
determining its policies 
fighting the Muslims of this land 
colonising Makkah and Madinah 
the biggest obstacle in the way of establishing the Islamic state 
desecrating the sacred land 
the protector of the Crusade 
implementing whatever possible in the war against Islam and Muslims 
the most hostile enemy ever 
will not experience security before leaving Arabia, Palestine, and all 
Muslim lands 
colonising Arabia 
using military bases in the sacred land to bomb Muslims 
waging a global war on Islam and Muslims 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
juyūsh alyahūd wa alsalībiyīn ‘the armies of the Jews and 
the Crusaders’, 
 
an aggressive state 
waging the tenth Crusade war 
took advantage of the Kuwait War to achieve its interests 
the stronghold of atheism 
invading the Islamic world 
tightens its grip on jihadist and Islamic movements in the Islamic world 
frightened and panicked after destroying the Crusade residential 
compound 
the leader of disbelief 
killing them pleases Muslims 
will know how Allah aids his supporters 
an empire held together by materialistic strength 
whose end is imminent 
drawn into a war of attrition by Al Qaeda 
swallowed the bait [laid by Al Qaeda], and expanded and deployed 
want to misshape our identity and strip us of religion 
being defeated 
requesting the apostate regime to arrest and interrogate the mujahedeen 
placing their churches in Mohammed’s land 
searching for the mujahedeen 
will receive painful blows from the mujahedeen 
head of infidelity 
killing Muslims in Palestine at the hands of Israel 
whose crimes in Afghanistan are indescribable 
are in a predicament in Afghanistan 
aim to make the mujahedeen busy fighting the Saudi regime 
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NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
(SOCIAL ACTOR: linguistic realisations) (Predicational themes: linguistic realisations) 
in a severe and critical situation in Iraq 
came with its soldiers to the land of Muhammed 
marketing the deception of reform in the Islamic world 
raping Muslim women in abu ghraib [an American prison in Iraq] 
appreciating Saudi efforts in the war on terrorism 
supporting Israel 
wronged our brothers in Guantanamo Bay prison 
mistreated and killed Muslims in Somalia 
caused the death of more than half a million Iraqi children 
defeat is just a matter of time 
cannot eliminate terrorism 
facing a guerrilla war 
militarily lurching 
politically wandering 
economically bleeding 
spend billions in maintaining the security of its facilities and its economic 
interests around the world 
trapped in a minefield in its war on Islam 
fake civilisation 
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Appendix D: Bin Laden’s Declaration 
World Islamic front for jihad against Zionists and crusaders: declaration of war1 
From al-Quds al-_Arabi, February 23, 1998 
Praise be to Allah, mover of the clouds, defeater of the Confederates, and who stated in his law-
giving Book: “Then, when the sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find 
them, take them [as captives], besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every point of 
observation” [9:5], and prayers and peace upon His Prophet Muhammad b. _Abdallah, who 
stated: “I was sent with a sword just before the Hour [of Judgment], so that they would worship 
Allah alone, and my daily sustenance was placed beneath the shadow of my spear, and 
humiliation and contempt were placed upon those who resist my message.” 
Since the time when Allah spread the Arabian Peninsula [see 79:30], created within it its deserts 
and surrounded it with its seas, it has never been crushed and overcome [see 12:7] as by these 
Crusader hordes that have spread over it like locusts, pressing upon its land, devouring its 
wealth, and annihilating its greenery. All of this is happening at the same time as “the nations 
are quarreling with each other over the Muslims, just as starving people quarrel over a bowl [of 
food].”8 The seriousness of the times and the minimum [number] of helpers compel us, and also 
you, to make a stand concerning current concealed events, just as it obligates us to agree on a 
course of action. 
No one today will argue concerning three truths that are backed up by abundant proofs 
concerning which all fair-minded people will agree. We will list them to remind those who can 
be reminded, to destroy those who will be destroyed by clarity, and to embarrass those who are 
embarrassed by clarity, and they are: 
1. For [a period of time] going on seven years, America has been occupying the lands of 
Islam, the holiest of its places, the Arabian Peninsula, stealing its produce, dictating to 
its rulers, humiliating its people, and frightening its neighbors. It has turned its bases 
on the peninsula into a spearhead with which to fight the adjoining Islamic peoples. 
Possibly in the past there were some who would argue the fact of the occupation, but 
now all of the people of the peninsula would acknowledge it. I will not even note the 
continual American aggression against the Iraqi people, using the peninsula, despite 
the refusal of the rulers to permit this, since they are overpowered. 
2. Despite the great destruction which has occurred among the Iraqi people at the hands 
of the Crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the frightening number of killed—close 
to a million— despite all of this, the Americans are trying once again to return to these 
terrible slaughters, as if they were not satisfied with the long siege after the violent 
war, and not even with ripping apart or destruction. Now they come once again to 
annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors. 
3. Since the motivations of the Americans behind these wars is religious and economic, 
and also to serve the interests of the minuscule Jewish state in order to remove eyes 
from its occupation of Jerusalem and its killing of Muslims there [so, too, the Muslims 
should respond with a religious and economic war]. The best demonstration of this is 
their desire to destroy Iraq, the strongest of the adjoining Arab nations, and their 
aspiration to dissolve the states of the region into paper statelets, such as Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan. Through their fragmentation and weakness the 
                                                 
1 The translation of this communiqué is adopted from (Cook 2005: 173-175). 
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continuation of Israel will be ensured, as well as the continual brutal Crusader 
occupation of the peninsula. 
All of these crimes and calamities from the Americans are an open declaration of war upon 
Allah and His Messenger, and upon the Muslims. All the religious leadership—past and 
present—has had through the Islamic age a consensus that jihad is an individual obligation if 
an enemy destroys the lands of the Muslims. Among those who have related this are the Imam 
Ibn Qudama [d. 1223] in his Mughni, the Imam al-Kasani [d. 1191] in his Bada_i_, al-Qurtubi 
[d. 1273] in his Tafsir, Shaykh al- Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] [d. 1348] in his Ikhtiyarat, where he 
stated: “As for defensive fighting, the most important of the types [of fighting] is to repel an 
invader from the sanctity and the religion is an obligation according to consensus. There is 
nothing more obligatory—other than actually believing [in Islam]—than repelling an attacking 
invader who corrupts the religion and this world.” 
So, building upon all of this, and taking the command of Allah as our example, we give the 
following opinion to all Muslims: 
The ruling of killing Americans and their allies—whether civilians or military— is incumbent 
upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, in order to liberate 
the Mosque of al-Aqsa and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and until their armies 
leave the lands of Islam, punished according to the law, broken and unable to threaten any 
Muslim. This is in accordance with the Word of Allah: “Fight them until there is no sedition 
[temptation] and the religion becomes that of Allah” [2:193]; and His Word: “And why don’t 
you fight for the cause of Allah and for the down-trodden, men, women and children, who say: 
‘Lord, bring us out of this city whose inhabitants are unjust and grant us, from You, a protector, 
and grant us, from You, a supporter’” [4:75]. 
So, with Allah’s permission, we call every Muslim who believes in Allah and desires a reward 
to take as his example the order of Allah to kill Americans and to steal their possessions in 
everyplace they are to be found, and during every time possible. We also call upon the religious 
leadership of the Muslims, their leaders, their youth, and their armies to initiate attacks upon 
the American devil, and upon those allies of Satan who have allied themselves with them, in 
order to frighten them away from behind them [the Americans], so that they may [re]consider. 
“O believers, respond to Allah and to the Apostle if He calls you to that which will give you 
life; and know that Allah stands between a man and his heart, and that unto Him you shall be 
gathered” [8:24]; and His Word: “O believers, what is the matter with you? If you are told: 
‘March forth in the way of Allah,’ you simply cling heavily to the ground. Are you satisfied 
with the present life rather than the Hereafter? Yet the pleasures of the present life are very 
small compared with those of the Hereafter. If you do not march forth, He will inflict a very 
painful punishment on you and replace you by another people, and you will not harm Him in 
the least; for Allah has power over everything” [9:38–39]; and also “Do not be faint-hearted 
and do not grieve; you will have the upper hand, if you are believers” [3:139]. 
Shaykh Osama b. Muhammad b. Ladin 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Gama_at al-Islamiyya (Egypt) 
Rifa_i Ahmad Taha, of the Gama_at al-Islamiyya (Egypt) 
Mir Hamza, Jami_at al-_ulema_-i Pakistan (Pakistan) 
Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Haraka al-Jihadiyya (Bangladesh) 
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 )1(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 21 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
  رحمه الله -تحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد للشيخ عبدالله عزام إ :ELTIT
 ... فكتبه وخطبه ومحاضراته مليئة بذكر فضائل القتال في سبيل الله التي يجنيها المجاهد في الدنيا والآخرة
 
 )2(
 4002 yluJ :ETAD 04 :EGAP 12 :EUSSI
 ذروة سنام الإسلام :ELTIT
 ن الدنيا وما فيهاوأن رباط يوم خير م
 
 )3(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 2 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 نداء النفير من الشيخ أسامة بن لادن :ELTIT
 بقلم / أبي هاجر عبد العزيز المقرن
 نداء النفير من الشيخ أسامة بن لادن
 
 )4(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 24 :EGAP 7 :EUSSI
 وختاما   :ELTIT
رصة ، ووجد المرء هدفا ًأو فرصة للنيل من الصليبيين فإنه يستعين بالله ، ولا يتردد ، وفي ثنايا حتى إذا ما سنحت الف
 الملحق تجد ما يجعلك قادرا ًعلى الإثخان في العدو
 
 
 )5(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 2 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ك تب عليكم القتال وهو كره لكم وعسى أن ) علينا أمًرا عًيًما ، وهو الجهاد في سبيل الله ، وقال سبحانه: فقد أوجب الله
 (كرهوا شيئًا وهو خيٌر لكم وعسى أن تحبوا شيئًا وهو شرٌّ لكم والله يعلم وأنتم لا تعلمون
ن الكافرين ، وقتال المرتدين ، ونصرة وقد أوجب الله الجهاد لأسباب جميعها متوفر في عصرنا هذا ، من دفع عدوا
المستضعفين ، وفكاك الأسرى والمسجونين ، فضلا ًعن جهاد الطلب بقتال الكفار حتى ي عطوا الجزية عن يٍد وهم 
صاغرون ، وكل من هذه إما فروض أعياٍن ، وإما فروض كفايٍة لكْن لم يق م بها من تحصل به  الكفاية  من المسلمين فهي 
 ٍن إلى حين  حصول الكفاية .فروض  أعيا
 
 )6(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن أعًم الأماكن الَّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليببيُّ المحتلُّ الَّذي يسرق خيراتها ، 
م سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ، كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلة  المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، ويرس
 وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.
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 )7(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 01 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 بيانات .. ومتابعات .. :ELTIT
  بجاد العتيبي إلى من يراه من المسلمين من سلطان بن
 ... فجريمتي أني أعمل بهذه الفريضة الغائبة وهي الجهاد في سبيل الله ...
 
 )8(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 23 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الأخيرة :ELTIT
المقصود من إصدار هذه لن نطلب منك أن تنتًر عددنا القادم ، بل نود أن تكون مشغولاً بالجهاد الواجب ، فإنه هو 
 المجلة
 
 )9(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 3 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية ...  :ELTIT
 على الدرب سائرون
 والجهاد ماض إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليما كثيرا
 
 )01(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 8 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 قال العلماء :ELTIT
 قال الشيخ: أبوعمر محمد بن عبدالله السيف حفظه الله
بل عليه أن ينًر إلى الأخطار المحيطة بالأمة. والحرب الأمريكية الًالمة على المسلمين في العراق وفي فلسطين وفي 
 أفغانستان
 
 )11(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 92 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية بيانات وفتاوى ... :ELTIT
 وفي هذا الواقع الأليم الذي تعيشه الأمة ، تكالبت قوى الكفر العالمي على المسلمين
 
 )21(
 4002 yraunaJ :ETAD 9 :EGAP 01 :EUSSI
 مؤتمر الحوار الوطني " تفرق في الدين ، و اجتماع على الباطل "مع الحدث:  :ELTIT
فيه جراح الأمة ، بسبب خيانات هؤلاء الحكام العملاء الذين كانوا وما زالوا في عمل دؤوب لإرضاء في وقت تزداد 
 الغرب الكافر
 
 )31(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 9 :EGAP 01 :EUSSI
 مقاِصُد الِجهاد: (دفُع الصَّ ائل) :ELTIT
 إقامة  الخ  لافة  في الأرض وتحكيم شرع  الله في أرض  الله فهو وسيلة  دفع  الع  دوان  ، ووسيلة  الدَّعوة  إلى الله ، ووسيلة  
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 )41(
 4002 yraunaJ :ETAD 34 :EGAP 81 :EUSSI
 أهل الجهادمحبة الله يا  :ELTIT
 لماذا لم تردعوهم عن الًلم والإجرام من قتل الموحدين ومطاردتهم
 
 )51(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 14 :EGAP 6 :EUSSI
 النعم وأكبر الشرف أجل :ELTIT
الفرقة الناجية والطائفة  -إن شاء الله  -وإنها لسعادة لنا وأيُّ سعادٍة أن نكون بإذن الله من ضمن هؤلاء الغرباء الذين هم 
 المنصورة التي لا يضرها من خالفها ولا من خذلها إلى قيام الساعة ..
 
 )61(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 73 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 متعب المحيّاني ... غربة الشهداء :ELTIT
لقد رأيته عندما خلا بنفسه يديم الوجوم والتحسر على واقع الأمة ، ويقول: ((نحن الغرباء القلائل الذين يقع علينا عبء 
 إعادة الأمة إلى دين الله
 
 )71(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 42 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 91لقاء مع أحد المطلوبين الـ  :ELTIT
 مجاهد / أبو هاجر عبد العزيز بن عيسى المقرن حفظه اللهال
واليوم بحمد الله نحن والإخوة في الجبهة التي كنا نسعى لها ولتطهيرها وتحريرها من رجس الحكام الخونة وقبلهم من 
 رجس الصليبيين من الأمريكان وحلفائهم ، نسأل الله لنا وللإخوة النصر والتمكين.
 
 )81(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
فإن حربنا مع أعداء الله مستمرة بفضل الله في كل مكان ، وضربات المجاهدين في أنحاء الأرض ترعب أعداء الله 
وترهبهم ، وجهادنا في جزيرة العرب مستمر بإذن الله قائم على سوقه ، يعجب المؤمنين ويغيظ الكفار ، ولن نترك 
 ريكان يحتلون بلاد الحرمين بأمن وسلام ، ولن نقف عن جهادنا حتى نحرر كل شبر من بلاد المسلمين.الأم
 
 )91(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 23 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الأخيرة :ELTIT
ن أأخي المجاهد .. حتى متى نتكلم ولا نعمل؟! وإلى متى نسمع صرخات الاستغاثة ونحن ننًر؟! وإلى أي حدٍّ ننتًر 
تصل الحرب على الإسلام حتى نتحرك من سباتنا؟! يا أيها الذين آمنوا: لم تقولون ما لا تفعلون؟! كبر مقتًا عند الله أن 
 تقولوا ما لا تفعلون .. 
 
 )02(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 62 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
 91لقاء مع أحد المطلوبين الـ  :ELTIT
 عيسى المقرن حفظه اللهالمجاهد / أبو هاجر عبد العزيز بن 
إلى متى ونحن ننًر ؟ إلى متى ونحن تستباح حرماتنا وتنتهك أعراضنا ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننًر إلى مشايخنا وهم يزج 
بهم في السجون ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننًر إلى قادتنا وكوادرنا وهم يقتلون ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننًر إلى الصليبي واليهودي 
ى متى ي سب الله تعالى ونسكت ؟ إلى متى نرضى بالطائرات الأمريكية تحلق من فوق يكرم ويعزز في أرضنا ؟ إل
 رؤوسنا لتهدم بيوت إخواننا في العراق وأفغانستان ؟
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 )12(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 81 :EGAP 31 :EUSSI
 فبايعهم على الموت  :ELTIT
 بقلم الشيخ: فارس بن أحمد آل شويل الزهراني
 م  سلٍم يقرأ  هذا الكلام فأقول: وإنني أسأل كلَّ 
 أين نحن من الشيخ عمر عبد الرحمن في سجون أمريكا؟
 وأين نحن من المجاهد رمزي يوسف والمجاهد أبي هاجر العراقي في سجون أمريكا؟
 وأين نحن من أسرانا في غوانتانامو؟ وأين نحن من علماء المسلمين المأسورين في سجون الطواغيت والمرتدين؟
 ن نحن من بقية المستضعفين من المسلمين الذين يقبعون خلف الأسوار؟وأي
 !!من رسول الله  -عثمان بن عفان  -يالله بيعة ٌعلى الموت وعلى عدم الفرار من أجل رجل واحد 
 وقتلانا اليوم وأسرانا بالمئات والآلاف ولا تتحرك فينا شعرة ٌولا نبايع لله بيعة صادقة نكفر بها خطايانا!!
 ين الذين صدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه ؟ أين شباب الإسلام؟أ
 أين الذين يثأرون لدينهم ولعرضهم ولإخوانهم ولأمتهم؟
 وأ خذت ديارنا ونحن سادرون غافلون مشغولون!! ونبينا  ح  ورب ديننا وس بَّ رب نا 
 وأ خذت أموالنا ونحن لاهون!! وق تل أبطالنا وأخيارنا ونحن ساكتون!!
 تى يا أمة الإسلام؟ إلى متى؟ إلى متى؟!!.فإلى م
 
 )22(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 2 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية ...  :ELTIT
 على الدرب سائرون
 ...جاءت كلمة شيخنا إمام المجاهدين أسامة بن لادن نصره الله في هذه المرحلة 
 
 )32(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 لافتتاحيةا :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
 والجهاد ماٍض إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليًما كثيًرا 
 
 )42(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
 كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلة  المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.
 
 
 )52(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 33 :EGAP 7 :EUSSI
 سيرة شهيد: تركي الدندني ... عزيمة وشجاعة :ELTIT
 بعض الشباب العائدين من أرض أفغانستان قبضت سلطات النًام الطاغوتي المرتد على 
 )62(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 9 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 معركة السويدي الوقائع كما هي ..!! :ELTIT
 يرويها أحد المجاهدين المشاركين في المعركة حفظه الله
 معركة السويدي ! نعم ، معركة وإن رغمت أنوف الذين لا يفقهون ..
 والتقى الجمعان: فئة تقاتل في سبيل الله ، وأخرى تقاتل في سبيل الطاغوت ... تقابل فيها الصفان ،
 
 
 
  812
 )72(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 6 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 وحرض المؤمنين :ELTIT
 قوموا إلى جنة عرضها السماوات والأرض
 .أسعد  ج  دَّ المجاهدين فما زال في صعود ، وأخزى أنجاس الجزيرة وأذلهم من آل يهود
 
 )82(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 51 :EGAP 6 :EUSSI
 لقاء مع الأستاذ: " لويس عطية الله " حفظه الله :ELTIT
 بمحاولة تشويه صورة المجاهدين لجأ الطواغيت من آل سلول إلى تجارب إخوانهم المرتدين في الجزائر ومصر ،
 
 )92(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 22 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 نّا مستضعفين في الأرضك ُ :ELTIT
أولئك الذين يكفرون بطواغيت الأرض كلها من الحكومات العربية والعجمية ، ومن الهيئات الطاغوتية الأممية والعربية 
 والإقليمية .. الذين يتبرؤون من المذاهب الشركية ومسالك الديمقراطية ، ووثنية الوطنية..
 
 )03(
 4002 yluJ :ETAD 62 :EGAP 12 :EUSSI
 عبد العزيز المقرن رضي الله عنه :ELTIT
طاردك عبيد عبيد الصليبيين, جنود إبليس وعسكر الشياطين, خدم الطواغيت وأحذية المرتدين, ولم تطب خواطرهم أن 
يروا من يؤذي الصليبيين ... طاردك عبيد العبيد بمساندة فعلية من الصليبيين الذين شاركوا عبيدهم في تلك المطاردات 
 أنت ومن معك ... وما كنتم والله إلا ّرجالا ًصدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه -أبا هاجر  -... رحمك الله 
 
 )13(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 03 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية :ELTIT
ن نتردد في دفع الصائل من جنودهم ، وسنريهم فإننا لن نكون لقمة ًسائغة ًللطواغيت وجنودهم ، بل سندافع عن أنفسنا ول
 م  نَّا ما يكرهون والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون 
 
 )23(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 41 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 مواجهات رياض الخبراء: صور من البطولة والصمود :ELTIT
 هم طلقة ًواحدة فما أخذنا مواقعنا إلا وهربوا جميعا ًدون أن نطلق علي
 
 )33(
 4002 hcraM :ETAD 31 :EGAP 71 :EUSSI
 خالد السبيت ... :ELTIT
 أتواصوا به .. بل هم قوٌم طاغون
 انهالت الطلقات من القناصة الجبناء المستترين الذين يقاتلون من وراء جدر 
 
 )43(
 4002 enuJ :ETAD 72 :EGAP 02 :EUSSI
 الوعيدين أشّد ؟! أي   أيها العلماء: :ELTIT
 عن الولوغ في وحل الطواغيت وأذنابهم من المرتزقة والمتفيهقين 
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 )53(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 5-4 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 إنَّما هُم الُمشِرُكوَن ، وإنَّما دُم أحِدِهم دُم كلٍب ! :ELTIT
 (إنَّ شرَّ الدَّوابِّ عند الله الّذين كفروا فهم لا يؤمنون)وقد قال الله تعالى: إنَّما هم  الم شر ك ون  ، وإنَّما دم  أحد  ه م دم  كلٍب ! ... 
... إنَّ الم  كتفي بما سب ق  يخرج  بأنَّ كفر هذا الكافر ، وخروجه عن دين الله ، اقتضى (أولئك كالأنعام بل هم أضلُّ )، وقال 
 به من عداوة  الك  فَّار  ، الَّذي كفر بالطَّاغوت  ومن عبد  الطَّاغوت  ، هدر دم  ه  ... إنَّ الموحِّ د الَّذي يمتلئ صدر  ه  بما أمره الله
 اللهوالَّذي والى في الله وعادى فيه ، إنَّ هذا الموحِّ د  حقًّا ل ي كفيه  ما س  ب ق  ، ليتحرَّ ق شوقًا إلى دم الكافر ، إلى نحر عدوِّ 
 وتقطيعه ...
 أخي المجاهد .. ألا تريد الجنَّة؟!
 ريد أن تأمن النار بإذن الله؟!ألا ت
 اقتل المشرك .. اقتل من دمه دم كلٍب .. اقتل هذا الَّذي أمرك الله العًيم بقتله
 
 )63(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليببيُّ المحتلُّ الَّذي يسرق خيراتها ، ومن أعًم الأماكن الَّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد 
ويرسم سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ، كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلة  المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، 
 وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.
 )73(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 53 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 شهيد الحرم: متعب المحيّاني ... غربة الشهداء :ELTIT
 غير أن الحملة الصليبية العاشرة بدأت جحافلها تتجه نحو مقبرة الأقوياء ، نحو أفغانستان 
 
 )83(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 11 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 بيانات .. ومتابعات .. :ELTIT
 ن بن بجاد العتيبي إلى من يراه من المسلمينمن سلطا
هاهم دخلوا  هاهو الجهاد اليوم جاء في بلدكم ..هاهم الأمريكان بين أظهركم ..هاهم يضعون الكنائس في أرض محمد 
 أرضكم بقواتهم وأسلحتهم 
 
 )93(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 5 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 ما دُم أحِدِهم دُم كلٍب !إنَّما هُم الُمشِرُكوَن ، وإنَّ  :ELTIT
 ألم تر هذا .. الذي .. يسب دينك ... ويحتل أرض المسلمين .. ويستعمر مكة والمدينة 
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 )1(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية ... على الدرب سائرون :ELTIT
المجاهدين ، والصلاة والسلام على أشرف المرسلين نبيّنا محمد الحمد لله رب العالمين ، ولي الصالحين ، وناصر عباده 
 وعلى آله وصحابته أجمعين ، أما بعد: 
فقد دخلت العشر الأواخر التي كان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يجتهد فيها ما لا يجتهد في غيرها ويحيي ليله ويوقظ 
 من أسهم فيه بتجارٍة تنجي من عذاٍب أليم.أهله ، وهي موسم من أعًم مواسم الطاعات ، وسوق رابٌح ل
وقد أغارت ثلّة مباركة ٌمن شباب الإسلام المبارك بين يدي هذه العشر على مجّمع من مستوطنات الصليبيين في جزيرة 
 هم﴾.ون لالعرب ، وتقّربوا إلى الله بعملية جهاديٍَّة في أعدائ ه  ، تعجب المؤمنين وتغيظ  الكفّار وأولياءهم ﴿وفيك  م سمَّ اع  
والجهاد ماٍض إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليًما كثيًرا ، ومن أعًم 
 أزمنة الجهاد في الإسلام شهر رمضان الّذي كان فيه عدٌد من المعارك ، كانت أولاها غزوة  بدٍر الكبرى.
ن كما أمرهم الله ، ولا يستهدفون المسلمين ولا يقصدون النيل منهم ، كيف ولم والمجاهدون ي قاتلون أعداء الله في كل مكا
 يخرجوا إلا دفاًعا عن حرمات المسلمين وذبًّا عن أعراضهم وامتثالا ًلأمر الله بالجهاد في سبيله.
إلينا ولا يأتون البأس إلاّ ومن علم أّن هذا مقصد الجهاد وهدفه الأسمى لم يكن وارًدا عنده دعوات المعّوقين والقائلين هلّم 
قليلا ً، وليس للمجاهدين ولا لغير المجاهدين أن يجعلوا ثوابت  الدين وقواعده ماّدة ًي تحاور فيها وي تفاوض ﴿وما كان 
لم ؤمٍن ولا م  ؤمنٍة إذا قضى الله ورسول ه  أمًرا أن يكون لهم  الخيرة  من أمر ه م﴾ فمن رضخ لحكم الشريعة ونزل عندها 
م وجهه لله ، وحّكم شرعه ورفع القوانين الوضعيَّة ، وتبّرأ من أعداء الله ولم يتولَّهم فهو أخونا ونحن معه على وأسل
الطريق ففيم التفاوض؟ ومن رفض شرع الله وشاء أن يدين بدين أمريكا ، أو أراد أن ي ؤمن ببعٍض ويكفر ببعٍض فليس 
لمسلمين ، ويقتل أبناءهم ويستحيي نساءهم فحوارنا معه بالقتال في سبيل الله بيننا وبينه حواٌر ، ومن أراد أن يحتّل بلاد ا
حتّى يكّف الله بأسه ويكسر شوكته ﴿فقاتل في سبيل الله لا تكلَّف  إلاّ نفسك وحّرض الم ؤمنين عسى الله أن يكّف بأس الذين 
 كفروا والله أشدُّ بأًسا وأشدُّ تنكيلاً﴾
ف الأمريكان في كّل مكان فهذه هي لغة  الحوار الّتي يفهم  ها العدّو ، ويستجيب للمطالب إذا ونحن ندعو الأمَّ ة إلى استهدا
 سمعها.
والمجاهدون بحول الله وقّوته ماضون على هذا الطريق  ، ثابتون على هذا الدرب  ، لن تأخذهم في الله لومة  لائٍم ، ولن 
 يثنيهم عن الجهاد المخذلون والمعوقون.
ينصر المجاهدين في كل مكان ، وأن يعلي راية الدين ، وصلى الله وسلم على نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحابته نسأل الله أن 
 أجمعين.
 
 )2(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله :ELTIT
 أيها المجاهدون في سبيل الله .... 
 إليكم يا من ترابطون على ذرا الهندكوش ، وتورا بورا .....وجنين .....وغزة ..... وقروزني ....وبلاد الحرمين
 إليكم يا من رضيتم السماء نزلا ًلنفوسكم العالية ....وأبيتم السماوة .....
 إليكم يا مصابيح العزة وشموس البطولة ....
 إليكم يا أهل الرباط ...أقول ...
 أبشروا والذي نفسي بيده الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....
(إن الله اشترى من المؤمنين أنفسهم وأموالهم بأن لهم الجنة يقاتلون في سبيل الله في قتلون وي قتلون وعدا ًعليه حقا ًفي 
 التوراة والإنجيل والقرآن ومن أوفى بعهده من الله فاستبشروا ببيعكم الذي بايعتم به .... )
 نعم استبشروا ...ولا تقولوا مات فلان وفلان ...
  لا تقولوا قد فقدنا الشهيدا
 مذ طواه الثرى وحيدا ًفريدا
  أنا ما مت فالملائك حولي
 عند ربي ب عثت خلقا ًجديدا 
 فاصنعوا اليوم من شموخي نشيدا
 أيها الأسود .... 
 قاتلوا أئمة الكفر إنهم لا أيمان لهم لعلهم ينتهون
 صبرا ًمعاشر المؤمنين ....قاتلوا على بصيرة من ربكم ، وثبات من دينكم ...وكأني بكم قد لقيتم سدنة الصليب
 وأحفاد القردة والخنازير .... 
 باعوا الآخرة بالدنيا ...واشتروا الضلالة بالهدى.
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 ..فما أصبرهم على النار ....
 الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....
 عنكم إرجاف المبطلين .... وتخذيل العلمانيين ...وخزعبلات الأذناب المنافقين دعوا
عباد الله .. أعملوا السيف في رقاب أعداء الله ، وخّذلوا دون أمتكم واستنهضوا الهمم بعًيم فعالكم وبدمائكم الطاهرة 
 المنهمرة في ساح الجهاد ...
 
 )3(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 33 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 قال أهل الثغور  :ELTIT
عددا ًوقوة ً يكونون ما أكثر مكان ، فهم كل في الكفر ضد الجهاد شعوٌر وإيماٌن بضرورة عندهم الحرمين أبناء كان لئن
 ويعلمون -أجمعين المسلمين المشرفة ، قبلة الكعبة-مقدساتهم  أعًم عن للدفاع عليها ولدوا التي أرضهم وحماسة ًعلى
 تحرير وهي المسلمين ، ألا كل الكبرى ، قضية قضيتهم في ويؤازرونهم أجمع ، سينصرونهم العالم في المسلمين أن
 العالم في مسلم واجب  كل هو هذا مقدساتهم ، وأن
 
 )4(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 إتحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد :ELTIT
 -رحمه الله  -للشيخ عبدالله عزام 
الله عزام الإمام الشهيد عبد كانولا فلتة أن يأتي هذا الكتاب (إتحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد) بهذا العنوان ، فقد ليس صدفة 
 . موفقا ًباختيار العناوين للمواضيع والكتب التي ألفها ، فكل موضوع أو كتاب ألفه وضع له عنوان صادقا ًلمحتواه
ريء بفضائل الجهاد ، فقد حوى على أحاديث تستجيش القلوب وتلهب فهذا الكتاب الذي نستعرضه حقا ًإنه يتحف القا
 . العواطف ، حتى إذا انتهيت من هذا الكتاب تمنيت أن لو كنت في ساح الوغى تقاتل في سبيل الله فتفوز فوزا ًعًيماً 
ر فضائل ليئة بذكوفضائل الجهاد التي تحدث عنها الشيخ لم تكن مقصورة على هذا الكتاب ، فكتبه وخطبه ومحاضراته م
 القتال في سبيل الله التي يجنيها المجاهد في الدنيا والآخر
 
 )5( 
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 33 :EGAP 6 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية كتب عليكم القتال :ELTIT
سبيل  يهل أوحشتكم قلة السالكين ، أو بطأ بكم طول الطريق ؟ فتذكروا قوله: (والذي نفس محمد بيده لوددت أن أغزو ف
 الله فأقتل ثم أغزو فأقتل ثم أغزو فأقتل) أيها المجاهدون في سبيل الله ...
 
 )6(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 2 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية  :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ه: (ك تب عليكم القتال وهو كره لكم وعسى أن فقد أوجب الله علينا أمًرا عًيًما ، وهو الجهاد في سبيل الله ، وقال سبحان
 كرهوا شيئًا وهو خيٌر لكم وعسى أن تحبوا شيئًا وهو شرٌّ لكم والله يعلم وأنتم لا تعلمون).
وقد أوجب الله الجهاد لأسباب جميعها متوفر في عصرنا هذا ، من دفع عدوان الكافرين ، وقتال المرتدين ، ونصرة 
ى والمسجونين ، فضلا ًعن جهاد الطلب بقتال الكفار حتى ي عطوا الجزية عن يٍد وهم المستضعفين ، وفكاك الأسر
 صاغرون
 
 )7(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 53 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
 بيان من المجاهدين في جزيرة العرب حول تصريحات وزارة الداخلية الأخيرة :ELTIT
ويجمعون ما استطاعوا من قوة ، إضافة إلى الخبرات القتالية التي المجاهدون في جزيرة العرب يعدون بفضل الله العدة ، 
اكتسبوها في شتى ميادين الجهاد ، ولم يعدوا هذه العدة ، ولا حملوا راية الجهاد إلا لتكون كلمة الله هي العليا ، وحتى لا 
 ، وخاصة في بلاد الحرمين التي تكون فتنة ويكون الدين لله ، وقد أخذوا على أنفسهم عهدا بمحاربة أمريكا في كل مكان
 لمتفرقةااتخذها الصليبيون قاعدة لانطلاق الحملة الصليبية وقيادتها وإدارتها ، وغزيت أفغانستان والعراق من قواعدها 
 
  222
 )8(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 53 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 خيرةبيان من المجاهدين في جزيرة العرب حول تصريحات وزارة الداخلية الأ :ELTIT
غرباء بين الأهل  في زمن كثر فيه المخذلون ، واشرأب فيه النفاق والمنافقون ، وقّل النّاصحون ، أصبح المجاهدون
 والأحباب ، وبين الأقارب والأصحاب ، فلا يجدون على الخير أعوانا ًإلا ما ندر ، ولا يجدون على الطريق أنصاراً 
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 7 RETPAHC
 )1(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 1 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 بسم الله :ELTIT
اب الكت :) لتكون عونا للمجاهد ، منيرة له الطريق ، وهادية له إلى السبيل ، معينها الذي لا ينضبصوت الجهاد(جاءت 
 نصوص الوحيين وسيرة الصحابة والتابعين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين .. :والسنة ، ومشربها الذي لا يتكدر
 
 )2(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 73 :EGAP 6 :EUSSI
 وصايا للمجاهدين: لا تتعلقوا بالنتائج  :ELTIT
وإن من سمات الواجبات الشرعية أن العبد يؤديها وهو مسلم لله ، فلا يعرضها على العقل ولا خبرات وتجارب الآخرين 
 بل يقوم بها كما أمر الله تعالى ويحتسب الأجر من عنده سبحانه
 
 )3(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 43 :EGAP 5 :EUSSI
 وصايا للمجاهدين: احذروا من هؤلاء :ELTIT
ويذكرنا سعي هؤلاء بما قام به النفر النشاز من الفئة العقلانية (محمد عبده وجمال الدين الأفغاني وممن هو على 
الحرب ، بسفسطاتهم العقلية ،  شاكلتهم) تجاه الاستعمار البريطاني لمصر حيث خدروا الأمة عن القتال ولبس لأمة
 وأطروحاتهم الانبطاحية التعايشية ، ونسفهم لأصول الدين من الولاء والبراء والجهاد في سبيل الله
 
 )4(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 82 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
  إلى الأمة الإسلامية بيان من المجاهدين :ELTIT
على عباده ، وليس فكرا أو منهجا أو رأيا بشريا يؤخذ على سبيل التجربة الجهاد في سبيل الله تعالى فريضة فرضها الله 
 والاختبار ، فلا خيرة للمسلم في قبوله أو رده.
و لا ينبغي أن يقوم من خلال النًر العقلي في المصالح والمفاسد بل لابد من اعتبار المصالح والمفاسد على ما يقتضيه 
 بدي فيهالشرع . كمالا يصح إغفال الجانب التع
 
 )5(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 03 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 إلى الأمة الإسلامية بيان من المجاهدين :ELTIT
فإن كفر هؤلاء الطواغيت هو ما دلت عليه أصول أهل السنة والجماعة في تكفير المرتدين من الحاكمين بغير ما أنزل 
للحلال ، والمناصرين للكفار على المسلمين ، المرتكبين الكفر الله ، و المبدلين لشرعه ، والمحللين للحرام المحرمين 
 البواح الذي عندنا فيه من الله برهان
 
 )6(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
 لاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلة  المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط ا
 
 )7(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 52 :EGAP 5 :EUSSI
 لقاء مع الشيخ أبي عبدالرحمن الأثري  :ELTIT
بلك نزل من قالتحاكم إلى غير شرع الله عز وجل قال الله تعالى (ألم تر إلى الذين يزعمون أنهم آمنوا بما أنزل إليك وما أ
يريدون أن يتحاكموا إلى الطاغوت وقد أمروا أن يكفروا به ويريد الشيطان أن يضلهم ضلالا بعيدا) مثال ذلك من واقعنا 
 التحاكم إلى نًام العمل والعمال ، والتحاكم إلى الغرفة التجارية وغيرها من النًم التي تخالف شرع الله .
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 )8(
 3002 rebmeceD :ETAD 22 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 ُكنّا مستضعفين في الأرض :ELTIT
أولئك الذين يكفرون بطواغيت الأرض كلها من الحكومات العربية والعجمية ، ومن الهيئات الطاغوتية الأممية والعربية 
 والإقليمية .. الذين يتبرؤون من المذاهب الشركية ومسالك الديمقراطية ، ووثنية الوطنية..
 
 )9(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 22 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
 إضاءة على طريق الجهاد :ELTIT
 قال الشيخ عبد القادر عبد العزيز حفًه الله:
" وكون جهاد هؤلاء الطواغيت فرض عين، هو من العلم الواجب إشاعته في عموم المسلمين، ليعلم كل مسلم أنه مأمور 
 شخصيا من ربه سبحانه بقتال هؤلاء.
 
 )01(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 71 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
  شموخ في زمن الهوان :يوسف العييري  :ELTIT
إننا يجب أن نوضح للناس أن الجهاد ما هو إلا تحقيق للتوحيد وتطبيق لمقتضيات شهادة أن لا إله إلا الله وأن محمدا 
 رسول الله ونربط الناس بهذا الأمر ليعلموا أهمية الجهاد
 
 )11(
 3002 rebmevoN :ETAD 5 :EGAP 5 :EUSSI
 بيان حول التراجعات الأخيرة :ELTIT
وإن هذه العبادة ماضية إلى يوم القيامة ، قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: " لن يبرح هذا الدين قائما يقاتل عليه عصابة من 
 المسلمين حتى تقوم الساعة"
 
 )21(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 يةالافتتاح :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
يا أيها الذين آمنوا من يرتد منكم عن دينه فسوف يأتي الله بقوم ( :فقد أثنى الله على المجاهدين في وعيده للمرتدين فقال
ح الله القوم فامتد )يحبهم ويحبونه أذلة على المؤمنين أعزة على الكافرين يجاهدون في سبيل الله ولا يخافون لومة لائم
الذين يأتي بهم مع الجهاد والولاء والبراء بأنهم لا يخافون لومة لائم ، بعد أن عرفوا صحة الطريق وسلكوها على هدى 
 من الله
 )31(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
 العميلة  المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار. كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة
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 )41(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 21 :EGAP 2 :EUSSI
  من عهود الطواغيت والمرتديالموحدين  براءة :ELTIT
محاربة باعتبار الاعتداء على المسلمين ومباشرته ومباشرة  ثم بين أن أمريكا دولة محاربة بهذا الاعتبار فضلا عن أنها 
الإعانة على المسلمين في مشارق الأرض ومغاربها ؛ مما يوجب نقض عهدها لوكان لها عهد كيف وعهدها غير لازم 
 في الأصل حيث عقده من ليس له الحق في ذلك من الطواغيت المرتدين
 
 )51(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن أعًم الأماكن الَّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليببيُّ المحتلُّ الَّذي يسرق خيراتها ، 
 ويرسم سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ، 
 
 )61(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 3 :EGAP 4 :EUSSI
 على الدرب سائرون :ELTIT
وقد أغارت ثلة مباركة من شباب الإسلام المبارك بين يدي هذه العشر على مجمع من مستوطنات الصليبيين في جزيرة 
اتلون يقوالمجاهدون ... العرب ، وتقربوا إلى الله بعملية جهادية في أعدائه ، تعجب المؤمنين وتغيظ الكفار وأولياءهم 
 أعداء الله في كل مكان كما أمرهم الله ، ولا يستهدفون المسلمين ولا يقصدون النيل منهم
 
 )71(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 الافتتاحية :ELTIT
 يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
 دين أخرى ويتركون هذا الميدان العًيمومن العجيب أن كثيرا من شباب الجهاد يتوجهون إلى ميا
 
 )81(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 03 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
 إلى الأمة الإسلامية بيان من المجاهدين :ELTIT
بل سندافع عن أنفسنا ولن نتردد في دفع الصائل من جنودهم ، وسنريهم م  نَّا ما يكرهون والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر 
 الناس لا يعلمون 
 
 )91(
 3002 rebotcO :ETAD 82 :EGAP 3 :EUSSI
  إلى الأمة الإسلامية بيان من المجاهدين :ELTIT
ومن ثم فإننا قد سلكنا هذا الطريق بناء على هذه الرؤية ، وعرفنا الحق فلزمناه ونسأل الله الثبات عليه . والجهاد في سبيل 
يه ما يقاتل علة باستمراره قال صلى الله عليه وسلم " لا يزال هذا الدين قائالله واجب شرعي ، وقدر كوني ، وعدت الأم
" فنحن نرجو أن نكون من هذه الطائفة المنصورة التي تقوم بأمر الله والجهاد في سبيله وقتال عصابة من المسلمين
 ".لا يضرهم من خالفهم ولا من خذلهمأعداءه" 
 
 )02(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 3 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 دراسة لواقع دعاة الصحوة: سنوات خّداعة :ELTIT
هؤلاء العلماء كانوا إنسان العين بالنسبة لجماهير الشباب ، وكانوا من المراجع التي يعتمد عليها الناس في تنزيل 
يقدموهم ونصوص الوحيين على واقع بئيس سكت فيه الكثيرون ، وكان بعض هؤلاء العلماء يرسلون الشباب إلى الثغور 
للساحات إما بأشرطتهم وكتبهم ومضامين أفكارهم القائمة على نبذ الحكم بغير ما أنزل الله وجهاد الطغاة ، وإما بالدعم 
 المادي المتحقق على الأرض فعلا
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 )12(
 4002 yluJ :ETAD 23 :EGAP 12 :EUSSI
 وصايا لأهل الجهاد :ELTIT
 أهل الجهادالعفو العفو يا 
ا العبادة التي تقومون بها ترجون عفو الله ومغفرة الذنوب فهي جهادكم في سبيل الله الذي جاءت النصوص أم
يا أيها الذين آمنوا هل أدلكم المتًاهرة من الكتاب والسنة على عفو الله ومغفرته ورفعة درجات من قام به قال تعالى: 
ن ذلكم خير لكم إوتجاهدون في سبيل الله بأموالكم وأنفسكم له تؤمنون بالله ورسو على تجارة تنجيكم من عذاب أليم 
 (.كنتم تعلمون
 
 
 )22(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 61 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
 دمعة حزن على فراق شهيد :ELTIT
 شموخ في زمن الهوان :يوسف العييري
مدبر  ومال ثم هي تأتيتك لتلقاها مقبلا غيررحمك الله يا يوسف العييري ، طلبت الشهادة في أفغانستان وطلبتها في الص
 على أرض الجزيرة العربية..
 
 
 )32(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 92 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
  تركي الدندني شهيد؟ :هل يقال :ELTIT
 وأسأل الله أن يرزقني الشهادة في
 
 )42(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 92 :EGAP 1 :EUSSI
  دندني شهيد؟تركي ال :هل يقال :ELTIT
 قتل الشهيد تركي الدندني في الجوف ، على أيدي جنود الطواغيت ، رحمه الله وغفر له وتقبله في الشهداء 
 
 )52(
 3002 rebmetpeS :ETAD 31 :EGAP 8 :EUSSI
 قال العلماء :ELTIT
 أبوعمر محمد بن عبدالله السيف :قال الشيخ
الأمة . والحرب الأمريكية الًالمة على المسلمين في العراق وفي فلسطين وفي بل عليه أن ينًر إلى الأخطار المحيطة ب
أفغانستان ، وما يتلو حرب العراق من تغيير في خارطة المنطقة وتغييرات في المجتمع والتعليم ، وفرض الديمقراطية 
منها  ي الكويت التي ينطلقونالكافرة على المنطقة .والذي يقول على سبيل المثال بحرمة قتل العسكريين الأمريكان ف
 لضرب العراق
 
